The 39th Battalion Australian Imperial Force (AIF)

Posted on February 9, 2012 by muzza

The 39th Battalion was an infantry unit of the Australian Army. It was originally raised in February 1916 for service during World War I as part of First Australian Imperial Force. Making up part of the 10th Brigade, it was attached to the 3rd Division and served on the Western Front in France and Belgium before being disbanded in March 1919. Following the re-organisation of the Australian Army in 1921, the battalion was raised again as a unit of the Citizens Force, known as the Hawthorn–Kew Regiment. In 1937 it was amalgamated with the 37th Battalion to become the 37th/39th Battalion. Later it was delinked with the 37th and amalgamated with the 24th Battalion to form the 24th/39th Battalion, before being raised again as a single unit in October 1941. During World War II the battalion was sent to New Guinea in 1942 and between July and August of that year the unit was heavily engaged in the defence of the Kokoda Trail during which time they fought several desperate actions against the Japanese as they attempted to hold out until further reinforcements could be brought up from Port Moresby. Such was their involvement in the battle that by the time they were withdrawn they could only muster 32 men and following its return to Australia, it was disbanded on 3 July 1943.

Formation

The 39th Battalion was first formed on 21 February 1916 at the Ballarat Showgrounds, in Victoria, for service during World War I. The battalion was raised as part of an expansion of the First Australian Imperial Force (1st AIF) which was undertaken at the conclusion of the Gallipoli campaign. The majority of the battalion’s recruits came from the Western District of Victoria, and together with the 37th, 38th and 40th Battalions, it formed the 10th Brigade, which was part of the 3rd Division.

Following a brief period of training in Australia, the 39th Battalion departed from Melbourne on 27 May 1916. Arriving in Britain in July 1916, they undertook a period of four months training before being sent to France in November. In December the battalion took its place in the trenches along the Western Front.

Western Front

A member of the 39th Battalion in the trenches near Houplines, December 1916

After having endured a long winter serving in mainly a defensive role, the battalion’s first major engagement came at Messines, in Belgium in June 1917, where during the march to the line of departure, the battalion suffered a high number of casualties following a German gas attack which subsequently resulted in the battalion only being able to muster about a third of its manpower for the attack. Despite this, however, the 39th managed to capture all of its objectives. Later, in October, the 39th Battalion took part in two other major attacks in that same sector, firstly at Broodseinde and then at Passchendaele, the first of which was a brilliant success, while the second a disastrous failure.

Over the course of the next five months, the 39th Battalion rotated between the front line and rear areas, serving mainly in Belgium. However, when the German Army launched its last effort at victory in the spring of 1918, known as the Spring Offensive, the 39th was among the many Australian battalions that were hurriedly moved south to France in order to stem the tide of the German onslaught towards Amiens. When the Allies launched their own offensive, known as the Hundred Days Offensive, on 8 August 1918, the battalion along with the rest of the 10th Brigade, was serving as the divisional reserve and they did not participate in the advance that has since become known as one of the greatest days for the Allies on the Western Front. On 10 August, the battalion was committed to battle once more, undertaking an attack on the village of Proyart, however, this attack was ill-conceived and ultimately failed. Despite this, however, the battalion remained in the line throughout August and early September as the 3rd Division advanced along the Somme Valley.

A member of the 39th Battalion in the trenches near Houplines, December 1916

The battalion undertook its last major action of the war at the end of September 1918 when, serving alongside the Americans, they breached parts of the Hindenburg Line along the St Quentin Canal. After this, the battalion was removed from the line to undertake training, and they were still at the rear when the Armistice was declared on 11 November 1918. With the fighting over, the process of demobilisation began and slowly the men began marching out for repatriation to Australia. Finally, in March 1919, the 39th Battalion was disbanded.

During the course of the war the 39th Battalion suffered 405 men killed, while a further 1,637 were wounded. Members of the battalion received the following decorations: one Member of the British Empire, two Distinguished Service Orders, 14 Distinguished Conduct Medals, 14 Military Cross, 81 Military Medals, and 22 Mentions in Dispatches.

Inter war years

At the end of World War I there was a wholesale disbandment of units of the Australian Army, however, in 1921, it was decided that there was a need to raise a part time military force, known as the Citizens Force, which would take responsibility for the defence of the Australian mainland. This force was organised along the same lines of the 1st AIF, and the units raised kept the same numerical designation as the 1st AIF battalions. The AIF ceased to exist officially on 1 April 1921, and the Citizens Force was reorganised the following month on 1 May, adopting the numerical designations and structures of the AIF. As a part of this, the 39th Battalion was raised in 1921 in Melbourne. Upon formation, the battalion was attached to the 10th Brigade, 3rd Division.

