General MacArthur and Terowie South Australia

In February 1942, as Japanese forces tightened their grip on the Philippines, MacArthur was ordered by President Roosevelt to relocate to Australia. On the night of 12 March 1942, MacArthur and a select group that included his wife Jean and son Arthur, as well as Sutherland, Akin, Casey, Marshall, Charles A. Willoughby, LeGrande A. Diller, and Harold H. George, left Corregidor in four PT boats. MacArthur, his family and Sutherland traveled aboard PT 41, commanded by Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley. The others followed aboard PT 34, PT 35 and PT 32. MacArthur and his party reached Del Monte Airfield on Mindanao, where U.S. Navy B-17s picked up.

On 17 March, he reached Batchelor Airfield, from which he flew to Alice Springs, and then took the Ghan Railway to Adelaide. MacArthur and his family were exhausted by flying and MacArthur ordered a special train to take him South to Melbourne. Little did he know that the only railway was a slow narrow gauge one across the Australian outback. They travelled the 1,028 miles of narrow gauge track to Adelaide in South Australia, in a three car wooden train pulled by a steam locomotive. The journey took 70 hours.

The train arrived at Terowie Railway Station about 220 kms north of Adelaide at 2 pm on 20 March 1942. Much to MacArthur’s surprise his “secret” arrival in Terowie was not so secret. A huge cheer went up from the locals who had gathered when he left the train. General MacArthur responded by striding towards an opening between a line of railway carriages and saluted the people of Terowie on the other side of the carriages and some passengers on a nearby train.

MacArthur greeted at Terowie by Major Claude Rogers, C.O. Terowie Staging Camp

It was here that MacArthur made his first statement to the Australian Press. It was here that his most famous statement was made “I came out of Bataan and I shall return”.

He subsequently repeated the line “I shall return” in a number of other speeches, in a number of other places. The event is commemmorated by a plaque on the now disused railway platform.

Upon his arrival in Adelaide, MacArthur abbreviated this to the now-famous, “I came through and I shall return” that made headlines. Washington asked MacArthur to amend his promise to “We shall return”. He ignored the request.

One can well wonder what MacArthur made of Terowie, a lonely outpost in the Australian outback.

Berlin – Then and Now – Anhalter railway Station

Anhalter Bahnhof 1910

Anhalter Bahnhof 1910

Anhalter Bahnhof 1951

Anhalter Bahnhof 1962

Anhalter Bahnhof 2010

The Anhalter Bahnhof building in Berlin was built in 1880 by Kaiser Wilhelm I and Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. The new facade was 101 m across and embellished with zinc sculptures titled Day and Night by Ludwig Brunow (1843-1913), positioned on either side of the clock above the main entrance. Emil Hundrieser (1846-1911) was responsible for a sculpture on the very top of the facade called The International Traffic. Inside the building was a lavish and spacious booking hall with separate waiting rooms and facilities for no fewer than four classes of ticket holders. A separate entrance and reception area were provided for visiting royalty, and these saw frequent use. Behind all this, the huge iron and glass train-shed roof by writer and engineer Heinrich Seidel (1842-1906) measured 171 m long by 62 m wide (covering 10,600 m², under which 40,000 people could stand), and rose to 34 m in height along its centre line.

During World War II the Anhalter Bahnhof was one of three stations used to deport some 55,000 Berlin Jews between 1941 and 1945, about a third of the city’s entire Jewish population (as of 1933). From the Anhalter alone 9,600 left, in groups of 50 to 100 at a time using 116 trains. In contrast to other deportations using freight wagons, here the Jews were taken away in ordinary passenger coaches which were coupled up to regular trains departing according to the normal timetable. All deportations went to Theresienstadt in Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia, and from there to the death camps.

Right up to the very last weeks of the war, transports of Jews from the Anhalter Bahnhof did not cease. The last one, on 27 March 1945, took place at a time when Germany’s defeat was already inevitable. 42 Jews, who had until then been considered ‘protected’, were sent under guard to Theresienstadt Ghetto. The reason for this excess zeal was Adolf Eichmann’s desire to appear busy so that he would not be sent from Berlin to the front.

Meanwhile, during World War II the Anhalter Bahnhof, like most of Berlin, was devastated by British and American bombs and Soviet artillery shells. A massive bombing raid on the night of 23 November 1943 badly affected the station, and caused so much damage to rail infrastructure further out that long-distance trains could no longer run, just a few local services. Two further major raids on 3 February and 26 February 1945 left the terminus with large sections of its roof missing, the rest unsafe and tottering, and no trains running at all. Many sections of the S-Bahn as well as the U-Bahn were also closed during the war due to enemy action, and the section through Anhalter Bahnhof was no exception.

The S-Bahn North-South Link, less than six years old, became the setting for one of the most contentious episodes of the final Battle of Berlin, in late April and early May 1945. With Hitler already dead, the remaining Nazi leaders resorted to increasingly desperate measures to slow the Soviet advance, whatever the consequences for their own citizens. Fearful that the Soviets might try to storm the centre of Berlin by coming through the underground rail tunnels, on 2 May the Nazi leaders ordered SS troops to blow up the bulkheads where the North-South Link passed beneath the Landwehrkanal. Altogether up to 26 km of tunnels and many stations were flooded by this action, most of which had been used as public shelters and also to house military wounded in hospital trains in underground sidings. No one knows how many people were drowned as figures are so diverse and unreliable. According to Soviet propaganda up to 15,000 may have lost their lives, but a more likely figure is two or three hundred.

A fragmentary train service resumed along the North-South Link on 2 June 1946 once massive repairs were well advanced (water had to be pumped out at the beginning). Full services recommenced on 16 November 1947, although repairs were not complete until May 1948. The services were extended further in 1951. Another interruption of services was caused by the uprising of 1953 in East Germany, no trains running between 17 June, the day of the uprising, and 9 July. Meanwhile, above ground, American servicemen had dismantled the surviving sections of the Anhalter Bahnhof’s roof in March 1948, and a limited train service had begun operating again in August, with a few trains running out into the Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg regions, but it was not to last. The station’s final demise was caused by the rapid collapse of relations between the Allied Occupying Powers which controlled Berlin and Germany as a whole. The Anhalter Bahnhof was served by trains arriving from places in Soviet-controlled East Germany, but the terminus was in West Berlin. An uncomfortable situation to start with, it eventually became a thorn in the Soviets’ side, and so on 17 May 1952, they switched all remaining trains to a station in their Eastern Sector, the Ostbahnhof, and the Anhalter Bahnhof was closed for good.

General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro and the evacuation of Gallipoli/Suvla

 

Kitchener recommends evacuation of Suvla and Anzac and retention ol Helles. Comments. General Staff and War Committee advise evacuation of whole Peninsula. Cabinet still hesitate. Lord Curzon’s fears. The November gale. Monro appeals for early decision. Kitchener wavers. Monro remains firm. Bonar Law’s memorandum. Salonika question forces a decision. Comments. Monro’s courage. Admiral Wemyss opposes evacuation. Admiralty reply. A general fights on two fronts. General Monro discomfits Mr. Churchill. A conflict of personalities

IT will be remembered that General Monro’s command comprised all the British forces east of Malta, excluding Egypt, and therefore included the Salonika front. He was at Salonika, called thither by the serious nature of the situation, when he received news of the Government’s decision to withdraw from Suvla and Anzac.

The 10th Division under General Mahon had recently moved into occupation of the line east of Strumnitza, while the Germans and Bulgarians were concentrating in the Strumnitza Valley. British reinforcements were arriving at Salonika, but owing to the bad state of the communications, transport and other difficulties, there was no prospect of their being able to reinforce Mahon’s line in time to meet an attack. General Monro saw the imperative necessity of holding back the enemy until the reinforcing divisions should have the time to complete their debarkation. At the same time he impressed on General Sarrail, commanding the French troops, the urgency of an immediate withdrawal from Serbia, as a defeat of the British would result in the cutting of the French line of retirement.

The Bulgarians attacked the 10th Division with a superiority in numbers of three or four to one. The 10th Division putting up a stubborn resistance throughout the fight, which lasted for three days, retired slowly to positions covering Salonika. It lost 1,800 men and eight guns and inflicted very severe losses on the Bulgars. The situation at one time was so serious that the possibility of having to carry out a double and simultaneous embarkation, at Gallipoli and at Salonika, had to be faced. Fortunately the Bulgars were brought to a standstill and the British were able to consolidate their hold on Salonika. General Monro reported that the troops, who had already suffered considerably from cold in the highlands of Macedonia, had conducted themselves very creditably in withdrawing from a difficult position.

Sir Charles was still detained, after the termination of this operation, in order to take part in negotiations which concerned the relations between the Greeks and the French and which had for their object the prevention of a rupture with the former Power. It was not, therefore, until December 12th, that he was able to return to Mudros. He had already, on December 8th, telegraphed to General Birdwood instructions to proceed with the preparations for evacuation.

From now onwards the preparations for the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac were rapidly carried forward, Helles was to be retained. The cause of this decision to cling on to the end of the Peninsula may be looked for in the advocacy of the sailors. The actual reason given was that by holding on to Helles we should be in a position to renew attack, based on another plan, at some future date, should the Government so decide.

This argument is unconvincing. There is no worse way in war of utilizing one’s military forces than not to use them ; to keep them locked up on an off-chance that they may perhaps be required for some speculative purpose at some indeterminate date. Anyhow, neither Sir Charles Monro nor the General Staff were convinced. On December 20th Sir Charles sent a telegram to Lord Kitchener in which he pressed for the evacuation of Helles for the reason that ” it would greatly facilitate the reorganization of the Dardanelles army, would lead immediately to reduced expenditure and would liberate a large quantity of freight“ and he went on to say that the army ” when rested and reorganized would constitute a valuable asset in a central position, ready to strike either in France or wherever demanded by the situation.” On December 22nd the General Staff came forward with a memorandum in which they said:

” The arrival of gun ammunition and of fresh guns to help the enemy will, moreover, greatly add to the difficulties in the way of. holding on to Helles at all. Not only have munitions arrived from Germany, but artillery which had been previously opposed to Suvla and Anzac will be moved to act against our forces cooped up in the thoroughly bad position they now occupy at the southern end of the Peninsula. Wastage, heavy before, will become greater. The troops, furthermore, are perfectly well aware that the Dardanelles undertaking has definitely failed, and, realizing that they have no hope of advancing or of causing the enemy any serious injury, will become dispirited. There will serious risk that the enemy will make a successful attack, and nay, in the circumstances, cause us a disaster.

” The necessity of concentration of effort, if this war is to be brought to a successful conclusion, has been drawn attention to hi recent papers prepared by the General Staff, and there is no object in labouring this point afresh ; retention of Helles means dispersion, not concentration of effort.” The General Staff, therefore, “recommend that the Gallipoli Peninsula should be entirely evacuated, and with the least possible delay.”

General Sir William Robertson had by this time taken up the appointment of C.I.G.S., and we see in this memorandum evidence i the clear logical mind and firm grasp of essentials which are characteristic of that distinguished soldier.

These combined opinions finally settled the question. On December 23rd the War Committee decided on the evacuation of Cape Helles, and four days later the Cabinet gave its tardy consent. Fifty-seven days had elapsed since Monro had telegraphed his evacuation despatch on October 31st!

In order to support his contention that the Gallipoli adventure had never have been abandoned, Mr. Churchill in The World Crisis quotes Count Metternich, German Ambassador at Constantinople during the War, as saying later, ” If you had only known what the state of the Turkish army (on the Peninsula) was, it would have gone hard with us.”

It is always wise in war to endeavour to see the situation from the enemy’s point of view, and it is always interesting to do so when the war is over; and it is as well, for this purpose, to consult the best authorities. It will generally be admitted that the eminent soldier commanding on the spot is a better authority on the point in question than the German Ambassador at Constantinople. Marshal Liman von Sanders has stated that he entirely agreed with the wisdom of the British decision to evacuate the Peninsula.”

It had all along been apparent to General Monro that the evacuation of the Peninsula, whether voluntary or forced, and however inch delayed, would have to be undertaken eventually. Consequently the measures to be adopted for carrying out the embarkation had been occupying his mind ever since he had penned his first despatch. Without waiting, therefore, for the Government’s final decision he directed General Birdwood in the latter end of November to set about the preparation of a detailed scheme for the withdrawal. The general idea on which the scheme was to be based is given in his despatch of March 6th, 1916, where he writes:

” I had in broad outline contemplated soon after my arrival on the Peninsula that an evacuation could be best conducted by subdivision into three stages.

” The first, during which all troops, animals and supplies not required for a long campaign should be withdrawn.

” The second, to comprise the evacuation of all men, guns animals and stores not required for defence during a period when the conditions of weather might retard the evacuation, or in fact seriously alter the programme contemplated.

” The third, or final stage, in which the troops on shore should be embarked with all possible speed, leaving behind such guns, animals and stores as were needed for military reasons at this period.

” This problem with which we were confronted was the withdrawal of an army of considerable size from positions in no case more than three hundred yards from the enemy’s trenches and its embarkation on open beaches, every part of which was within range of Turkish guns, and from which, in winds from the south and south-west, the withdrawal of troops was not possible

“The attitude which we should adopt from a naval an< military point of view in case of a withdrawal from the Peninsula being ordered, had given me much anxious thought. According to text-book principles and lessons from history it seemed essential that this operation of evacuation should be immediately preceded by a combined naval and military feint in the neighbourhood o the Peninsula, with a view to distracting the attention of the Turks from our intention.

” When endeavouring to work out the concrete fact how such principles could be applied to the situation of our forces, I came i to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitely more probable if we made no departure of any kind from the normal life which we were following both on sea and land. A feint 1 which did not fully fulfil its purpose would have been worse than useless, and there was obvious danger that the suspicion < i the Turks would be aroused by our adoption of a course, the real purport of which could not have been long disguised.”

During the period in which the Government had been discussing the question of the withdrawal from Gallipoli the time facto had been daily growing in importance. The storm of November had given an indication of what might be expected in the winter Vice-Admiral Wemyss, writing of the evacuation from Suvla and Anzac, says:

” A southerly wind of even moderate force at any time during this period must have wrecked piers and have caused considerable loss among the small craft—such loss of craft would have made anything in the nature of rapid evacuation an impossibility, and would have enormously increased the difficulties“. This means that a moderate southerly wind would have eliminated the all-important element of surprise, and a gale I would have caused a disaster.

On Monday morning, December 20th, by 5.30 a.m., the embarkations at Suvla and Anzac were completed. Twelve hours later the weather broke ; a storm raged and the landing stages it Suvla and Anzac were washed away. The margin, which the 1 government had taken thirty-seven days in cutting, was indeed u narrow one.

It has been seen that the Government, when at last obliged to come to a definite decision on the question whether the Gallipoli Peninsula should be evacuated or not, was unable to refrain from looking both ways at once. Suvla and Anzac were to be given up; Helles was to be retained. But General Monro would not budge an inch from the position he had taken when writing the report in which he recommended the entire evacuation of the Peninsula, and not all the Government’s piety, wit nor tears could induce him to cancel half a line of that report.

They turned to the General Staff, thinking that here perhaps they might get some support to their own desires. They got none. Sir W. Robertson endorsed General Monro’s views absolutely: he blessed when it was hoped that he would curse. At last the Government yielded to Sir Charles’ representations and warning regarding the daily increasing dangers of delay. On December 27th they gave their final consent to the withdrawal from Helles in a telegram which was received by General Monro on the 28th.

As in the case of Anzac and Suvla, the scheme for the withdrawal and re-embarkation had been prepared by the Dardanelles army in anticipation of Government’s orders, and on December 24th Sir William Birdwood had been directed by the Commander-in-Chief to take the preliminary steps for an immediate evacuation which followed the same system as had been practised at Suvla and Anzac. ” The situation,” wrote Sir Charles in his despatch of March 6th, 1926, ” had not materially changed owing to our withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac, except that there was a marked increased of activity in aerial reconnaissance over our positions, and the islands of Mudros and Imbros, and that hostile patrolling of our trenches was more frequent and daring. ” The most apparent factor was that the number of heavy guns on the European and Asiatic shores had been considerably augmented, and that these guns were more liberally supplied with German ammunition, the result of which was that our beaches were continuously shelled, especially from the Asiatic shore.”

As already shown, a feint did not, in Sir Charles Monro’s opinion, offer any prospect of success. Time and the uncertainty of weather conditions in the Aegean were among the reasons which influenced him in coming to this conclusion. It was decided, therefore, with the concurrence of the Vice-Admiral, that the Navy was to do its utmost to counter-batter the Turkish batteries should these open serious fire during the withdrawal, while in the event of the Turkish guns remaining quiescent, the Navy was to refrain from aggressive action. The final stage of the operation was to be completed in one night and the troops withdrawn direct1 from the fire trenches to the beaches without occupying any intermediate position. The lives of the troops were not to be endangered by the devotion of too much time to the destruction of stores or of bringing stores away with them.

We see in this last instruction, Sir Charles’ readiness to free the commanders concerned from criticism for any undue haste in withdrawing which they might have had to face had the withdrawal been less successful than it was.

On the night of January 8th-9th the operation was carried through without a hitch, according to plan. By dawn of January 9th the entire evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula was completed. It has been rightly described as a triumph of Staff work. Sir Charles Monro wrote in his despatch : “It demanded for its successful realization two important military essentials, viz, good luck and skilled disciplined organization, and they were both forthcoming to a marked degree at the hour needed. Our luck was in the ascendant by the marvellous spell of calm weather which prevailed. But we were able to turn to the fullest advantage these accidents of fortune.

” Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood and his corps commanders elaborated and prepared the orders in reference to the evacuation with a skill, competence and courage which could not have been surpassed, and we had a further stroke of good fortune in being associated with Vice-Admiral Sir John de Robeck, Vice-Admiral Wemyss and a body of naval officers whose worl remained throughout this anxious period at that standard of accuracy and professional ability which is beyond the power <>! criticism or cavil.

“The line of communication staff, both military and naval represented respectively by Lieutenant General E. A. Altham, Commodore S. M. Fitzmaurice, R.N., principal naval transport officer, and Captain H. V. Simpson, R.N., superintending transport officer, contributed to the success of the operation by their untiring zeal and conspicuous ability. ” The members of the Headquarters staff showed themselves, without exception, to be officers with whom it was a privilege to associated ; their competence, zeal and devotion to duty were uniform and unbroken.”

To this generous appreciation of others the Dardanelles Commision appended the remark, “In these words of well-deserved commendation of officers and men, the name of Sir Charles Monro should be included.”

The highest commendation is due to every officer and man engaged ; none failed to give of their best. The Prime Minister announced the news of the evacuation to the Commons in the following words: “The House and Country will have learnt with extreme gratification of the successful retirement of the forces at Cape Helles without the loss of a single life. Eleven guns only were left behind—not a very large number—of which ten were worn-out fifteen-pounders, and before being abandoned all were rendered unfit for further service. Such of the stores and reserve ammunition which could not be removed were set on fire at the last moment and the whole retirement was conducted with an absolute minimum of loss.

” This operation, taken in conjunction with the earlier retirement from Suvla and Anzac, is, I believe, without parallel in military or naval history. That it should have been carried through with no appreciable loss, in view of the vast amount of personnel and material involved, is an achievement of which all concerned—commanding officers, officers and men in both services—may well be proud. It deserves, and I am sure will receive, the profound gratitude of the King and Country, and will I take an imperishable place in our national history.

” His Majesty will be advised that General Sir Charles Monro, Admirals de Robeck and Wemyss, Lieutenant Generals Birdwood and Davies and other generals who worked under them, shall receive special recognition.”

The successful evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula will go own in history as a wonderful feat of arms, with which the names of General Sir Charles Monro, and Sir William Birdwood and Vice-Admiral Sir John de Robeck will be for ever associated. The news swept away one of the heaviest clouds of suspense that hung over the British people during the War. Lord Derby writing to General Monro on December 27th, 1915, says : ” What a wonderful achievement of yours, getting all those men off Gallipoli. I don’t think you can possibly imagine what a feeling of relief came over the whole country when we heard the news.”

There were a few people outside the Government at the time, there are some even to-day, who held the opinion that, bringing fresh troops into the fight, we should have continued the offensive at the earliest possible moment, or maintaining our positions on the Peninsula throughout the winter we should have resumed the offensive in the following spring. This opinion is jejune ; it pays no regard to the hard facts of the case.

In November, 1915, the Turks had on the Peninsula or at close call 200,000 rifles. The effective strength of the British was 90,000 rifles. In order to have any prospect of success it would have been necessary to raise the British forces to at least 250,000 rifles. It would not have been practicable to land the additional 100,000 reinforcements before the stormy winter season set in, not to mention the proportionate number of guns and the large amount of supplies of food, clothing and munitions which they would require.

Again, without extensive preparations which would have needed several months to complete, these masses of men with their transport animals could not have been disposed on the restricted area which existed behind our trench line, the whole area being exposed to observed artillery fire. The water supply was also limited and partly sea-borne and a succession of stormy days would have created an alarming situation in this respect. But perhaps the most important consideration of all was the certainty of an immense increase in the weight of artillery fire to which every portion of the ground occupied by us would be subjected, now that direct communication between Germany and Turkey was open.

The shelling of the trenches was already increasing daily and the casualty rate rising proportionately. Everyone having the experience of the Western Front will realize that a concentration of observed fire of heavy and medium guns would have quickly converted the contracted area held by the British into a terrible scene of desolation and carnage.

Since the War we have learnt that the Germans were actually preparing to bring about this denouement, and had our withdrawal been delayed, the British arms would have suffered a disaster unparalleled in their history.

Sir Charles Monro had early appreciated the grave risks attendant on a decision to retain our positions on the Peninsula, and in addition to those which have been mentioned, he pointed to the difficulties of supply and maintenance owing to the inadequate piers and the danger of these being destroyed; to the probability of the beaches being isolated from outside sources lay stress of bad weather during the winter; to the great strain placed on the Navy; and to the fact that an increase in the enemy’s gun power, if it did nothing worse, would enable the Turks to hold us in check with a small force, while they withdrew the bulk of their strength for operations elsewhere.

These were the facts and they cannot be ignored, although there may be a difference of opinion regarding the value to be given them. A commander, in whose hands the the lives of his men and the welfare of his country, weighs the facts in scales that are generally more reliable and well-balanced than those held by the usual onlooker.

Field Marshal Sir William Robertson in a letter to The Times says: “Credit for the successful evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula was due to all who took part in it as Sir Charles himself is the first to declare, but to him alone, almost, was due the credit for evacuation taking place when it did.

” Fearing the possible consequences of withdrawal and the confession of failure which it involved, certain members of the Cabinet—Mr. Bonar Law being a notable exception—tried to prevent it or, at any rate, to delay it, and had not Sir Charles stood firm and declined to water down his expressed opinion that evacuation was imperative it might have been deferred until too fate to be carried out at all, and at the best great hardships and additional loss of life would have been suffered by the troops for no useful purpose.”

A proper share of the credit for the evacuation must be given to Field Marshal Sir William Robertson himself, for it was largely owing to his advice that the Cabinet nerved itself, at long last, to accept Sir Charles Monro’s recommendations.

As a military operation it was one of the most remarkable achievements of the Great War. General Sir Ian Hamilton wrote in his despatch:

” On October 11th Your Lordship cabled asking me for an estimate of the losses which would be involved in an evacuation of the Peninsula. On October 12th I replied in terms showing that such a step was to me unthinkable.”

He put the probable losses of a withdrawal at thirty thousand to forty thousand men, besides guns and stores and transport. He was supported in this estimate by others, both soldiers and civilians. The losses incurred were :

At Anzac: Four 18-pounder guns, two 5-inch howitzers, one 4.7-inch naval gun, one aircraft gun, three 3-pounder hotchkiss, fifty-six mules, some carts stripped of their wheels, some supplies burnt.

At Helles: Ten worn-out 15-pounder guns, one 16-inch gun, six French old heavy guns—all these were blown up ; 508 animals, most of which were destroyed, some vehicles and a quantity of supplies and stores burnt.

At Suvla: Every man, gun and animal was embarked and a small stock of supplies was burnt.

General Sir Ian Hamilton’s opinion was that which many another skilled and instructed soldier might have given, and yet it was one which after events proved was entirely wrong. If war were all science and no art, it would have been a correct opinion.

But there is a point in the conduct of war where science ceases and art comes in, and then it is that the seemingly impossible is accomplished : when Gideon and his hundred men with the battle cry, ” a sword for the Eternal and for Gideon,” routed the Midianites, the Amalekites and the Bedouin, ” who were lying along the valley in swarms like locusts, and their camels were past counting, as the sand on the seashore ; ” when the little Revenge fought, single-handed, the Spanish fleet of fifty-three great galleons from the uprising of the sun until its going down and ” the stars came out far over the summer sea ” ; when Wolfe scaled the cliff and assembled his army in the face of an enemy on the Heights of Abraham ; when Napoleon ordered his Polish Lancers to charge in the Pass of Somosierra and they put a whole Spanish army in position to flight—these were accomplishments of the seemingly impossible.

Similar actions are recorded on many pages of the History of War and the measure of their greatness is shown in their ” impossibility,” as gauged by the rules and conceptions of ordinary men.

The British nation owed a debt of gratitude to Sir Charles Monro for his clear vision and military insight, for his decided and lucid reports, for his undaunted adherence to the opinions he expressed and for his part as supreme director of the evacuation. The debt was never fully repaid as will be seen later.

With the issue of his instructions and orders in connection with the evacuation of Helles, Sir Charles’ task at Gallipoli was finished. He had received a telegram from the War Office on December 30th directing him to hand over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to General Sir Archibald) Murray! who had left London on December 28th. Consequently he broke up his Headquarters at Mudros and proceeded with a small staff on H.M.S. Cornwallis to Alexandria. Here he had the satisfaction of receiving the news of the successful withdrawal and re-embarkation at Helles, and of knowing, on the last day of his command, that his harassing mission had ended in triumphant success. Sir Charles Monro was made a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George for his Gallipoli services.

He left Egypt in order to assume command of the First Army in France.

On the voyage the P. and O. ship on which Sir Charles and his personal staff were travelling was pursued one morning for a considerable distance by a German submarine. All the passengers sat on deck wearing their lifebelts. When the luncheon gong sounded Sir Charles told Lord Herbert Scott that it was a very bad thing to be either submerged or captured on an empty stomach, and the two descended to the saloon and enjoyed some excellent chops, while the majority of the passengers preferred to remain above. The approach of some British destroyers during the afternoon caused the submarine to sheer off, and the remainder of the voyage was completed without further incidents.

Battle of Rabaul (1942) – Lark Force

The sacrifice of the 2/22nd Battalion AIF to a flawed forward defence plan in WW2 (see also Ambon).

The Battle of Rabaul, also known by the Japanese as Operation R, was fought on the island of New Britain in the Australian Territory of New Guinea, in January and February 1942. It was a strategically significant defeat of Allied forces by Japan in the Pacific campaign of World War II. Following the capture of the port of Rabaul, Japanese forces turned it into a major base and proceeded to land on mainland New Guinea, advancing toward Port Moresby and Australia. Hostilities on the neighbouring island of New Ireland are also usually considered to be part of the same battle. Rabaul was important because of its proximity to the Japanese territory of the Caroline Islands, site of a major Imperial Japanese Navy base on Truk.