In 1927, territorial designations were adopted and the battalion assumed the title of the Hawthorn Regiment. Three years later this was changed to the Hawthorne–Kew Regiment. Initially the battalion was kept up to strength with volunteers and men serving under the terms of the compulsory training scheme, however, in 1929 the scheme was suspended by the newly elected Scullin Labor government and the Citizen Forces were renamed the Militia. The combination of the end to compulsory training and the financial hardships of the Great Depression meant that there were few volunteers available as men could not risk losing their jobs to undertake training and as a result throughout the 1930s a number of units were amalgamated or disbanded as the size of the Army was reduced. In 1937 the 39th Battalion was merged with the 37th Battalion, before later being delinked with the 37th and being amalgamated with the 24th Battalion, becoming the 24th/39th Battalion.

World War II

Formation

On 1 October 1941, the Australian Military Board issued an order re-raising the 39th Battalion as a single battalion of the Australian Military Forces, as Militiamen were called up for national service. The new battalion had an authorised strength of 1,500 men and was composed mainly of men taken from the previous 24th/39th Battalion and initially it was deployed at Nagambie Road, Seymour, Victoria with elements from the Militia 2nd Cavalry and 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Conran became the battalion’s new commanding officer, having previously served with the 23rd Battalion during World War I, and in the Citizens Military Force after the war.

By 8 October 1941, a nucleus of officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs), many of whom had experience from World War I, had prepared the battalion for the arrival of the soldiers or other ranks (ORs) that would bring it up to its required establishment. On 10 October 1941, the first draft of nine officers and 523 men from the 3rd Infantry Division assembled at Caulfield Racecourse Transit Camp and were transported by rail to Darley Camp, Bacchus Marsh. The following day numbers increased further with the arrival of another seven officers and 400 men from the 2nd Cavalry and 4th Infantry Divisions. Later, in June 1942, after it had arrived in New Guinea, the battalion’s strength was bolstered with the transfer of 16 officers from the Second Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF), including a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel William Owen.

On 21 November 1941, the 39th Battalion paraded through the streets of Melbourne with weapons. It had taken 52 days to form the battalion and while the battalion had still been understrength, they were declared ready for training. In the end, however, as events in the Pacific unfolded, this training was cut short and the battalion was only able to undertake one training exercise in this time.

Two days after the Japanese attack on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor and the British in Malaya, on 9 December 1941 the battalion was ordered to ‘prepare to move’. They were originally allocated to relieve the Queensland 49th Battalion that was already on garrison duties at Port Moresby, however, the threat of invasion by the Japanese had changed the strategic situation and with it the planning forecasts of the Australian high command. As such, the battalion was combined with the 49th Battalion and the 53rd Battalion from New South Wales to form the 30th Brigade and plans were made for the entire brigade to deploy to New Guinea.

Christmas Day 1941 was spent in camp, before the 39th Battalion was loaded onto two trains the following day for a rapid move north.One train went straight to Albury and the other departed from Spencer Street Station, Melbourne, two hours later. Both trains arrived in Sydney at 10.40 hours, on 27 December 1941. The battalion then detrained and moved by ferry to Woolloomooloo wharf where the 1,068 officers, NCOs and men of the battalion boarded the passenger ship the Aquitania bound for New Guinea.

Kokoda Track

Initially upon their arrival in New Guinea in January 1942 the 39th Battalion was used to defend the airfield at Seven Mile Aerodrome near Port Moresby and to carry out various other garrison tasks such as building defences and unloading stores at the wharf. In May 1942, the battalion’s commanding officer, Conran, was deemed medically unfit for service and on 24 May he relinquished command.

In June 1942, as the military situation in New Guinea deteriorated further, the battalion received orders to move up the Kokoda Track in order to act as a blocking force against the possibility of a Japanese advance overland from the north. In order to counter this threat, Maroubra Force composed of troops the 39th Battalion and the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) were sent to Kokoda, arriving there on 15 July. This move proved prescient as a large Japanese force landed at Gona only a week later, and they quickly began to move inland towards Kokoda.

The first clash occurred at Awala on 23 July, when a platoon from ‘B’ Company, under the command of Captain Sam Templeton, having destroyed the footbridge over the Kumusi River, engaged the Japanese on the far side of the river.The Australians were forced to withdraw, however, when hundreds of Japanese marines began crossing the river under a barrage of mortar and machine gun fire. They withdrew only a few miles, before Templeton set up a successful ambush for the advancing Japanese on the banks of the Gorari Creek. Nevertheless, they were forced back further towards the high ground at Oivi where they attempted to make a stand while Templeton tried to make contact with battalion headquarters and the rest of the battalion who were spread out further along the track, in order to get more reinforcements.