The 1,400-strong Australian Army garrison in New Britain—known as Lark Force—was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Scanlan. It included 716 frontline Australian Imperial Force (AIF) soldiers in the shape of the 2/22nd Battalion, deployed from March 1941 as fears of war with Japan increased. The force also included personnel from a local militia unit, the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, a coastal defence battery, an anti-aircraft battery, an anti-tank battery and a detachment of the 2/10th Field Ambulance. (The 2/22nd Battalion Band—which was also included in Lark Force—is perhaps the only military unit ever to have been entirely recruited from the ranks of the Salvation Army.) A commando unit, the 130-strong 2/1st Independent Company, was detached to garrison the nearby island of New Ireland.

The main tasks of the garrison were protection of Vunakanau, the main Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) airfield near Rabaul, and the nearby flying boat anchorage in Simpson Harbour, which were important for the surveillance of Japanese movements in the region. However, the RAAF contingent, under Squadron Leader (some sources say Wing Commander) John Lerew, had little offensive capability, with 10 lightly armed CAC Wirraway training aircraft and four Lockheed Hudson light bombers from No. 24 Squadron.

In January 1942, Rabaul came under attack by large numbers of Japanese carrier-based aircraft. After the odds facing the Australians mounted significantly, Lerew signalled RAAF HQ in Melbourne with the Latin motto “Nos Morituri Te Salutamus” (“we who are about to die salute you”), the phrase uttered by gladiators in ancient Rome before entering combat. On 21 January, eight Wirraways attacked a formation of 109 Japanese aircraft; three RAAF planes were shot down, two crash-landed, and another was damaged. One of the attacking Japanese bombers was shot down by anti-aircraft fire. As a result of the intense air attacks, Australian coastal artillery was destroyed and Australian infantry were withdrawn from Rabaul itself. An RAAF flying boat crew located the invasion fleet and signalled a warning before their aircraft was also shot down.

On 22 January, the Japanese landed just off New Ireland and had to wade ashore in deep water filled with dangerous mudpools. The 2/1st Independent Company had been dispersed around the island and the Japanese took the main town of Kavieng without opposition. That night, the invasion fleet approached Rabaul.

At 02:45 on 23 January, the South Seas Force began to land on New Britain. The 3rd Battalion of the 144th Infantry Regiment encountered stiff resistance from a mixed company-sized force of AIF and militiamen at Vulcan Beach. However, because of its numerical superiority, most of the South Seas Force was able to land unopposed in unguarded locations. Within hours, Scanlan ordered “every man for himself”, and Australian soldiers and civilians split into small groups and retreated through the jungle.

Only the RAAF had made evacuation plans; its personnel were removed by flying boat. Australian soldiers remained at large in the interior of New Britain for many weeks, but Lark Force had made no preparations for guerrilla warfare on New Britain. Without supplies, their health and military effectiveness declined. Leaflets posted by Japanese patrols or dropped from planes stated in English, “you can find neither food nor way of escape in this island and you will only die of hunger unless you surrender.” Most Australian soldiers were captured or surrendered during the following weeks.

Late January 1942. Australian soldiers (right centre) retreating from Rabaul cross the Warangoi/Adler River in the Bainings Mountains, on the eastern side of Gazelle Peninsula.

The Imperial Japanese Army assault formation—the South Seas Force, under Major General Tomitaro Horii—was essentially a brigade group based on the 55th Division. Its main combat units were the 144th Infantry Regiment (headquarters unit, three infantry battalions, an artillery company, signals unit, and munitions squad), a few platoons from the 55th Cavalry Regiment, a battalion from the 55th Mountain Artillery Regiment and a company from the 55th Engineer Regiment.

From mainland New Guinea, some civilians and individual officers organised unofficial rescue missions to New Britain, and between March and May about 450 troops and civilians were evacuated by sea. Rabaul became the biggest Japanese base in New Guinea. The Australians tried to restrict its development soon after its capture by a bombing counter attack in March. A handful of Lark Force members remained at large on New Britain and often in conjunction with the local islanders conducted guerrilla operations against the Japanese.

At least 800 soldiers and civilian prisoners of war—most of them Australian—lost their lives on 1 July 1942, when the ship on which they were sent from Rabaul to Japan—the Montevideo Maru—was sunk off the north coast of Luzon by the U.S. submarine USS Sturgeon.

Of the approximately 1,050 Australians taken prisoner, at least 130 personnel were massacred on or about 4 February 1942. Six men survived these killings and later described what happened. The Australian government concluded that personnel were marched into the jungle near Tol Plantation in small groups and were bayoneted by Japanese soldiers. At the nearby Waitavalo Plantation, 35 Australian prisoners were shot. The officer with the main responsibility for these war crimes was Colonel Masao Kusunose, who later committed suicide.

On New Ireland, the 2/1st Independent Company became victims of a policy which scattered them in small groups around the island to such an extent that their ability to wage any kind of co-ordinated raiding or guerrilla campaign became impossible. The Australian commandos, along with some civilians who fought, in most cases were quickly overcome and killed or taken prisoner. Japanese forces also committed atrocities against POWs on New Ireland.

In December 1943, during the Battle of Cape Gloucester, U.S. Marines landed in western New Britain and consequent Allied operations on New Britain gradually restricted the Japanese force to Rabaul. However, a large number of Japanese personnel remained in Rabaul until the Japanese surrender in August 1945.

LBJ reveals GI Mutiny and more on MacArthur’s Hubris

The newspapers are full of a story about a mutiny by African-American GIs in WW2 at Townsville, Queensland, Australia. Apparently the story was covered up at the time. Couldn’t have been as big as the news story would have it as casualties were remarkably low when you consider 700 rounds were fired. Here are the details…….

 

An Australian historian has uncovered hidden documents which reveal that African American troops used machine guns to attack their white officers in a siege on a US base in north Queensland in 1942.

Information about the Townsville mutiny has never been released to the public. [Blog Ed. that is questionable!]

But the story began to come to light when James Cook University’s Ray Holyoak first began researching why US congressman Lyndon B Johnson visited Townsville for three days back in 1942.

What he discovered was evidence detailing one of the biggest uprisings within the US military.

“For 70 years there’s been a rumour in Townsville that there was a mutiny among African-American servicemen. In the last year and a half I’ve found the primary documentation evidence that that did occur in 1942.”

During World War II, Townsville was a crucial base for campaigns into the Pacific, including the Battle of the Coral Sea.

About 600 African-American troops were brought to the city to help build airfields.

Mr Holyoak says these troops, from the 96th Battalion, US Army Corps of Engineers, were stationed at a base on the city’s western outskirts known as Kelso.

This was the site for a large-scale siege lasting eight hours, which was sparked by racial taunts and violence.

“After some serial abuse by two white US officers, there was several ringleaders and they decided to machine gun the tents of the white officers,” Mr Holyoak said.

He has uncovered several documents hidden in the archives of the Queensland Police and Townsville Brigade detailing what happened that night.

According to the findings, the soldiers took to the machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons and fired into tents where their white counterparts were drinking.

More than 700 rounds were fired.

At least one person was killed and dozens severely injured, and Australian troops were called in to roadblock the rioters.

Mr Holyoak also discovered a report written by Robert Sherrod, a US journalist who was embedded with the troops.

It never made it to the press, but was handed to Lyndon B Johnson at a Townsville hotel and eventually filed away into the National Archives and Records Administration.

“I think at the time, it was certainly suppressed. Both the Australian and the US government would not have wanted the details of this coming out. The racial policies at the time really discluded [sic] people of colour,” Mr Holyoak says.

Both the Australian Defence Department and the Australian War Memorial say it could take months to research the incident, and say they have no details readily available for public release.

But Townsville historian Dr Dorothy Gibson-Wilde says the findings validate 70-year-old rumours.

“Anytime it was raised, people usually sort of said, ‘Oh you know, no that can’t be true. Nobody’s heard about that’, and in fact it must have been kept pretty quiet from the rest of the town,” she said.

Mr Holyoak will spend the next two years researching the sentences handed out to both the officers and the mutineers involved, and why the information has been kept secret for so long.

Source: abc.net.au

Company "A", 96th Engineers in Port Moresby on 19 November 1943

This made out to be big news but website www.ozatwar.com has had a write-up on this event on it’s site for some time, as follows:

By August 1942, there were about 7, 258 Negro servicemen based in Australia. One such Negro unit was the 96th Engineers General Services Regiment airfield construction Battalion that was based in the Upper Ross area near Townsville to construct the Upper Ross airfield (Kelso field).

On 15 April 1942, about 100 men of the 96th Battalion were involved in a fight in Townsville. They had been rounded up by white soldiers with fixed bayonets and loaded guns.

On 22 May 1942 between 8 pm and 9 pm several shots could be heard coming from the Negroes camp. One of the many to hear the shots was the late Arthur Kelso who was riding his horse on his property at Laudham Park, on Five Head Creek in the Upper Ross area just outside Townsville. He heard the initial shots and judged them to be about 1.5 miles away. The shooting continued and he could then hear Thompson sub machine guns. The firing continued until about 11pm.

Many of the locals who heard the firing thought the military were playing “war games”. However all hell had broken loose at the camp. One source suggested that the riot started when a white Captain struck a Negro soldier. Arthur Kelso indicated that drunken Negroes started to fire guns at their white officers, who then returned the fire.

A road block was set up to prevent the rioting Negroes from entering Townsville. There were reports of 250 Negroes on the rampage and that they had commandeered some trucks and were heading into town. Arthur Kelso reported that he later heard that 19 coffins had been ordered to bury those killed in the riot.

Dick Kelso, Arthur’s brother, who was with the 11th Brigade was one of those who manned a road block on Ross River road that evening after the riot. Dick said they were issued with live ammunition and Bren Guns as well. Dick reported that the rioting Negroes had been stopped and turned back at another road block near Corbeth’s water hole on Ross River.

Another report on www.politicalhotwire.com highlights:

Armed Australian troops were sent in at the height of the emergency on the US base.

George Gnezdiloff, then a 20-year-old private in the north Queensland-raised 51st battalion, was told to block Ross River Road with his bren gun carrier. Other soldiers were issued with a password, Bucks, as they deployed to bottle up the Americans.

Gnezdiloff and his crew were ordered to shoot the mutineers on sight. “We had ammo, the lot,” the now 90-year-old recalled yesterday from his home in Proserpine, 300km south of Townsville.

“We weren’t mucking around, I can tell you.”

The disgruntled African-Americans were from the US 96th engineers, a labour battalion that had the thankless job of building the airfields and barracks around Townsville. Racial tensions had been simmering for months, creating a poisonous atmosphere on the base at Kelso Field, southwest of the city. On the night of May 22-23, 1942, it boiled over. The men of A and C companies took up arms against their white officers, angry at claims a black sergeant had died at the hands of a white superior.

Sherrod’s report says the mutineers resolved to kill their commander, Captain Francis Williams, of Columbus, Georgia. “They fired several hundred rounds at his tent,” it says.

After Williams escaped “almost certain death” by diving into a slit trench, the rebels turned a machine gun on other officers as they fled. There is no record of whether any were hit.

The mutinous A and C companies of black engineers were hurriedly packed off to New Guinea, where the Australians of the 51st Battalion were also bound, to confront the Japanese.


More than 10,000 African-American servicemen were put to work in north Queensland during the war, and Holyoak says the racial violence at Kelso was not isolated. Other clashes between white and black US personnel took place at Torrens Creek, Ingham and Mt Isa in 1942.

The researcher believes Roosevelt was aware of the tensions, and this may have been a factor behind the visit of his wife, Eleanor, to Townsville in 1943, when the then first lady dropped in on the newly established North American Services Club in Flinders Street – a “negro-only” establishment.

The best part is the report made by Lyndon Johnson, see attached paper.

This report also contains comments on MacArthur…and his super-size ego. Interesting reading.

See also…..MacArthur’s Hubris

The 39th Battalion Australian Imperial Force (AIF)

The 39th Battalion was an infantry unit of the Australian Army. It was originally raised in February 1916 for service during World War I as part of First Australian Imperial Force. Making up part of the 10th Brigade, it was attached to the 3rd Division and served on the Western Front in France and Belgium before being disbanded in March 1919. Following the re-organisation of the Australian Army in 1921, the battalion was raised again as a unit of the Citizens Force, known as the Hawthorn–Kew Regiment. In 1937 it was amalgamated with the 37th Battalion to become the 37th/39th Battalion. Later it was delinked with the 37th and amalgamated with the 24th Battalion to form the 24th/39th Battalion, before being raised again as a single unit in October 1941. During World War II the battalion was sent to New Guinea in 1942 and between July and August of that year the unit was heavily engaged in the defence of the Kokoda Trail during which time they fought several desperate actions against the Japanese as they attempted to hold out until further reinforcements could be brought up from Port Moresby. Such was their involvement in the battle that by the time they were withdrawn they could only muster 32 men and following its return to Australia, it was disbanded on 3 July 1943.

Formation

The 39th Battalion was first formed on 21 February 1916 at the Ballarat Showgrounds, in Victoria, for service during World War I. The battalion was raised as part of an expansion of the First Australian Imperial Force (1st AIF) which was undertaken at the conclusion of the Gallipoli campaign. The majority of the battalion’s recruits came from the Western District of Victoria, and together with the 37th, 38th and 40th Battalions, it formed the 10th Brigade, which was part of the 3rd Division.

Following a brief period of training in Australia, the 39th Battalion departed from Melbourne on 27 May 1916. Arriving in Britain in July 1916, they undertook a period of four months training before being sent to France in November. In December the battalion took its place in the trenches along the Western Front.

Western Front

A member of the 39th Battalion in the trenches near Houplines, December 1916

After having endured a long winter serving in mainly a defensive role, the battalion’s first major engagement came at Messines, in Belgium in June 1917, where during the march to the line of departure, the battalion suffered a high number of casualties following a German gas attack which subsequently resulted in the battalion only being able to muster about a third of its manpower for the attack. Despite this, however, the 39th managed to capture all of its objectives. Later, in October, the 39th Battalion took part in two other major attacks in that same sector, firstly at Broodseinde and then at Passchendaele, the first of which was a brilliant success, while the second a disastrous failure.