On the evening of 29 July the Japanese attacked the main position Kokoda. There were only 80 men from ‘B’ Company left at that time, and armed only with small arms and a few Bren light machine guns, they were no match for the assaulting Japanese. Casualties on both sides were high as the Australians resorted to hand-to-hand combat, and the battalion’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel William Owen, who had flown in to take over the battalion following Templeton’s death, was killed while organising the withdrawal. It became clear that Kokoda was lost and the following morning, under the cover of a dense mist, with the Papuan Infantry Battalion commanding officer, Major William Watson, assuming temporary command, the survivors abandoned the position and fell back towards the village of Deniki, a mile or so back along the Kokoda Track towards Isurava.

The remnants of ‘B’ Company regrouped at Deniki, however, they were in a bad state and when on 4 August, Major Allan Cameron, brigade major of the 30th Brigade, arrived to take command of Maroubra Force, most of them were sent back to Isurava in disgrace as he was under the mistaken belief that they had run away from the fighting. Nevertheless, on 8 August the rest of the 39th Battalion, now without the only troops who had any experience fighting the Japanese, launched a counterattack at Kokoda. They managed to secure one side of the airfield, however, due to the close proximity of the Japanese on the other side, relief aircraft were unable to land and short of food and ammunition, they were forced to fall back to Deniki once again after almost two days of fighting. They eventually managed to halt the Japanese advance and on 14 August Maroubra Force fell back to Isurava.

(Left to right): Kessels, Porter, Fleay, Owen, Findlay - Lieutenant Colonel Owen, CO of the 39th Battalion with his second-in-command Major Findlay – July 1942

At this point the fighting ceased for almost two weeks and during this time the 39th was joined by the 53rd and the 30th Brigade headquarters. On 23 August Brigadier Arnold Potts took over command of Maroubra Force and further reinforcements arrived as first the 2/14th, 2/16th and later the 2/27th Battalions from the 7th Division’s 21st Brigade also reached the area. Despite this, however, the situation remained bleak as the supply issue was becoming a serious problem for the Australians and the reinforcements that had arrived were also in a state of disarray having been committed to the battle in a piecemeal fashion and suffering badly from hunger and disease.

Although the Japanese were experiencing similar problems in relation to supplies, they began their advance once again on 26 August and despite several rugged defensive actions the Australians were forced back again, first to Eora Creek on 30 August, then Templeton’s Crossing on 2 September, and finally to Efogi three days later. Exhausted from their efforts and no longer able to be considered an effective fighting force, the 39th was relieved and sent down the track to Koitaki to rest. They had done the job that was required of them, however, having stalled the Japanese advance in order to allow reinforcements to be brought up. These reinforcements came in the shape of the 25th Brigade, comprising the 2/25th, 2/31st and 2/33rd Battalions. Bitter fighting ensued and the Australians withdrew once again on 17 September, this time to Imita Ridge, however, the Japanese had reached their limit and on 24 September began to withdraw. By 2 November, Kokoda was back in Australian hands.

Soldiers of the 39th Battalion following their relief in September 1942

Fighting around Gona

Following the 39th Battalion’s withdrawal from the line in September 1942, they spent a month at Koitaki before being sent back to Port Moresby in mid-October, where they were detailed to prepare defensive positions. In November they were attached to the 21st Brigade, and throughout December the 39th Battalion was involved in further fighting as the brigade fought around Gona. During this time the 39th suffered heavy casualties, however, the fighting continued and having captured the Gona Mission, the battalion moved to the Sanananda Track on 21 December, taking up a forward position at Huggins’ Road Block.

In the New Year the battalion was withdrawn to Soputa and returned to the 30th Brigade, however, they had suffered heavy casualties and in January 1943, when it was flown back to Port Moresby, it had a frontage of only seven officers and 25 men. In February the 39th was ordered to prepare for operations in the Wau area, in anticipation of a further Japanese attack, however, this attack did not eventuate and on 12 March the 39th Battalion embarked for the return journey to Australia.

Disbandment

Following the 39th Battalion’s return to Australia, it was decided that the 30th Brigade, along with its component battalions—39th, 49th, and 3rd Battalions—would be disbanded. This came into effect on 3 July 1943 and as a result of this decision, the Militiamen that had been called up for service were absorbed in to the 36th Battalion, while those who volunteered for overseas service were absorbed into the 2/2nd Battalion.

At the end of the battalion’s involvement in the fighting in New Guinea, 1,666 men had served in its ranks. The battalion suffered 403 combat casualties, which consisted of 118 killed in action, 13 died of wounds, five died other causes, and 266 wounded in action. Illness and disease also took a heavy toll and as a result, after six months of combat the 39th Battalion’s muster roll was only seven officers and 25 other ranks.

For their service during World War II members of the 39th Battalion received the following decorations: two Members of the British Empire, one Distinguished Service Order, four Distinguished Conduct Medals, seven Military Crosses, 10 Military Medals, one Distinguished Service Cross and 11 Mentions in Dispatches.

Battle honours
World War I: St Quentin Canal, Messines 1917, Ypres 1917, Polygon Wood, Broodseinde, Poelcappelle, Passchendaele, Somme 1918, Ancre 1918, Amiens, Albert 1918, Mont St Quentin, Hindenburg Line, France and Flanders 1916–1918.
World War II: South-West Pacific 1942–43, Kokoda Trail, Kokoda–Deniki, Isurava, Eora Creek–Templeton’s Crossing I, Buna–Gona, Gona, Sanananda Road, Amboga River.

To read more on the WW1 operations, the 39 Bn AIF Unit History 1916-19 can be ordered and downloaded in the eBook store here.

ANZAC – Australia’s youngest casualty

Posted on January 27, 2012 by muzza

James Charles (Jim) Martin (3 January 1901 – 25 October 1915) was the youngest Australian known to have died in World War I. He was only 14 years and nine months old when he succumbed to typhoid during the Gallipoli campaign. He was one of 20 Australian soldiers under the age of 18 known to have died in World War I.

James Martin was born to Amelia and Charles Martin on 3 January 1901. His father was born Charles Marks, in Auckland, New Zealand however, after emigrating to Australia and settling in Tocumwal, New South Wales, he changed his name to Martin to avoid discrimination for being Jewish. Charles worked as a grocer, handyman and (horse-drawn) cab driver. His mother, Amelia, was born in Bendigo in 1876 to Thomas and Frances Park. Her parents had emigrated to Australia during the gold rush in the 1850s. The youngest of twelve children, she married Charles just before her 18th birthday.

Martin’s family moved to many different suburbs in and around Melbourne before finally settling in Hawthorn in 1910. Born in Hawthorn, he was the third of six children, and the only son. He attended Manningtree Road State School from 1910 to 1915, during which time he also received basic military training as a junior cadet under the compulsory training scheme.

At the outbreak of World War I Martin enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force on 12 April 1915, against the wishes of his family. His parents finally agreed however when he made it clear that he would sign on under an assumed name and never write to them if they did not consent. He gave a false date of birth to the recruiting officer, claiming to be 18, when he was actually 14 years and three months.

Martin joined the 1st Reinforcements of the 21st Battalion as a private and trained in Broadmeadows and Seymour (later Puckapunyal) camps in Victoria before boarding HMAT Berrima in June 1915 to deploy to Egypt. In late August, he was sent to Gallipoli on the steamer HMT Southland, to take part in the fighting against the Turks. En route, his ship was torpedoed by a German submarine off the island of Lemnos and he was rescued after spending four hours in the water. After being picked up, Martin rejoined his battalion at Mudros Island where they were transferred to the transport ship Abassieh on 7 September.

The following morning, just before 2:00 am, Martin’s platoon, 4 Platoon, landed at Watson’s Pier in Anzac Cove. He then served in trenches around Courtney’s Post, which was positioned on the ridge overlooking Monash Valley. During this time he wrote to his family telling them that “the Turks are still about 70 yards (64 m) away from us” and asked them not to worry about him as “I am doing splendid over here”. Throughout his time in Gallipoli, although his family were writing to him, Martin did not receive any letters from home due to a breakdown in the mail system.

Following a period of cold temperatures and heavy rain Martin contracted enteric fever (typhoid) in the trenches. After suffering mild symptoms for about a fortnight during which time he refused treatment, he was subsequently evacuated to the hospital ship Glenart Castle on 25 October 1915 after he developed diarrhoea. He died of heart failure that night, at the age of 14 and nine months, and was buried at sea the next day. At the time of his death only Martin’s parents and his best friend, Cec Hogan—who was himself only 16—knew Martin’s real age. Nevertheless, on 18 December 1915, Melbourne’s Herald newspaper reported Martin’s death in an article titled “Youngest Soldier Dies”.

Martin was awarded the 1914–15 Star, the British War Medal, and the Victory Medal. His name is recorded on the Australian memorial at Lone Pine and on the Australian War Memorial roll of honour in Canberra.