Over the course of the next five months, the 39th Battalion rotated between the front line and rear areas, serving mainly in Belgium. However, when the German Army launched its last effort at victory in the spring of 1918, known as the Spring Offensive, the 39th was among the many Australian battalions that were hurriedly moved south to France in order to stem the tide of the German onslaught towards Amiens. When the Allies launched their own offensive, known as the Hundred Days Offensive, on 8 August 1918, the battalion along with the rest of the 10th Brigade, was serving as the divisional reserve and they did not participate in the advance that has since become known as one of the greatest days for the Allies on the Western Front. On 10 August, the battalion was committed to battle once more, undertaking an attack on the village of Proyart, however, this attack was ill-conceived and ultimately failed. Despite this, however, the battalion remained in the line throughout August and early September as the 3rd Division advanced along the Somme Valley.

A member of the 39th Battalion in the trenches near Houplines, December 1916

The battalion undertook its last major action of the war at the end of September 1918 when, serving alongside the Americans, they breached parts of the Hindenburg Line along the St Quentin Canal. After this, the battalion was removed from the line to undertake training, and they were still at the rear when the Armistice was declared on 11 November 1918. With the fighting over, the process of demobilisation began and slowly the men began marching out for repatriation to Australia. Finally, in March 1919, the 39th Battalion was disbanded.

During the course of the war the 39th Battalion suffered 405 men killed, while a further 1,637 were wounded. Members of the battalion received the following decorations: one Member of the British Empire, two Distinguished Service Orders, 14 Distinguished Conduct Medals, 14 Military Cross, 81 Military Medals, and 22 Mentions in Dispatches.

Inter war years

At the end of World War I there was a wholesale disbandment of units of the Australian Army, however, in 1921, it was decided that there was a need to raise a part time military force, known as the Citizens Force, which would take responsibility for the defence of the Australian mainland. This force was organised along the same lines of the 1st AIF, and the units raised kept the same numerical designation as the 1st AIF battalions. The AIF ceased to exist officially on 1 April 1921, and the Citizens Force was reorganised the following month on 1 May, adopting the numerical designations and structures of the AIF. As a part of this, the 39th Battalion was raised in 1921 in Melbourne. Upon formation, the battalion was attached to the 10th Brigade, 3rd Division.

In 1927, territorial designations were adopted and the battalion assumed the title of the Hawthorn Regiment. Three years later this was changed to the Hawthorne–Kew Regiment. Initially the battalion was kept up to strength with volunteers and men serving under the terms of the compulsory training scheme, however, in 1929 the scheme was suspended by the newly elected Scullin Labor government and the Citizen Forces were renamed the Militia. The combination of the end to compulsory training and the financial hardships of the Great Depression meant that there were few volunteers available as men could not risk losing their jobs to undertake training and as a result throughout the 1930s a number of units were amalgamated or disbanded as the size of the Army was reduced. In 1937 the 39th Battalion was merged with the 37th Battalion, before later being delinked with the 37th and being amalgamated with the 24th Battalion, becoming the 24th/39th Battalion.

World War II

Formation

On 1 October 1941, the Australian Military Board issued an order re-raising the 39th Battalion as a single battalion of the Australian Military Forces, as Militiamen were called up for national service. The new battalion had an authorised strength of 1,500 men and was composed mainly of men taken from the previous 24th/39th Battalion and initially it was deployed at Nagambie Road, Seymour, Victoria with elements from the Militia 2nd Cavalry and 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Conran became the battalion’s new commanding officer, having previously served with the 23rd Battalion during World War I, and in the Citizens Military Force after the war.

By 8 October 1941, a nucleus of officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs), many of whom had experience from World War I, had prepared the battalion for the arrival of the soldiers or other ranks (ORs) that would bring it up to its required establishment. On 10 October 1941, the first draft of nine officers and 523 men from the 3rd Infantry Division assembled at Caulfield Racecourse Transit Camp and were transported by rail to Darley Camp, Bacchus Marsh. The following day numbers increased further with the arrival of another seven officers and 400 men from the 2nd Cavalry and 4th Infantry Divisions. Later, in June 1942, after it had arrived in New Guinea, the battalion’s strength was bolstered with the transfer of 16 officers from the Second Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF), including a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel William Owen.

On 21 November 1941, the 39th Battalion paraded through the streets of Melbourne with weapons. It had taken 52 days to form the battalion and while the battalion had still been understrength, they were declared ready for training. In the end, however, as events in the Pacific unfolded, this training was cut short and the battalion was only able to undertake one training exercise in this time.

Two days after the Japanese attack on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor and the British in Malaya, on 9 December 1941 the battalion was ordered to ‘prepare to move’. They were originally allocated to relieve the Queensland 49th Battalion that was already on garrison duties at Port Moresby, however, the threat of invasion by the Japanese had changed the strategic situation and with it the planning forecasts of the Australian high command. As such, the battalion was combined with the 49th Battalion and the 53rd Battalion from New South Wales to form the 30th Brigade and plans were made for the entire brigade to deploy to New Guinea.

Christmas Day 1941 was spent in camp, before the 39th Battalion was loaded onto two trains the following day for a rapid move north.One train went straight to Albury and the other departed from Spencer Street Station, Melbourne, two hours later. Both trains arrived in Sydney at 10.40 hours, on 27 December 1941. The battalion then detrained and moved by ferry to Woolloomooloo wharf where the 1,068 officers, NCOs and men of the battalion boarded the passenger ship the Aquitania bound for New Guinea.

Kokoda Track

Initially upon their arrival in New Guinea in January 1942 the 39th Battalion was used to defend the airfield at Seven Mile Aerodrome near Port Moresby and to carry out various other garrison tasks such as building defences and unloading stores at the wharf. In May 1942, the battalion’s commanding officer, Conran, was deemed medically unfit for service and on 24 May he relinquished command.

In June 1942, as the military situation in New Guinea deteriorated further, the battalion received orders to move up the Kokoda Track in order to act as a blocking force against the possibility of a Japanese advance overland from the north. In order to counter this threat, Maroubra Force composed of troops the 39th Battalion and the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) were sent to Kokoda, arriving there on 15 July. This move proved prescient as a large Japanese force landed at Gona only a week later, and they quickly began to move inland towards Kokoda.

The first clash occurred at Awala on 23 July, when a platoon from ‘B’ Company, under the command of Captain Sam Templeton, having destroyed the footbridge over the Kumusi River, engaged the Japanese on the far side of the river.The Australians were forced to withdraw, however, when hundreds of Japanese marines began crossing the river under a barrage of mortar and machine gun fire. They withdrew only a few miles, before Templeton set up a successful ambush for the advancing Japanese on the banks of the Gorari Creek. Nevertheless, they were forced back further towards the high ground at Oivi where they attempted to make a stand while Templeton tried to make contact with battalion headquarters and the rest of the battalion who were spread out further along the track, in order to get more reinforcements.

On the evening of 29 July the Japanese attacked the main position Kokoda. There were only 80 men from ‘B’ Company left at that time, and armed only with small arms and a few Bren light machine guns, they were no match for the assaulting Japanese. Casualties on both sides were high as the Australians resorted to hand-to-hand combat, and the battalion’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel William Owen, who had flown in to take over the battalion following Templeton’s death, was killed while organising the withdrawal. It became clear that Kokoda was lost and the following morning, under the cover of a dense mist, with the Papuan Infantry Battalion commanding officer, Major William Watson, assuming temporary command, the survivors abandoned the position and fell back towards the village of Deniki, a mile or so back along the Kokoda Track towards Isurava.

The remnants of ‘B’ Company regrouped at Deniki, however, they were in a bad state and when on 4 August, Major Allan Cameron, brigade major of the 30th Brigade, arrived to take command of Maroubra Force, most of them were sent back to Isurava in disgrace as he was under the mistaken belief that they had run away from the fighting. Nevertheless, on 8 August the rest of the 39th Battalion, now without the only troops who had any experience fighting the Japanese, launched a counterattack at Kokoda. They managed to secure one side of the airfield, however, due to the close proximity of the Japanese on the other side, relief aircraft were unable to land and short of food and ammunition, they were forced to fall back to Deniki once again after almost two days of fighting. They eventually managed to halt the Japanese advance and on 14 August Maroubra Force fell back to Isurava.

(Left to right): Kessels, Porter, Fleay, Owen, Findlay - Lieutenant Colonel Owen, CO of the 39th Battalion with his second-in-command Major Findlay – July 1942

At this point the fighting ceased for almost two weeks and during this time the 39th was joined by the 53rd and the 30th Brigade headquarters. On 23 August Brigadier Arnold Potts took over command of Maroubra Force and further reinforcements arrived as first the 2/14th, 2/16th and later the 2/27th Battalions from the 7th Division’s 21st Brigade also reached the area. Despite this, however, the situation remained bleak as the supply issue was becoming a serious problem for the Australians and the reinforcements that had arrived were also in a state of disarray having been committed to the battle in a piecemeal fashion and suffering badly from hunger and disease.

Although the Japanese were experiencing similar problems in relation to supplies, they began their advance once again on 26 August and despite several rugged defensive actions the Australians were forced back again, first to Eora Creek on 30 August, then Templeton’s Crossing on 2 September, and finally to Efogi three days later. Exhausted from their efforts and no longer able to be considered an effective fighting force, the 39th was relieved and sent down the track to Koitaki to rest. They had done the job that was required of them, however, having stalled the Japanese advance in order to allow reinforcements to be brought up. These reinforcements came in the shape of the 25th Brigade, comprising the 2/25th, 2/31st and 2/33rd Battalions. Bitter fighting ensued and the Australians withdrew once again on 17 September, this time to Imita Ridge, however, the Japanese had reached their limit and on 24 September began to withdraw. By 2 November, Kokoda was back in Australian hands.

Soldiers of the 39th Battalion following their relief in September 1942

Fighting around Gona

Following the 39th Battalion’s withdrawal from the line in September 1942, they spent a month at Koitaki before being sent back to Port Moresby in mid-October, where they were detailed to prepare defensive positions. In November they were attached to the 21st Brigade, and throughout December the 39th Battalion was involved in further fighting as the brigade fought around Gona. During this time the 39th suffered heavy casualties, however, the fighting continued and having captured the Gona Mission, the battalion moved to the Sanananda Track on 21 December, taking up a forward position at Huggins’ Road Block.

In the New Year the battalion was withdrawn to Soputa and returned to the 30th Brigade, however, they had suffered heavy casualties and in January 1943, when it was flown back to Port Moresby, it had a frontage of only seven officers and 25 men. In February the 39th was ordered to prepare for operations in the Wau area, in anticipation of a further Japanese attack, however, this attack did not eventuate and on 12 March the 39th Battalion embarked for the return journey to Australia.

Disbandment

Following the 39th Battalion’s return to Australia, it was decided that the 30th Brigade, along with its component battalions—39th, 49th, and 3rd Battalions—would be disbanded. This came into effect on 3 July 1943 and as a result of this decision, the Militiamen that had been called up for service were absorbed in to the 36th Battalion, while those who volunteered for overseas service were absorbed into the 2/2nd Battalion.

At the end of the battalion’s involvement in the fighting in New Guinea, 1,666 men had served in its ranks. The battalion suffered 403 combat casualties, which consisted of 118 killed in action, 13 died of wounds, five died other causes, and 266 wounded in action. Illness and disease also took a heavy toll and as a result, after six months of combat the 39th Battalion’s muster roll was only seven officers and 25 other ranks.

For their service during World War II members of the 39th Battalion received the following decorations: two Members of the British Empire, one Distinguished Service Order, four Distinguished Conduct Medals, seven Military Crosses, 10 Military Medals, one Distinguished Service Cross and 11 Mentions in Dispatches.

Battle honours
World War I: St Quentin Canal, Messines 1917, Ypres 1917, Polygon Wood, Broodseinde, Poelcappelle, Passchendaele, Somme 1918, Ancre 1918, Amiens, Albert 1918, Mont St Quentin, Hindenburg Line, France and Flanders 1916–1918.
World War II: South-West Pacific 1942–43, Kokoda Trail, Kokoda–Deniki, Isurava, Eora Creek–Templeton’s Crossing I, Buna–Gona, Gona, Sanananda Road, Amboga River.

To read more on the WW1 operations, the 39 Bn AIF Unit History 1916-19 can be ordered and downloaded in the eBook store here.

ANZAC – Australia’s youngest casualty

James Charles (Jim) Martin (3 January 1901 – 25 October 1915) was the youngest Australian known to have died in World War I. He was only 14 years and nine months old when he succumbed to typhoid during the Gallipoli campaign. He was one of 20 Australian soldiers under the age of 18 known to have died in World War I.

James Martin was born to Amelia and Charles Martin on 3 January 1901. His father was born Charles Marks, in Auckland, New Zealand however, after emigrating to Australia and settling in Tocumwal, New South Wales, he changed his name to Martin to avoid discrimination for being Jewish. Charles worked as a grocer, handyman and (horse-drawn) cab driver. His mother, Amelia, was born in Bendigo in 1876 to Thomas and Frances Park. Her parents had emigrated to Australia during the gold rush in the 1850s. The youngest of twelve children, she married Charles just before her 18th birthday.

Martin’s family moved to many different suburbs in and around Melbourne before finally settling in Hawthorn in 1910. Born in Hawthorn, he was the third of six children, and the only son. He attended Manningtree Road State School from 1910 to 1915, during which time he also received basic military training as a junior cadet under the compulsory training scheme.

At the outbreak of World War I Martin enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force on 12 April 1915, against the wishes of his family. His parents finally agreed however when he made it clear that he would sign on under an assumed name and never write to them if they did not consent. He gave a false date of birth to the recruiting officer, claiming to be 18, when he was actually 14 years and three months.

Martin joined the 1st Reinforcements of the 21st Battalion as a private and trained in Broadmeadows and Seymour (later Puckapunyal) camps in Victoria before boarding HMAT Berrima in June 1915 to deploy to Egypt. In late August, he was sent to Gallipoli on the steamer HMT Southland, to take part in the fighting against the Turks. En route, his ship was torpedoed by a German submarine off the island of Lemnos and he was rescued after spending four hours in the water. After being picked up, Martin rejoined his battalion at Mudros Island where they were transferred to the transport ship Abassieh on 7 September.

The following morning, just before 2:00 am, Martin’s platoon, 4 Platoon, landed at Watson’s Pier in Anzac Cove. He then served in trenches around Courtney’s Post, which was positioned on the ridge overlooking Monash Valley. During this time he wrote to his family telling them that “the Turks are still about 70 yards (64 m) away from us” and asked them not to worry about him as “I am doing splendid over here”. Throughout his time in Gallipoli, although his family were writing to him, Martin did not receive any letters from home due to a breakdown in the mail system.

Following a period of cold temperatures and heavy rain Martin contracted enteric fever (typhoid) in the trenches. After suffering mild symptoms for about a fortnight during which time he refused treatment, he was subsequently evacuated to the hospital ship Glenart Castle on 25 October 1915 after he developed diarrhoea. He died of heart failure that night, at the age of 14 and nine months, and was buried at sea the next day. At the time of his death only Martin’s parents and his best friend, Cec Hogan—who was himself only 16—knew Martin’s real age. Nevertheless, on 18 December 1915, Melbourne’s Herald newspaper reported Martin’s death in an article titled “Youngest Soldier Dies”.

Martin was awarded the 1914–15 Star, the British War Medal, and the Victory Medal. His name is recorded on the Australian memorial at Lone Pine and on the Australian War Memorial roll of honour in Canberra.

His Majesty’s Troopship Southland – an incident of the Gallipoli campaign

HMT Southland was an ocean liner launched in July 1900 as SS Vaderland for Red Star Line service between Antwerp and New York. During her passenger career, the ship initially sailed under British registry, but was re-registered in Antwerp in 1903. Vaderland was a sister ship to Zeeland and a near sister ship to Kroonland and Finland.

After the beginning of the First World War, Vaderland was re-registered in Liverpool and converted to a troopship, ferrying troops of the Canadian Expeditionary Force from Halifax to Liverpool. While under the operation of White Star–Dominion in 1915, she was renamed Southland to avoid the German-sounding Vaderland.

The Southland was later used in the Mediterranean to carry troops of the 6th Essex regiment and two companies of l/7th Essex, transported from Devonport to Gallipoli from 4 July 1915 to 11 August 1915, and later from Alexandria, the Australian 22nd Battalion (6th Brigade) 2nd Division AIF with some troops from the Australian 23rd Battalion, General Legge and staff and 2nd Division Signals Company. During its sail from Egypt to Gallipoli on the 2 September 1914 at 9:45am it was torpedoed at right forward by the German submarine UB-14 30 nautical miles (56 km) from Lemnos in the Aegean Sea. The ship did not sink immediately, and was eventually beached on Lemnos, and all but 40 of 1400 men were able to leave in lifeboats and were picked up by other transports and HT Neuralia, although mostly by HMS Ben-my-Chree by about midday though some troops spent up to 4 hours in the water. During the subsequent rescue operations Ben-my-Chree took on board 649 troops and 121 crew from 21 boats and rafts and provided medical attention as required until all were transferred to the troopship SS Transylvania in Mudros harbour. Southland eventually limped back to Mudros assisted by HMS Racoon and was repaired.

The sinking was reported as

“A Splendid story is told of the sinking of the transport Southland in the Mediterranean Sea. When the torpedo struck the vessel rolled and the order was given to abandon the ship. There was never a cry or sign of fear. The Australian soldiers merely came briskly on deck singing ‘Australia will be there.’ The troops all went to their stations and lowered the boats in an orderly manner. The subalterns searched the interior of the ship for wounded and finally came on deck to find only the general staff on board. They helped to lower the last boats and got into a half swamped one themselves. Fourteen persons were killed by the explosion and twenty two were drowned including Brigadier General Linton.”

A record of this event is recorded in the war diary of Captain Herbert Franklin Curnow Thursday 2nd September Up 6am. Drew 120 rounds of ammunition and iron and landing rations. Pulled into Lemnos and dropped anchor about 10am. The Military Landing Officer came on board, got my disembarkation return and meantime informed us that the “Southland” having on board 2 Aus Div H.Q 6th Inf Bge HQ., 21 Bt 1 Coy 23rd Btn. some A.S.C. A.M.C. & Signalling details had been torpedoed behind us. Later ascertained about 25 lives lost including Col Linton, Brigadier. Turned in soon after dinner.

However, a member of Australian unit reported one crew shot for behaving improperly. The remaining men and ship’s crew were able to got to the Allied vessels later the same day. HMT Southland carried James Martin whose experiences, and those of his friend Cecil Hogan, were described in a book by Anthony Hill.

The sinking was depicted in the painting Sinking of the Southland by Fred Leist, who was appointed an official war artist in September 1917, and attached to the 5th Division AIF.

Southland was repaired and returned to White Star–Dominion for Liverpool–Quebec–Montreal service in August 1916, but on 4 June 1917 was torpedoed and sunk by the German submarine SM U-70 while 140 nautical miles (260 km) northwest of Tory Island off the Irish coast with the loss of 4 lives.

First Australian Imperial Force – Mutiny on the Western Front.

The First Australian Imperial Force (1st AIF) was the main expeditionary force of the Australian Army during World War I. It was formed from 15 August 1914, following Britain’s declaration of war on Germany. Generally known at the time as the AIF, it is today referred to as the 1st AIF to distinguish from the 2nd AIF which was raised during World War II.

The 1st AIF was a purely volunteer force for the duration of the war. In Australia, two plebiscites on conscription were defeated, thereby preserving the volunteer status but stretching the AIF’s reserves towards the end of the war. A total of 331,814 Australians were sent overseas to serve as part of the AIF, which represented 13% of the white male population. Of these, 18% (61,859) were killed. The casualty rate (killed or wounded) was 64%. About 2,100 women served with the 1st AIF, mainly as nurses. Close to 20% of those who served in the 1st AIF had been born in the United Kingdom but all enlistments had to occur in Australia (there were a few exceptions). As a volunteer force, all units were demobilized at the end of the war.

The Australian infantry did not have regiments in the British sense, only battalions identified by ordinal number (1st to 60th). Each battalion originated from a geographical region. New South Wales and Victoria, the most populous states, filled their own battalions (and even whole brigades) while the “Outer States” often combined to assemble a battalion. These regional associations remained throughout the war and each battalion developed its own strong regimental identity.

In the manpower crisis following the Third Battle of Ypres, in which the five divisions sustained 38,000 casualties, there were plans to follow the British reorganisation and reduce all brigades from four battalions to three. In the British regimental system this was traumatic enough; however, the regimental identity survived the disbanding of a single battalion. In the Australian system, disbanding a battalion meant the extinction of the unit. In September 1918, when the call was made to disband eight battalions, there followed a series of “mutinies over disbandment” where the ranks refused to report to their new battalions. In the AIF, mutiny was one of two charges that carried the death penalty, the other being desertion to the enemy. Instead of being charged with mutiny, the instigators were charged as being AWOL and the doomed battalions were eventually permitted to remain together for the forthcoming battle, following which the survivors voluntarily disbanded.

Charles Bean in the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 – Volume VI – The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Allied Offensive, 1918 described the situation as follows:

The 1st and 4th Australian Divisions were now relieved and went to the rear for the “Corps” rest for which they had been hoping since July. General Monash had also insisted that the three remaining Australian divisions must go into rest after the next battle. While he was in the thick of preparation for that offensive, another sharp trouble, though much less serious than it might appear to non-Australians, descended on him.

The Army Council in London was concerned at the depletion of the Australian infantry through lack of reinforcements. It pointed out that the 57 Australian battalions were 8,500 men short, and that reinforcement drafts for the next four months, estimated at 3,000 monthly, would be insufficient to keep up even the present strength. Battalions which entered the battle with 300-400 men were in some important respects uneconomic, requiring the same staff as a battalion that took in 750. In the British Army this difficulty had been met by disbanding the fourth battalion in each infantry brigade; a similar measure had long before been adopted by the French and Germans, and this policy had already been approved for the A.I.F. in February: Battalions had been earmarked for disbandment but, in view of the extreme reluctance expressed by the Australian Government, it was to be carried out only gradually as it became unavoidable.

Three battalions had been thus disbanded in the spring; Haig entirely accepted the Australian Government’s condition, but in June he pointed out that of the 57 remaining battalions 5 now had less than 700 men, 17 less than 800 and only 11 more than 900, which was the strength then laid down as minimum. He considered this (‘a rather alarming degree of unevenness.” Birdwood (as G.O.C., A.I.F.) explained that there were still hopes of keeping the battalions at 900 and that they were disbanded only when so weak as to be inefficient as fighting units. On August 29th the Army Council drafted a letter to Haig saying that, in view of the shortage then evident, it considered that the reduction of the remaining four-battalion brigades to three-battalion ones should be carried out as soon as possible. Before sending this letter it passed the draft to A.I.F. Headquarters for comment, and Birdwood asked Monash for his views. Both realised that the step would cause intense heart-burning, and Monash, even now that his battalions were going into battle 300-400 strong, urged that it should be postponed till the new year.

It is not likely that weather conditions will permit of our carrying on for much longer at the same intense pressure at which the Corps has been going for the last five months, (he wrote to Birdwood on Sep. 7). In all probability if we carry on, at latest till the end of October, we ought to be able to carry on right over the winter. It was possible, he added, that G.H.Q. might then be able to do “what we all desire”-keep the Australian Corps entirely out of the line for the four winter months. Australian battalions had never been so effective as in the last month when they were all far below strength; he urged that 750 should be considered a sufficient strength even for next year. I welcome any pretext (he said to a friend on Sep. 8th) to take the fewest possible men into action. So long as they have thirty Lewis guns (per battalion) it doesn’t very much matter what else they have.

And it was true that the A.I.F. battalions, entering these great battles with 300-400 rifles, still attacked on fronts of 850-1,000 yards, and had even attacked on fronts of up to a mile. Carrying parties could not be provided; Lewis gun teams were reduced to two men, and Vickers gun crews could no longer carry full loads of ammunition. These and the food supplies had to go by pack or waggon, and in recent fights this had worked very well. Monash asked to be allowed to reorganise his battalions on a three company basis, but he well knew that most of them had already done this for themselves, and reduced their companies to three or even two platoons. Finally he asked to be allowed discretion to recommend the disbanding of “one or more battalions” if he and his generals found it advantageous. Birdwood insisted on prompter action, pointing out that the principle had already been determined in January. He and Monash now agreed that it should not yet be applied to the four original brigades, but he informed the War Office that it would be applied in all unreduced brigades as soon as found necessary.

It was immediately after this that Monash learnt of the coming withdrawal of “1914 men” (estimated by him at “upwards of 6,000”) on furlough to Australia, which obviously would render the disbandments more urgent. The battalions selected by divisional commanders on the advice of their brigadiers were the 19th, 21st,25th,37th, 42nd,54th and 60th; and on September 23rd the order went out for their immediate disbandment: in each case their records, and a few representatives were to go to training battalions on Salisbury Plain, whose companies would assume the battalions’ names, but the rest would reinforce some other battalion or battalions of their own brigade.

To officers and men of these battalions the blow was overwhelming. The step might be necessary-but why should their battalion be chosen. Men and even officers held among themselves indignant meetings. In the first battalion to hear of its fate, the 37th, Col. Story, a fine leader, took the step of protesting not merely to the brigadier, but over his head to Gellibrand, Monash and Birdwood, a serious breach of discipline. Moreover in the bitterness of the moment Story’s letter was foolishly drawn, disparaging sister units. He was relieved of his command, but his attitude had become widely known. At a meeting the men of the 37th agreed that on the final parade they would obey every order but the last-the order to march to their new battalions. On September 22nd when that parade took place, they did so, obeying every command but the final one. Brig.-Genl. McNicoll was then summoned and spoke to the men, but with the same result. The officers then reluctantly obeyed an order to fall out; after them the sergeants did the same-and one corporal and one private. The remainder were told that, if they did not join their new units that afternoon, they would be posted as absent without leave. Being left to themselves they at once re-established strict military form in the battalion, choosing from their own number commanders to carry on temporarily the absent officers’ duties. It was noticeable that those selected were not the “bad hats” or of the demagogue type, but the men most fitted to lead in action, and strict discipline was maintained. The battalion marched back to its huts; men already in detention for various offences were retained under guard ; the medical aid-post was re-formed by the orderlies, and church parade for next day arranged with the padre, who went with the men.

The “commanders” had meals with the men, rations being obtained through the support of other units who “lost” occasional boxes of food from their own waggon-loads as they passed near by. There was keen sympathy for these troops throughout the force and, one after the other, the other selected battalions, when ordered to disband (mostly on September 24th and 25th) took the same action. General Gellibrand had asked for representatives of the 37th to meet him, and later went to the camp and talked the matter over with the men in a friendly, informal way. Monash also spoke quietly to representatives of the 37th, and battalion Commanders and brigadiers addressed all the recalcitrant battalions. The men’s argument was the same in every case and was entirely sincere.

Look Colonel (said those of the 25th to Col. Davis) the 25th from the first has been built on esprit de corps. We have been taught that the regiment is everything. You have often told us that we must sacrifice everything for its honour. We have always obeyed you and we always will-in everything but what you now ask. We cannot obey you in this just for that reason-we would sacrifice everything for the battalion. They told General Wisdom that it was their unanimous wish to go into the next battle and to be given the hardest task: there would either be no 25th left to break up, or they would leave such a record as would make it impossible to break them up. All the resisting battalions said they were keen to enter the great attack that they knew to be impending, but they demanded to be allowed to go in with their identity unchanged. A point elicited by Gellibrand was that the amalgamation of two battalions would be much less keenly felt than the extinction (in the field) of one of them.