His Majesty’s Troopship Southland – an incident of the Gallipoli campaign

Posted on January 27, 2012 by muzza

HMT Southland was an ocean liner launched in July 1900 as SS Vaderland for Red Star Line service between Antwerp and New York. During her passenger career, the ship initially sailed under British registry, but was re-registered in Antwerp in 1903. Vaderland was a sister ship to Zeeland and a near sister ship to Kroonland and Finland.

After the beginning of the First World War, Vaderland was re-registered in Liverpool and converted to a troopship, ferrying troops of the Canadian Expeditionary Force from Halifax to Liverpool. While under the operation of White Star–Dominion in 1915, she was renamed Southland to avoid the German-sounding Vaderland.

The Southland was later used in the Mediterranean to carry troops of the 6th Essex regiment and two companies of l/7th Essex, transported from Devonport to Gallipoli from 4 July 1915 to 11 August 1915, and later from Alexandria, the Australian 22nd Battalion (6th Brigade) 2nd Division AIF with some troops from the Australian 23rd Battalion, General Legge and staff and 2nd Division Signals Company. During its sail from Egypt to Gallipoli on the 2 September 1914 at 9:45am it was torpedoed at right forward by the German submarine UB-14 30 nautical miles (56 km) from Lemnos in the Aegean Sea. The ship did not sink immediately, and was eventually beached on Lemnos, and all but 40 of 1400 men were able to leave in lifeboats and were picked up by other transports and HT Neuralia, although mostly by HMS Ben-my-Chree by about midday though some troops spent up to 4 hours in the water. During the subsequent rescue operations Ben-my-Chree took on board 649 troops and 121 crew from 21 boats and rafts and provided medical attention as required until all were transferred to the troopship SS Transylvania in Mudros harbour. Southland eventually limped back to Mudros assisted by HMS Racoon and was repaired.

The sinking was reported as

“A Splendid story is told of the sinking of the transport Southland in the Mediterranean Sea. When the torpedo struck the vessel rolled and the order was given to abandon the ship. There was never a cry or sign of fear. The Australian soldiers merely came briskly on deck singing ‘Australia will be there.’ The troops all went to their stations and lowered the boats in an orderly manner. The subalterns searched the interior of the ship for wounded and finally came on deck to find only the general staff on board. They helped to lower the last boats and got into a half swamped one themselves. Fourteen persons were killed by the explosion and twenty two were drowned including Brigadier General Linton.”

A record of this event is recorded in the war diary of Captain Herbert Franklin Curnow Thursday 2nd September Up 6am. Drew 120 rounds of ammunition and iron and landing rations. Pulled into Lemnos and dropped anchor about 10am. The Military Landing Officer came on board, got my disembarkation return and meantime informed us that the “Southland” having on board 2 Aus Div H.Q 6th Inf Bge HQ., 21 Bt 1 Coy 23rd Btn. some A.S.C. A.M.C. & Signalling details had been torpedoed behind us. Later ascertained about 25 lives lost including Col Linton, Brigadier. Turned in soon after dinner.

However, a member of Australian unit reported one crew shot for behaving improperly. The remaining men and ship’s crew were able to got to the Allied vessels later the same day. HMT Southland carried James Martin whose experiences, and those of his friend Cecil Hogan, were described in a book by Anthony Hill.

The sinking was depicted in the painting Sinking of the Southland by Fred Leist, who was appointed an official war artist in September 1917, and attached to the 5th Division AIF.

: HMT Southland after torpedo hit in September 1915. The photograph was taken from the hospital ship Neuralia.

: A lifeboat from the Ben-My-Chree passing a line to a lifeboat full of Australian troops from the troopship SS Southland. The troopship SS Southland was torpedoed near Agistrati Island while it was carrying Australian troops to the Gallipoli Peninsula.

: Troops from the 21st Battalion prepare to abandon the Southland after it was torpedoed by a German submarine, September 1915

: Sinking of the Southland – Fred Leist – Depicts the sinking of the HMT Southland in the Aegean Sea, with the soldiers from 2nd Australian Division taking to and waiting for lifeboats or jumping overboard.

Southland was repaired and returned to White Star–Dominion for Liverpool–Quebec–Montreal service in August 1916, but on 4 June 1917 was torpedoed and sunk by the German submarine SM U-70 while 140 nautical miles (260 km) northwest of Tory Island off the Irish coast with the loss of 4 lives.

First Australian Imperial Force – Mutiny on the Western Front.

Posted on January 21, 2012 by muzza

The First Australian Imperial Force (1st AIF) was the main expeditionary force of the Australian Army during World War I. It was formed from 15 August 1914, following Britain’s declaration of war on Germany. Generally known at the time as the AIF, it is today referred to as the 1st AIF to distinguish from the 2nd AIF which was raised during World War II.