Some units were clearly affected by their commanders’ arguments, the strongest of which was that they could not indefinitely resist, which the men knew to be true; but only one battalion gave way. It is a tribute to the unrivalled hold of Brig.-Genl. “Pompey” Elliott on the loyalty of his men that the 60th Battalion, after disobeying its commander’s order to join the 59th, agreed to do so upon being addressed by this beloved stout-hearted Australian. What was Elliott’s disgust when next morning, September 27th, he learnt that the other battalions were being allowed to go into the coming battle intact. As the great offensive was only a few days distant Monash had urged upon Rawlinson that the disbandment should be deferred for a fortnight, and asked him to press this upon Haig. The news of the order, says a record of the 21st Battalion, “was received with deafening cheers.” Naturally trouble at once recurred in the 60th, but Elliott again addressed it.

“By using my influence to the utmost,” he wrote in his diary, “I managed to sway the men over the line. My brigade is the only one in which the reorganisation was successfully accomplished.”
This incident has been called that of “the mutinies over disbandment,” and so in the strict sense of the terms it was; but the refusal was not treated as mutiny by any authority, Australian or British. In contrast to the mutiny in the 1st Battalion, it had its origin in some of the best men and finest qualities of the A.I.F. Australian soldiers had experienced few ties of loyalty in their civil lives; and a public loyalty once conceived was sustained with a flaming zeal disconcerting to those who had encouraged it. If, as General Brudenell White always strongly wished, it had been possible to tie the A.I.F. battalions oversea to the corresponding regiments of the citizen forces in Australia, so that the home regiment fed battalions or even companies overseas as in the New Zealand force, this trouble would probably never have arisen. But the A.I.F. was an improvised force and the disbandment of a battalion carried too many of the consequences of its extinction.

Mutiny was one of the only two offences punishable in the A.I.F. by death. No man was punished for his part in the disbandment mutiny. The mutiny in the 1st Battalion was in a totally different category. The men who refused duty, 119 in number, were tried and, with one exception, found guilty, not of joining in a mutiny, but of desertion. The ending of hostilities caused General Monash not to enforce the penalties and almost certainly saved him and the A.I.F. from having to face difficult problems whose solution would have called for not only tact but the highest qualities of wisdom, leadership and moral courage. Monash had some of these. In this decisive fighting, for such it was, he was right to work his troops to the extreme limit of their endurance, which normally is beyond the limit to which men themselves think they can endure. At such times victory often goes to the troops that hold out longest, withstanding strain, toil or exhaustion in perhaps unbelievable degree and for an unbelievable time; and the value of different armies depends largely upon how far they are ready to do this. On the other hand students of history may doubt whether mere eagerness for military prestige could ever, as Monash apparently imagined, maintain the will to such sacrifices, or could be wisely substituted for the high aims of justice and humanity in implanting a motive for which ordinary men, in such a war, will readily die.

The 21st Battalion Australian Imperial Force

The 21st Battalion was an infantry battalion of the Australian Army. It was raised in 1915 as part of the First Australian Imperial Force for service during World War I and formed part of the 6th Brigade, attached to the 2nd Division. It fought during the Gallipoli campaign and on the Western Front before being disbanded in late 1918. The battalion was the first Australian battalion to commence active operations on the Western Front and also had the distinction of being the last to pull back when the Australian Corps was withdrawn from the line.

Returning to Egypt via Lemnos, the battalion undertook Canal Zone defensive duties and further training. During this time the AIF underwent a period of reorganisation while its future employment on operations was decided. A number of units from the 1st Division were split up and used to provide cadre staff for newly formed battalions, however, the 21st Battalion, like the rest of those from the 2nd Division remained intact. In mid-1916 the decision was made to transfer part of the AIF to Europe to take part in the fighting along the Western Front, and in March 1916 the battalion arrived in France. In April they became the first Australian battalion to “commence active operations on the Western Front”. In July 1916, during the Battle of Pozières, the battalion was committed to the battle, but was mainly used to carry out portage tasks. Later, in August, during the fighting around Mouquet Farm, the 21st Battalion suffered its most significant losses of the war.

Throughout 1917, the battalion took part in two major battles. The first came in May, when the 21st Battalion fought in the Second Battle of Bullecourt. In October, during the fighting around Broodseinde they advanced over 3 kilometres (3,000 m) before being withdrawn from the line for rest.

After a period in reserve for rest and reinforcement the battalion was called upon to help to defend against the German Spring Offensive of April 1918. After this was defeated, the Allies launched their own offensive, known as the Hundred Days Offensive and subsequently the 21st Battalion went on to participate in the battles of Hamel, Amiens and Mont St. Quentin. During the fight for Mont St Quentin, Sergeant Albert Lowerson was awarded the Victoria Cross. He had led seven men, attacking the flanks of a post, rushed the strongpoint and captured it, together with 12 machine-guns and 30 prisoners. He was severely wounded in the right thigh, but refused to leave the front line until the position had been consolidated.

As a result of the heavy losses that the battalion suffered during this time, coupled with the limited reinforcements arriving from Australia following the defeat of the conscription referendum, the 21st Battalion’s strength fell to the point where it was able to field little more than a company of men fit for active service. As a result it was ordered to disband and provide reinforcements to other battalions. On 25 September 1918, however, the battalion’s personnel mutinied in protest against the order to disband and subsequently the order was rescinded. Thus, the 21st Battalion took part in the final Australian operation of the war, joining the attack at Montbrehain on 5 October. The following day, however, upon a request made by Prime Minister Billy Hughes, the Australian Corps was withdrawn from the line. The 21st Battalion had the distinction of being the last Australian battalion to be withdrawn.

Following this, the battalion was formally disbanded on 13 October 1918 and its personnel dispersed to other units as reinforcements. Throughout its service during the war, it suffered 872 men killed and 2,434 wounded (including those that were gassed). Members of the battalion received the following decorations: one Victoria Cross, five Distinguished Service Orders with one bar, one Order of the British Empire, 22 Military Crosses with seven bars, 29 Distinguished Conduct Medals, 117 Military Medals with seven bars, seven Meritorious Service Medals, 24 Mentioned in Despatches, and eight foreign awards.

The 21st Battalion received the following battle honours for its service during World War I:
Suvla, Gallipoli 1915–1916, Egypt 1915–1917, Somme 1916, Pozieres, Bapaume 1917, Bullecourt, Ypres 1917, Menin Road, Polygon Wood, Broodseinde, Poelcappelle, Passchendaele, Hamel, Amiens, Albert 1918, Mont St Quentin, Hindenburg Line, Beaurevoir, France and Flanders 1916–1918.

The 21st Battalion attacks Mont St Quentin, 1 September 1918

The 21st Bn AIF Unit History can be ordered for online download here.

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28 Battalion AIF – Unit History

“The 28th: A Record of War Service in the Australian Imperial Force, 1915-19, Vol. I Egypt, Gallipoli, Lemnos Island, Sinai Peninsula” By COLONEL H. B. COLLETT – 1922

The 28th Battalion was raised at Blackboy Camp in Western Australia on 16 April 1915. The battalion left Australia in June, and, after two months spent training in Egypt, landed at Gallipoli on 10 September.

The 28th Battalion was raised at Blackboy Camp in Western Australia on 16 April 1915 from recruits previously earmarked for the 24th Battalion, which was instead being raised in Victoria. The battalion left Australia in June, and, after two months spent training in Egypt, landed at Gallipoli on 10 September.

28 Bn in Egypt

28 Bn in Egypt

At Gallipoli, the 7th Brigade, which included the 28th Battalion, reinforced the weary New Zealand and Australian Division. The 28th had a relatively quiet time at Gallipoli and the battalion departed the peninsula in December, having suffered only light casualties.

After another stint in Egypt, the 7th Brigade proceeded to France and the Western Front, as part of the 2nd Australian Division. The 28th Battalion took part in its first major battle at Pozières between 28 July and 6 August 1916. After a spell in a quieter sector of the front in Belgium, the 2nd Division returned to the south in October, where the 28th Battalion took part in confused and costly fighting to the east of Flers, in the Somme Valley.

For many of the major battles of 1917 the 28th found itself in supporting roles. At the second battle of Bullecourt, the 28th provided reinforcements who were nonetheless involved in heavy fighting. The 28th went on to attack as part of the third phase at the battle of Menin Road, capturing its objectives in seven minutes, and was in reserve during the capture of Broodseinde Ridge. The battalion was also in reserve for the battle of Poelcappelle on 9 October, but, with the attack floundering in the mud, it soon became embroiled in the fighting.

In April 1918, the 28th fought to turn back the German spring offensive and, from 8 August participated in the joint British and French offensive that marked the beginning of Germany’s defeat. The Battalion was prominent in the fighting to secure crossing points over the Somme River around Peronne, and in the advance beyond Mont St Quentin. The 28th’s last actions of the war were fought as part of the effort to break through the Beaurevoir Line in the first week of October 1918. The first members of the battalion began returning to Australia in January, and the 28th was disbanded in March 1919.

The Unit History Volume 1 is available in PDF eBook format. Volume 1 of the Unit history covers the Unit formation, transport to Egypt, action in Gallipoli and the Sinai from 1915-1916. A second Volume was never produced.

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Blackboy Camp

Blackboy Camp

Gallipoli

Gallipoli

28 Bn at Gallipoli

28 Bn at Gallipoli

Map at Gallipoli

Map at Gallipoli

Report of the British Committee on the Alleged German Outrages – WW1

Report of the British Committee on the Alleged German Outrages

Introductory Observations

. . . The depositions printed in the Appendix themselves show that the stories were tested in detail, and in none of these have we been able to detect the trace of any desire to “make a case” against the German army. Care was taken to impress upon the witness that the giving of evidence was a grave and serious matter, and every deposition submitted to us was signed by the witness in the presence of the examiner.

A noteworthy feature of many of the depositions is that though taken at different places and on different dates, and by different lawyers from different witnesses, they often corroborate each other in a striking manner.

The evidence is all couched in the very words which the witnesses used, and where they spoke, as the Belgian witnesses did, in Flemish or French, pains were taken to have competent translators, and to make certain that the translation was exact.

Seldom did these Belgian witnesses show a desire to describe what they had seen or suffered. The lawyers who took the depositions were surprised to find how little vindictiveness, or indeed passion, they showed, and how generally free from emotional excitement their narratives were. Many hesitated to speak lest what they said, if it should ever be published, might involve their friends or relatives at home in danger, and it was found necessary to give an absolute promise that names should not be disclosed.

For this reason names have been omitted.

A large number of depositions, and extracts from depositions, will be found in Appendix A., and to these your attention is directed.

In all cases these are given as nearly as possible (for abbreviation was sometimes inevitable) in the exact words of the witness, and wherever a statement has been made by a witness tending to exculpate the German troops, it has been given in full. Excisions have been made only where it has been felt necessary to conceal the identity of the deponent, or to omit what are merely hearsay statements, or are palpably irrelevant. In every case the name and description of the witnesses are given in the original depositions and in copies which have been furnished to us by H.M. Government. The originals remain in the custody of the Home Department, where they will be available, in case of need, for reference after the conclusion of the War.

The Committee have also had before them a number of diaries taken from the German dead.

It appears to be the custom in the German army for soldiers to be encouraged to keep diaries and record in them the chief events of each day. A good many of these diaries were collected on the field when British troops were advancing over ground which had been held by the enemy, were sent to Head Quarters in France, and despatched thence to the War Office in England. They passed into the possession of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau, and were handed by it to our secretaries. They have been translated with great care. We have inspected them and are absolutely satisfied of their authenticity. They have thrown important light upon the methods followed in the conduct of the war. In one respect indeed, they are the most weighty part of the evidence, because they proceed from a hostile source and are not open to any such criticism on the ground of bias as might be applied to Belgian testimony. From time to time references to these diaries will be found in the text of the Report. In Appendix B. they are set out at greater length both in the German original and in an English translation, together with a few photographs of the more important entries.

In Appendix C. are set out a number of German proclamations. Most of these are included in the Belgian Report No. VI. which has been furnished to us. Actual specimens of original proclamations, issued by or at the bidding of the German military authorities, and posted in the Belgian and French towns mentioned, have been produced to us, and copies thereof are to be found in this Appendix.

Appendix D. contains the rules of the Hague Convention dealing with the conduct of War On Land as adopted in 1907, Germany being one of the signatory powers.

In Appendix E. will be found a selection of statements collected in France by Professor Morgan.

These five appendices are contained in a separate volume.

In dealing with the evidence we have recognised the importance of testing it severely, and so far as the conditions permit we have followed the principles which are recognised in the Courts of England, the British Overseas Dominions, and the United States. We have also as already noted set aside the testimony of any witnesses who did not favourably impress the lawyers who took their depositions, and have rejected hearsay evidence except in cases where hearsay furnished an undesigned confirmation of facts with regard to which we already possessed direct testimony from some other source, or explained in a natural way facts imperfectly narrated or otherwise perplexing.

It is natural to ask whether much of the evidence given, especially by the Belgian witnesses, may not be due to excitement and overstrained emotions, and whether, apart from deliberate. falsehood persons who mean to speak the truth may not in a more or less hysterical condition have been imagining themselves to have seen the things which they say that they saw. Both the lawyers who took the depositions, and we when we came to examine them, full recognised this possibility. The lawyers, as already observed, took pains to test each witness and either rejected, or appended a note of distrust to, the testimony of those who failed to impress them favourably. We have carried the sifting still further by also omitting from the depositions those in which we found something that seemed too exceptional to be accepted on the faith of one witness only, or too little supported by other evidence pointing to like facts. Many depositions have thus been omitted on which , although they are probably true, we think it safer not to place reliance.

Notwithstanding these precautions, we began the inquiry with doubts whether a positive result would be attained. But the further we went and the more evidence we examined so much the more was our scepticism reduced. There might be some exaggeration in one witness, possible delusion in another. inaccuracies in a third. When, however, we found that things which had at first seemed improbable were testified to by many witnesses coming from different places, having had no communication with one another, and knowing nothing of one another’s statements the points in which they all agreed became more and more evidently true. And when this concurrence of testimony, this convergence up on what were substantially the same broad facts, showed itself in hundreds of depositions, the truth of those broad facts stood out beyond question. The force of the evidence is cumulative. Its worth can be estimated only by perusing the testimony as a whole. If any further confirmation had been needed, we found it in the diaries in which German officers and private soldiers have recorded incidents just such as those to which the Belgian witnesses depose.

The experienced lawyers who took the depositions tell us that they passed from the same stage of doubt into the same stage of conviction. They also began their work in a sceptical spirit, expecting to find much of the evidence coloured by passion, or prompted by an excited fancy. But they were impressed by the general moderation and matter of fact level-headedness of the witnesses.

We interrogated them, particularly regarding some of the most startling and shocking incidents which appear in the evidence laid before us, and where they expressed a doubt we have excluded the evidence, admitting it as regards the cases in which they stated that the witnesses seemed to them to be speaking the truth, and that they themselves believed the incidents referred to have happened. It is for this reason that we have inserted among the depositions printed in the Appendix several cases which we might otherwise have deemed scarcely credible.

The Committee has conducted its investigations and come to its conclusions independently of the reports issued by the French and Belgian Commissions, but it has no reason to doubt that those conclusions are in substantial accord with the conclusions that have been reached by these two Commissions.

Report of the British Committee on the Alleged German Outrages

Excerpt:

CHARLEROIS DISTRICT. In Tamines, a large village on the Meuse between Namur and Charleroi, the advance guard of the German army appeared in the first fortnight in August, and in this as well as in other villages in the district, it is proved that a large number of civilians, among them aged people, women and children, were deliberately killed by the soldiers. One witness describes how she saw a Belgian boy of fifteen shot on the village green at Tamines, and a day or two later on the same green a little girl and her two brothers (name given) who were looking at the German soldiers, were killed before her eyes for no apparent reason.

The principal massacre at Tamines took place about August the 23rd. A witness describes how he saw the public square littered with corpses and after a search found those of his wife and child, a little girl of seven.

Another witness, who lived near Tamines, went there on August 27th, and says: “It is absolutely destroyed and a mass of ruins.”

At Morlanwelz, about this time, the British army, together with some French cavalry were compelled to retire before the German troops. The latter took the burgomaster and his man servant prisoner and shot them both in front of the H\’99tel de Ville at Peronne (Belgium), where the bodies were left in the street for 48 hours. They burnt the Hotel de Ville and 62 houses. The usual accusation of firing by civilians was made. It is strenuously denied by the witness, who declares that three or four days before the arrival of the Germans, circulars had been distributed to every house and placards had been posted in the town ordering the deposit of all firearms at the Hotel de Ville and that this order had been complied with.

At Monceau-sur-Sambre, on the 21st August, a young man of eighteen was shot in his garden. His father and brother were seized in their house and shot in the courtyard of a neighbouring country house. The son was shot first. The father was compelled to stand close to the feet of his son’s corpse and to fix his eyes upon him while he himself was shot. The corpse of the young man shot in the garden was carried into the house and put on a bed. The next morning the Germans asked where the corpse was. When they found it was in the house they fetched straw, packed it round the bed on which the corpse was lying, and set fire to it and burnt the house down. A great many houses were burnt in Monceau.

A vivid picture of the events at Montigny-sur-Sambre has been given by a witness of high standing who had exceptional opportunities of observation. In the early morning of Saturday, August 2nd, Uhlans reached Montigny. The French army was about 4 kilometres away, but on a hill near the village were a detachment of French about 150 to 200 strong lying in ambush. At about 1.30 the main body of the German army began to arrive. Marching with them were two groups of so-called hostages, about 400 in all. Of these, 300 were surrounded with a rope held by the front, rear, and outside men. The French troops in ambush opened fire, and immediately the Germans commenced to destroy the town. Incendiaries with a distinctive badge on their arm went down the main street throwing handfuls of inflammatory and explosive pastilles into the houses. These pastilles were carried by them in bags, and in this way about 130 houses were destroyed in the main street. By 10.30 p.m. some 200 more hostages had been collected. These were drawn from Montigny itself and on that night about 50 men, women, and children were placed on the bridge over the Sambre and kept there all night. The bridge was similarly guarded for a day or two, apparently either from a fear that it was mined or in the belief that these men, women, and children would afford some protection to the Germans in the event of the French attempting to storm the bridge. At one period of the German occupation of Montigny, eight nuns of the Order of Ste. Marie were captives on the bridge. House burning was accompanied by murder, and on the Monday morning 27 civilians from one parish alone were seen lying dead in the hospital.

Other outrages committed at Jumet, Bouffioulx, Charleroi, Marchiennes-au-Pont, Couillet, and Maubeuge are described in the depositions given in the Appendix.

DINANT.

A clear statement of the outrages at Dinant, which many travellers will recall as a singularly picturesque town on the Meuse, is given by one witness, who says that the Germans began burning houses in the Rue St. Jacques on the 21st August, and that every house in the street was burnt. On the following day an engagement took place between the French and the Germans, and the witness spent the whole day in the cellar of a bank with his wife and children. On the morning of the 23rd, about 5 o’clock, firing ceased, and almost immediately afterwards a party of Germans came to the house. They rang the bell and began to batter at the door and windows. The witness’s wife went to the door and two or three Germans came in. The family were ordered out into the street. There they found another family, and the two families were driven with their hands above their heads along the Rue Grande. All the houses in the street were burning. The party was eventually put into a forge where there were a number of other prisoners, about a hundred in all, and were kept there from 11 a.m. till 2 p.m. They were then taken to the prison. There they were assembled in a courtyard and searched. No arms were found. They were then passed through into the prison itself and put into cells. The witness and his wife were separated from each other. During the next hour the witness heard rifle shots continually, and noticed in the corner of a court yard leading off the row of cells the body of a young man with a mantle thrown over it. He recognised the mantle as having belonged to his wife. The witness’s daughter was allowed to go out to see what had happened to her mother, and the witness himself was allowed to go across the courtyard half an hour afterwards for the same purpose. He found his wife lying on the floor in a room. She had bullet wounds in four places, but was alive and told her husband to return to the children, and he did so. About 5 o’clock in the evening he saw the German ringing out all the young and middle-aged men from the cells, and ranging their prisoners, to the number of 40, in three rows in the middle of the courtyard. About 20 Germans were drawn up opposite, but before anything was done there was a tremendous fusillade from some point near the prison and the civilians were hurried back to their cells. Half an hour later the same 40 men were brought back into the courtyard. Almost immediately there was a second fusillade like the first and they were driven back to the cells again. About 7 o’clock the witness and other prisoners were brought out of their cell and marched out of the prison. They went between two line of troops to Roche Bayard about a kilometre away. An hour later the women and children were separated and the prisoners were brought back to Dinant, passing the prison on their way. Just outside the prison the witness saw three lines of bodies, which he recognised as being those of neighbours. They were nearly all dead, but he noticed movement in some of them. There were about 120 bodies. The prisoners were then taken up to the top of the hill outside Dinant and compelled to stay there till 8 o’clock in the morning. On the following day they were put into cattle trucks and taken thence to Coblenz. For three months they remained prisoners in Germany.

Unarmed civilians were killed in masses at other places near the prison. About 90 bodies were seen lying on the top of one another in a grass square opposite the convent. They included many relatives of a witness whose deposition will be found in the Appendix. This witness asked a German officer why her husband had been shot, and he told her that it was because two of her sons had been in the civil guard and had shot at the Germans. As a matter of fact one of her sons was at that time in Liege and the other in Brussels. It is stated that beside the 90 corpses referred to above, 60 corpses of civilians were recovered from a hole in the brewery yard and that 48 bodies of women and children were found in a garden. The town was systematically set on fire by hand grenades.

Another witness saw a little girl of seven, one of whose legs was broken and the other injured by a bayonet.

We have no reason to believe that the civilian population of Dinant gave any provocation, or that any other defence can be put forward to justify the treatment inflicted upon its citizens.

As regards this town and the advance of the German army from Dinant to Rethel on the Aisne, a graphic account is given in the diary of a Saxon officer. [A copy of this diary was given by the French military authorities to the British Headquarters Staff in France, and the latter have communicated it to the Committee. It will be found in Appendix B. after the German diaries shown to us by the British War Office.] This diary confirms what is clear from the evidence as a whole both as regards these and other districts, that civilians were constantly taken as prisoners, often dragged from their homes and shot under the direction of the authorities without any charge being made against them. An event of the kind is thus referred to in a diary entry: “Apparently 200 men were shot. There must have been some innocent men amongst them. In future we shall have to hold an inquiry as to their guilt instead of shooting them.” The shooting of inhabitants, women and children as well a men, went on after the Germans had passed Dinant on their way into France. The houses and villages were pillaged and property wantonly destroyed.

(c) Abuse of the Red Cross and of the White Flag

The Red Cross

Cases of the Red Cross being abused are much more definite.

There are several accounts of fire being opened, sometimes at very short range, by machine guns which had been disguised in a German Red Cross ambulance or car; this was aggravated in one case near Tirlemont by the German soldiers wearing Belgian uniform.

Witness speaks also of a stretcher party with the Red Cross being used to cover an attack, and of a German Red Cross man working a machine gun.

There is also a well-attested case of a Red Cross motor car being used to carry ammunition under command of officers.

Unless all these statements are wilfully false, which the Committee sees no reason to believe, these acts must have been deliberate, and it does not seem possible that a Red Cross car could be equipped with a machine gun by soldiers acting without orders. There is also one case of firing from a cottage where the Red Cross flag was flying, and this could not be accidental.

On the whole, there is distinct evidence of the Red Cross having been deliberately misused for offensive purposes, and seemingly under orders, on some, though not many, occasions.
Abuse of the White Flag

Cases of this kind are numerous. It is possible that a small group of men may show a White Flag without authority from any proper officer, in which case their action is, of course, not binding on the rest of the platoon or other unit. But this will not apply to the case of a whole unit advancing as if to surrender, or letting the other side advance to receive the pretended surrender, and then opening fire. Under this head we find many depositions by British soldiers and several by officers. In some cases the firing was from a machine gun brought up under cover of the White Flag.

The depositions taken by Professor Morgan in France strongly corroborate the evidence collected in this country.

The case numbered h 70 may be noted as very clearly stated. The Germans, who had “put up a white flag on a lance and ceased fire,” and thereby induced a company to advance in order to take them prisoners, “dropped the white flag and opened fire a t a distance of 100 yards.” This was near Nesle, on September the 6th, 1914. It seems clearly proved that in some divisions at least of the German army this practice is very common. The incidents as reported cannot be explained by unauthorised surrenders of small groups.

There is, in our opinion, sufficient evidence that these offences have been frequent, deliberate, and in many cases committed by whole units under orders. All the acts mentioned in this part of the Report are in contravention of the Hague Convention, signed by the Great Powers, including France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, in 1907, as may be seen by a reference to Appendix D., in which the provisions of that Convention relating to the conduct of war on land are set forth.
Conclusions

From the foregoing pages it will be seen that the Committee have come to a definite conclusion upon each of the heads under which the evidence has been classified.

It is proved:

(i) That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and systematically organised massacres of the civil population, accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.

(ii) That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated, and children murdered.

(iii) That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German Army, that elaborate provisions had been made for systematic incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that t he burnings and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be alleged, being indeed part of a system of general terrorisation.

(iv) That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including women and children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.

Sensible as they are of the gravity of these conclusions, the Committee conceive that they would be doing less than their duty if they failed to record them as fully established by the evidence. Murder, lust, and pillage prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a scale unparalleled in any war between civilised nations during the last three centuries.

Our function is ended when we have stated what the evidence establishes, but we may be permitted to express our belief that these disclosures will not have been made in vain if they touch and rouse the conscience of mankind, and we venture to hope that as soon as the present war is over, the nations of the world in council will consider what means can be provided and sanctions devised to prevent the recurrence of such horrors as our generation is now witnessing.

The Committee on Alleged German Outrages, often called the Bryce Committee after its chair, Viscount James Bryce (1838-1922), is best known for producing the “Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages” published on May 12, 1915. The report is seen as a major propaganda form that Britain and America used in order to educate the world on the behavior of Germany who had invaded Belgium the year before.

The Report was translated by the end of 1915 into every major European language and had a profound impact on public opinion in Allied and neutral countries, particularly in the USA. Though the findings of the Report have been substantiated by several scholars in the 21st century, the eyewitness testimony published in its 320-page Appendix A included some sensationalist accounts of mutilations and rapes for which there is no other evidence. These invented atrocities stigmatized the Report and made it a target for revisionist historians and writers on propaganda down to the present day.

By the middle of September, 1914, the Belgian Government had issued three reports on German war crimes committed during the invasion of the country, and there were calls in the British Parliament and the Press for a British commission to conduct its own inquiry. Prime Minister Herbert Asquith responded on September 15 by authorizing the Home Secretary and the Attorney General to investigate allegations of violations of the laws of war by the German Army. In the end, some 1,200 witnesses were interviewed by teams of barristers appointed by George A. Aitken, Assistant Home Secretary, who directed the investigation, and by clerks in the Attorney General’s Office. Most of the witnesses were Belgian refugees; nearly two million Belgians had fled the country, and over 120,000 found refuge in the UK.