The 1st AIF was a purely volunteer force for the duration of the war. In Australia, two plebiscites on conscription were defeated, thereby preserving the volunteer status but stretching the AIF’s reserves towards the end of the war. A total of 331,814 Australians were sent overseas to serve as part of the AIF, which represented 13% of the white male population. Of these, 18% (61,859) were killed. The casualty rate (killed or wounded) was 64%. About 2,100 women served with the 1st AIF, mainly as nurses. Close to 20% of those who served in the 1st AIF had been born in the United Kingdom but all enlistments had to occur in Australia (there were a few exceptions). As a volunteer force, all units were demobilized at the end of the war.

The Australian infantry did not have regiments in the British sense, only battalions identified by ordinal number (1st to 60th). Each battalion originated from a geographical region. New South Wales and Victoria, the most populous states, filled their own battalions (and even whole brigades) while the “Outer States” often combined to assemble a battalion. These regional associations remained throughout the war and each battalion developed its own strong regimental identity.

In the manpower crisis following the Third Battle of Ypres, in which the five divisions sustained 38,000 casualties, there were plans to follow the British reorganisation and reduce all brigades from four battalions to three. In the British regimental system this was traumatic enough; however, the regimental identity survived the disbanding of a single battalion. In the Australian system, disbanding a battalion meant the extinction of the unit. In September 1918, when the call was made to disband eight battalions, there followed a series of “mutinies over disbandment” where the ranks refused to report to their new battalions. In the AIF, mutiny was one of two charges that carried the death penalty, the other being desertion to the enemy. Instead of being charged with mutiny, the instigators were charged as being AWOL and the doomed battalions were eventually permitted to remain together for the forthcoming battle, following which the survivors voluntarily disbanded.

Charles Bean in the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 – Volume VI – The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Allied Offensive, 1918 described the situation as follows:

The 1st and 4th Australian Divisions were now relieved and went to the rear for the “Corps” rest for which they had been hoping since July. General Monash had also insisted that the three remaining Australian divisions must go into rest after the next battle. While he was in the thick of preparation for that offensive, another sharp trouble, though much less serious than it might appear to non-Australians, descended on him.

The Army Council in London was concerned at the depletion of the Australian infantry through lack of reinforcements. It pointed out that the 57 Australian battalions were 8,500 men short, and that reinforcement drafts for the next four months, estimated at 3,000 monthly, would be insufficient to keep up even the present strength. Battalions which entered the battle with 300-400 men were in some important respects uneconomic, requiring the same staff as a battalion that took in 750. In the British Army this difficulty had been met by disbanding the fourth battalion in each infantry brigade; a similar measure had long before been adopted by the French and Germans, and this policy had already been approved for the A.I.F. in February: Battalions had been earmarked for disbandment but, in view of the extreme reluctance expressed by the Australian Government, it was to be carried out only gradually as it became unavoidable.

Three battalions had been thus disbanded in the spring; Haig entirely accepted the Australian Government’s condition, but in June he pointed out that of the 57 remaining battalions 5 now had less than 700 men, 17 less than 800 and only 11 more than 900, which was the strength then laid down as minimum. He considered this (‘a rather alarming degree of unevenness.” Birdwood (as G.O.C., A.I.F.) explained that there were still hopes of keeping the battalions at 900 and that they were disbanded only when so weak as to be inefficient as fighting units. On August 29th the Army Council drafted a letter to Haig saying that, in view of the shortage then evident, it considered that the reduction of the remaining four-battalion brigades to three-battalion ones should be carried out as soon as possible. Before sending this letter it passed the draft to A.I.F. Headquarters for comment, and Birdwood asked Monash for his views. Both realised that the step would cause intense heart-burning, and Monash, even now that his battalions were going into battle 300-400 strong, urged that it should be postponed till the new year.

It is not likely that weather conditions will permit of our carrying on for much longer at the same intense pressure at which the Corps has been going for the last five months, (he wrote to Birdwood on Sep. 7). In all probability if we carry on, at latest till the end of October, we ought to be able to carry on right over the winter. It was possible, he added, that G.H.Q. might then be able to do “what we all desire”-keep the Australian Corps entirely out of the line for the four winter months. Australian battalions had never been so effective as in the last month when they were all far below strength; he urged that 750 should be considered a sufficient strength even for next year. I welcome any pretext (he said to a friend on Sep. 8th) to take the fewest possible men into action. So long as they have thirty Lewis guns (per battalion) it doesn’t very much matter what else they have.