James Bryce, 1st Viscount Bryce

On December 4, James Bryce was asked to chair the “German Outrages Inquiry Committee”, which would review the material that had been collected and issue a report. The mission of this committee was to review the “charges that German soldiers, either directed or condoned by their officers, had been guilty of widespread atrocities in Belgium.” Bryce asked if he would have a chance to interview witnesses, but was told that would not be necessary. The Britannic Majesty’s Government appointed some of their most notable citizens to be a part of the committee: James Bryce who was a former British ambassador to the United States, H.A.L Fisher a well known Liberal historian, Sir Frederick Pollock who was a famous judge and legal historian, and Harold Cox, the Edinburgh Review editor, and two lawyers, Sir Edward Clark and Sir Alfred Hopkinson.

Viscount Bryce was an inspired choice to chair the committee. He was a Gladstonian Liberal who had opposed the Boer War and had sought accommodation with Germany until the invasion of Belgium. He also had a substantial reputation as a scholar, having studied at Heidelberg, had made his scholarly reputation with a book on the Holy Roman Empire, and had been awarded honorary doctorates by the universities of Jena and Leipzig in addition to the Pour le Mérite. Still more important for the government, Bryce was a respected figure in both Britain and the United States, where he had been the British ambassador from 1907–1913, and was a friend of President Wilson. He had written an important work on the political system in the U.S., The American Commonwealth, had traveled widely in the country, and had many admirers among American politicians and intellectuals. His imprimatur guaranteed that the report would be widely read. In public statements and private correspondence, Bryce claimed that he hoped to exonerate the German Army from accusations of barbarism. Bryce was also known for his sympathy towards the German people and their culture. By selecting Bryce to be head of the committee, it was believed that the research and findings completed would be reviewed with extreme care and that it would hold the guilty responsible for their actions.

The membership of the Committee incorporated many important individuals of British and international status, including Sir Frederick Pollock, Sir Edward Clarke, Sir Alfred Hopkinson, Sir Kenelm E. Digby, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, and Mr. Harold Cox.

The Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages, more commonly known as the Bryce Report, was a 61-page document issued on May 12, 1915.

The Report

The British Home Office collected a vast amount of evidence from civilians whose villages were attacked by German troops, British officers, German soldier diaries, and other firsthand accounts. The evidence against the German soldiers verified their inhumane acts of violence.

The Report was divided into two parts:
Part I, “The Conduct of the German Troops in Belgium” consists of descriptions and summaries of war crimes in six regions: “Liège and District,” “Valleys of Meuse and Sambre,” “The Aerschot (Aarschot), Malines (Mechelen), Vilvorde (Vilvoorde), and Louvain (Leuven) Quadrangle,” “Louvain (Leuven) and District,” “Termonde” (Dendermonde), and “Alost” (Aalst).

Belgium was guaranteed by a Treaty in 1839, that no nation was to have the right to claim the passage for its army through a neutral state. The treaty was in the case that Germany and France might enter a war between each other.

Belgian Minister in 1911 requested from Germany that she would respect the Treaty of 1839. Germany’s response to the request was, “Belgian neutrality is provided for by international conventions and Germany is determined to respect those conventions.”

The German Minister, Herr von Below on August 2, 1914 presented Belgium with a note where they demanded with an instant declaration of war that they were allowed passage through Belgium.

The King of Belgium with concern for his civilians was reluctant to Germany’s request. But on the evening of August 3, German troops crossed through Belgium land. The Belgian civilians were startled by the attacks, and German troops did not expect a difficult passage

Part II is divided into two sections summarizing “Treatment of Civilian Population” and “Offences Against Combatants.”

After having “narrated the offenses committed in Belgium, which it has been proper to consider as a whole, we now turn to another branch of the subject, the breaches of the usages of war which appear in the conduct of the German army general.”

A one-page Conclusion follows.

The Report came to four conclusions about the behavior of the German Army:
“That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and systematically organized massacres of the civil population, accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.”
“That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated, and children murdered.”
“That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German Army, that elaborate provisions had been made for systematic incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burnings and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be alleges, being indeed part of a system of general terrorism.”

“That the rules and usages in of war were frequently broken, particularly be the using of civilians, including woman and children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to the fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.

The Committee determined that “these excesses were committed–in some cases ordered, in others allowed–on a system and in pursuance of a set purpose. That purpose was to strike terror into the civil population and dishearten the Belgian troops, so as to crush down resistance and extinguish the very spirit of self-defence. The pretext that civilians had fired upon the invading troops was used to justify not merely the shooting of individual francs-tireurs, but the murder of large numbers of innocent civilians, an act absolutely forbidden by the rules of civilised warfare.”

The Committee sought to exonerate certain individuals. German peasants “are as kindly and good-natured as any people in Europe. But for Prussian officers, “war seems to have become a sort of sacred mission… The Spirit of War is deified. Obedience to the State and its War Lord leaves no room for any other duty or feeling. Cruelty becomes legitimate when it promises victory.”

The committee made an important note that this report was investigating the actions of the Germany army and that the German people should not be blame for the crimes of their national army. This careful investigation of all 1,200 depositions created the belief that the term ‘atrocity’ should be directly connected with the German army, due to the army’s extreme practice of militarism.[8] This is confirmed by the German diaries, which showed the German account of the war crimes in Belgian was directly ordered by commanding army officers. In its final conclusion, the committee claimed that the militarism of the German army was the cause of the outrages in Belgium.

Distribution

The Report was widely accepted throughout the world, translated into more than 30 languages and widely circulated by British propaganda services, especially in the USA, where it was reprinted and circulated in most of the US national newspapers, including the New York Times.

Impact of Report

On 27 May 1915 it was reported that every New York newspaper had reprinted the Bryce Report. Charles Masterman, head of the British War Propaganda Bureau at Wellington House, had 41,000 copies shipped to the US. The same month the German government attempted to combat the report with the publication of its own reports on atrocities committed against German soldiers by Belgian civilians. It offered depositions and eyewitness accounts but had little impact.

The Committee on Public Information urged US newspapers not to publish stories that might undermine the Bryce Report. A column titled “The Daily German Lie” linked support for the Report’s authenicity to a War Department request for a ban on printing unsubstantiated atrocity stories.

The findings of the committee became a major piece of British propaganda used to convince Americans to join the war. The committee’s report proved the atrocities in Belgian were committed under German militarism, which left neutral countries to draw their own conclusions of how to view the German army. But, based on their own conclusions, most neutral countries, especially the United States, came to connect the German army with the term ‘atrocity’ during World War I. “By identifying German army conduct with militarism, the Bryce Report made opposition to the German army the same as opposition to war itself.” Because the Bryce Report was considered a credible source, it was cited throughout national newspapers. The New York Times reported that the committee was “set to answer the question, ‘Were there German atrocities in Belgian?’ and they have answered it. They have made further disputes impossible.” The American public believed that the committee had made credible arguments against the German army.

Criticism

German authorities in response to the Bryce Report published the White Book five days later. The book contained records where Belgians were guilty of atrocities committed on German soldiers.
“It has been established beyond doubt that Belgian civilians plundered, killed and even shockingly mutilated German wounded soldiers in which atrocities even women and children took part. Thus the eyes were gouged out of the German wounded soldiers, their ears, noses and finger-joints were cut off, or they were emasculated or disemboweled. In other cases German soldiers were poisoned or strung up on trees; hot liquid was poured over them, or they were otherwise burned so that they died under terrible tortures.

Immediately after World War I, the original documents of the Belgian witness depositions could not be found in the British Home Office, where they were supposed to be kept for protection. This prevented others from questioning and investigating the depositions to prove if the Bryce Report was true. The Committee on Alleged German Outrages was not a direct part in collecting the depositions of the witnesses. The majority of the depositions that were obtained for the Bryce Report were taken by English barristers (lawyers), who were not under oath. It was subsequently revealed that the committee did not personally interview a single witness, relying instead on hearsay evidence and depositions given without oaths.

Objections were made to the timing of its release, to the fact that the testimony of witnesses was not given under oath and the individuals were not identified by name, and to the improbability of some of the testimony. It was repeatedly claimed that the charges had been refuted by subsequent investigations. The fact that the original depositions were lost was said to show bad faith. The motives of Bryce and the other members were also questioned. Trevor Wilson claims in particular that members believed that if they rejected the more sensationalist accusations against the German Army, involving rape and mutilation, audiences would question the more prosaic was crimes that the Army did indeed commit.

Among the books of the interwar period attacking the Bryce Report are Harold Laswell, Propaganda Techniques in the World War (1927), Arthur Ponsonby, Falsehood in Wartime (1928), H. Grattan, Why We Fought (1928), Harry Elmer Barnes, In Quest of Truth and Justice (1928), George Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate (1930), James Squires, British Propaganda at Home and in the United States (1935), H. C. Peterson, Propaganda for War: The Campaign Against American Neutrality, 1914-1917 (1938) and James Read, atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1919 (1941).

Criticisms have seldom been dispassionate. Convinced that reports of German war crimes were fabrications, revisionists have vilified Bryce and the Report for nine decades. The latter was “in itself one of the worst atrocities of the war.” Bryce was guilty of “an irresponsible misuse of judicial procedure that disseminated…huge untruths.” For Bryce, “no lie was too great and no distortion too bizarre.”

Responses to Criticism

As to the specific charges made by inter-war revisionists, there is no evidence that the Report was rushed into print five days after the sinking of the Lusitania in order to capitalize on the outrage caused by that event. When there can be no prosecution for perjury, the taking of testimony under oath is no guarantee of its reliability, as evidenced by the German White Book (which claimed the Belgian government had organized guerrilla attacks on the German Army in 1914), where most of the depositions are sworn. The Belgian government requested that witnesses not be identified by name for fear of reprisals against relatives and friends in occupied Belgium. Most witnesses can be identified from lists of names in the Committee’s papers in the National Archive.

When historian James Morgan Read wished to consult the original depositions in 1939, he was told, with much embarrassment, that they were lost. On August 13, 1942, however, the missing depositions were located. The depositions, however, were subsequently destroyed, most likely by a German rocket. There is no evidence that they were deliberately withheld from Read or intentionally destroyed.

However, the claim by revisionists that some of the testimony is not credible is entirely legitimate. The Committee included in Appendix A depositions it should have been much more skeptical of, particularly from Belgian soldiers. Critics repeatedly cited as the most egregious accusations a claim by a Belgian soldier that he had witnessed a mass rape in central Liège and the claim of two civilians in Mechelen that they saw a German soldier spear a child with his bayonet as he marched past.

There is a clear correlation between the unreliability of the testimony in a given town or region and the percentage of soldiers offering testimony. In an analysis of the plausibility of testimony in Appendix A, based on other sources, Jeff Lipkes found that in the testimony about Liège and the villages to its east, the 35 depositions average 3.8 on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represents “probably a legend or invention” and 5 represents “very likely.” Soldiers, however, rate only 2.16, while civilians average 4.14. The former accounted for just 17% of the depositions. Similarly, in the section on the valleys of the Meuse and Sambre, the 30 statements by witnesses average 3.77, with civilians rating 4.04, while soldiers only average 2.4. The soldiers again comprised a low percent of the total, 16.6%. It is in the region designated “The Aershot, Malines, Vilvorde, Louvain Quadrangle,” where the majority of the testimony comes from soldiers, that the most dubious depositions occur. Even within this region, testimony from townspeople tends to be reliable. In Aarschot, the 38 depositions average 4.0. Soldiers, 31.6% of the total, averaged only 2.4, whereas the 26 civilians rated 4.73, providing credible accounts that fully tallied with other evidence.

Although the claim was made repeatedly that subsequent investigations disproved the charges of the Bryce Report, this is not the case. There was no systematic attempt to analyze the findings of the Committee, and certainly no official re-investigation. Read, the most scholarly of the revisionists, compared eyewitness reports in three towns with the reports of the post-war Belgian Commission of Inquest. In Mechelen and Elewijt, there are certainly some dubious allegations among the Bryce Committee witnesses. However, the 14 reports from Aalst are almost entirely corroborated by testimony from the Belgian Commission. Most of the slashings, stabbings, and burnings described by witnesses were likely to have taken place.

In areas where there were mass executions, the Bryce Report actually underestimates the killing. In Aarschot, where 169 civilians were murdered, the report records only ten deaths. No totals are given for Dinant, where 685 civilians were killed; however, various figures, added together, come to 410. As for Tamines, where 383 were killed, the Report only states: “A witness describes how he saw the public square littered with corpses…” The Committee had few witnesses to draw upon for the French-speaking regions of Belgium. Most Walloons fled to France.

There is no evidence that Committee members felt that the graver charges would not be believed in if the more sensationalist accusations were dismissed, as Wilson claims. However, there is no question that the Committee members exercised poor judgement in their selection of testimony. They reprinted 55 depositions from the small town of Hofstadt, many dubious, where fewer than ten murders occurred. (The depositions average only 2.11 on Lipkes’s scale, with soldiers providing 85% of the testimony.) Meanwhile, the Committee failed to investigate carefully well-documented cases of mass executions, such as Andenne, Tamines, and Dinant.

Conclusion

Today, the Report is considered by some to be a “prime example of untruthful war propaganda.” The report released by the committee was considered credible because of its use of professional structure and legal terms, but the lack of documented resources greatly injured the reputation of the committee for modern scholars.

The findings of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages show that war propaganda can be effective, even if it lacks both true and reliable sources. “The character of evidence helps explain how inaccuracies and exaggerations so frequently crept into the text.” While these exaggerations are most commonly seen in the witness accounts, the German diaries in actuality did not contain accounts “of the sexual-sadistic” scandals with women and children of Belgium. In a post-war report, the Belgian Commission proved that the main victims of the German war crimes were male adults, not women and children. Overall, modern scholars suggest that the committee’s “Bryce Report slid from the factual into the symbolic.”

Despite its flaws, the four conclusions the Report comes to have been amply documented by recent historians: J. Horne and A. Kramer, German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial (2001), L. Zuckerman, The Rape of Belgium (2003), and J. Lipkes, Rehearsals: The German Army in Belgium, August 1914 (2007). Lipkes endorses the Report’s analysis as well, while Horne and Kramer emphasize German paranoia.