And it was true that the A.I.F. battalions, entering these great battles with 300-400 rifles, still attacked on fronts of 850-1,000 yards, and had even attacked on fronts of up to a mile. Carrying parties could not be provided; Lewis gun teams were reduced to two men, and Vickers gun crews could no longer carry full loads of ammunition. These and the food supplies had to go by pack or waggon, and in recent fights this had worked very well. Monash asked to be allowed to reorganise his battalions on a three company basis, but he well knew that most of them had already done this for themselves, and reduced their companies to three or even two platoons. Finally he asked to be allowed discretion to recommend the disbanding of “one or more battalions” if he and his generals found it advantageous. Birdwood insisted on prompter action, pointing out that the principle had already been determined in January. He and Monash now agreed that it should not yet be applied to the four original brigades, but he informed the War Office that it would be applied in all unreduced brigades as soon as found necessary.

It was immediately after this that Monash learnt of the coming withdrawal of “1914 men” (estimated by him at “upwards of 6,000”) on furlough to Australia, which obviously would render the disbandments more urgent. The battalions selected by divisional commanders on the advice of their brigadiers were the 19th, 21st,25th,37th, 42nd,54th and 60th; and on September 23rd the order went out for their immediate disbandment: in each case their records, and a few representatives were to go to training battalions on Salisbury Plain, whose companies would assume the battalions’ names, but the rest would reinforce some other battalion or battalions of their own brigade.

To officers and men of these battalions the blow was overwhelming. The step might be necessary-but why should their battalion be chosen. Men and even officers held among themselves indignant meetings. In the first battalion to hear of its fate, the 37th, Col. Story, a fine leader, took the step of protesting not merely to the brigadier, but over his head to Gellibrand, Monash and Birdwood, a serious breach of discipline. Moreover in the bitterness of the moment Story’s letter was foolishly drawn, disparaging sister units. He was relieved of his command, but his attitude had become widely known. At a meeting the men of the 37th agreed that on the final parade they would obey every order but the last-the order to march to their new battalions. On September 22nd when that parade took place, they did so, obeying every command but the final one. Brig.-Genl. McNicoll was then summoned and spoke to the men, but with the same result. The officers then reluctantly obeyed an order to fall out; after them the sergeants did the same-and one corporal and one private. The remainder were told that, if they did not join their new units that afternoon, they would be posted as absent without leave. Being left to themselves they at once re-established strict military form in the battalion, choosing from their own number commanders to carry on temporarily the absent officers’ duties. It was noticeable that those selected were not the “bad hats” or of the demagogue type, but the men most fitted to lead in action, and strict discipline was maintained. The battalion marched back to its huts; men already in detention for various offences were retained under guard ; the medical aid-post was re-formed by the orderlies, and church parade for next day arranged with the padre, who went with the men.

The “commanders” had meals with the men, rations being obtained through the support of other units who “lost” occasional boxes of food from their own waggon-loads as they passed near by. There was keen sympathy for these troops throughout the force and, one after the other, the other selected battalions, when ordered to disband (mostly on September 24th and 25th) took the same action. General Gellibrand had asked for representatives of the 37th to meet him, and later went to the camp and talked the matter over with the men in a friendly, informal way. Monash also spoke quietly to representatives of the 37th, and battalion Commanders and brigadiers addressed all the recalcitrant battalions. The men’s argument was the same in every case and was entirely sincere.

Look Colonel (said those of the 25th to Col. Davis) the 25th from the first has been built on esprit de corps. We have been taught that the regiment is everything. You have often told us that we must sacrifice everything for its honour. We have always obeyed you and we always will-in everything but what you now ask. We cannot obey you in this just for that reason-we would sacrifice everything for the battalion. They told General Wisdom that it was their unanimous wish to go into the next battle and to be given the hardest task: there would either be no 25th left to break up, or they would leave such a record as would make it impossible to break them up. All the resisting battalions said they were keen to enter the great attack that they knew to be impending, but they demanded to be allowed to go in with their identity unchanged. A point elicited by Gellibrand was that the amalgamation of two battalions would be much less keenly felt than the extinction (in the field) of one of them.

Some units were clearly affected by their commanders’ arguments, the strongest of which was that they could not indefinitely resist, which the men knew to be true; but only one battalion gave way. It is a tribute to the unrivalled hold of Brig.-Genl. “Pompey” Elliott on the loyalty of his men that the 60th Battalion, after disobeying its commander’s order to join the 59th, agreed to do so upon being addressed by this beloved stout-hearted Australian. What was Elliott’s disgust when next morning, September 27th, he learnt that the other battalions were being allowed to go into the coming battle intact. As the great offensive was only a few days distant Monash had urged upon Rawlinson that the disbandment should be deferred for a fortnight, and asked him to press this upon Haig. The news of the order, says a record of the 21st Battalion, “was received with deafening cheers.” Naturally trouble at once recurred in the 60th, but Elliott again addressed it.

“By using my influence to the utmost,” he wrote in his diary, “I managed to sway the men over the line. My brigade is the only one in which the reorganisation was successfully accomplished.”
This incident has been called that of “the mutinies over disbandment,” and so in the strict sense of the terms it was; but the refusal was not treated as mutiny by any authority, Australian or British. In contrast to the mutiny in the 1st Battalion, it had its origin in some of the best men and finest qualities of the A.I.F. Australian soldiers had experienced few ties of loyalty in their civil lives; and a public loyalty once conceived was sustained with a flaming zeal disconcerting to those who had encouraged it. If, as General Brudenell White always strongly wished, it had been possible to tie the A.I.F. battalions oversea to the corresponding regiments of the citizen forces in Australia, so that the home regiment fed battalions or even companies overseas as in the New Zealand force, this trouble would probably never have arisen. But the A.I.F. was an improvised force and the disbandment of a battalion carried too many of the consequences of its extinction.

Mutiny was one of the only two offences punishable in the A.I.F. by death. No man was punished for his part in the disbandment mutiny. The mutiny in the 1st Battalion was in a totally different category. The men who refused duty, 119 in number, were tried and, with one exception, found guilty, not of joining in a mutiny, but of desertion. The ending of hostilities caused General Monash not to enforce the penalties and almost certainly saved him and the A.I.F. from having to face difficult problems whose solution would have called for not only tact but the highest qualities of wisdom, leadership and moral courage. Monash had some of these. In this decisive fighting, for such it was, he was right to work his troops to the extreme limit of their endurance, which normally is beyond the limit to which men themselves think they can endure. At such times victory often goes to the troops that hold out longest, withstanding strain, toil or exhaustion in perhaps unbelievable degree and for an unbelievable time; and the value of different armies depends largely upon how far they are ready to do this. On the other hand students of history may doubt whether mere eagerness for military prestige could ever, as Monash apparently imagined, maintain the will to such sacrifices, or could be wisely substituted for the high aims of justice and humanity in implanting a motive for which ordinary men, in such a war, will readily die.

The 21st Battalion Australian Imperial Force

Posted on January 21, 2012 by muzza

The 21st Battalion was an infantry battalion of the Australian Army. It was raised in 1915 as part of the First Australian Imperial Force for service during World War I and formed part of the 6th Brigade, attached to the 2nd Division. It fought during the Gallipoli campaign and on the Western Front before being disbanded in late 1918. The battalion was the first Australian battalion to commence active operations on the Western Front and also had the distinction of being the last to pull back when the Australian Corps was withdrawn from the line.

Returning to Egypt via Lemnos, the battalion undertook Canal Zone defensive duties and further training. During this time the AIF underwent a period of reorganisation while its future employment on operations was decided. A number of units from the 1st Division were split up and used to provide cadre staff for newly formed battalions, however, the 21st Battalion, like the rest of those from the 2nd Division remained intact. In mid-1916 the decision was made to transfer part of the AIF to Europe to take part in the fighting along the Western Front, and in March 1916 the battalion arrived in France. In April they became the first Australian battalion to “commence active operations on the Western Front”. In July 1916, during the Battle of Pozières, the battalion was committed to the battle, but was mainly used to carry out portage tasks. Later, in August, during the fighting around Mouquet Farm, the 21st Battalion suffered its most significant losses of the war.

Throughout 1917, the battalion took part in two major battles. The first came in May, when the 21st Battalion fought in the Second Battle of Bullecourt. In October, during the fighting around Broodseinde they advanced over 3 kilometres (3,000 m) before being withdrawn from the line for rest.

After a period in reserve for rest and reinforcement the battalion was called upon to help to defend against the German Spring Offensive of April 1918. After this was defeated, the Allies launched their own offensive, known as the Hundred Days Offensive and subsequently the 21st Battalion went on to participate in the battles of Hamel, Amiens and Mont St. Quentin. During the fight for Mont St Quentin, Sergeant Albert Lowerson was awarded the Victoria Cross. He had led seven men, attacking the flanks of a post, rushed the strongpoint and captured it, together with 12 machine-guns and 30 prisoners. He was severely wounded in the right thigh, but refused to leave the front line until the position had been consolidated.

As a result of the heavy losses that the battalion suffered during this time, coupled with the limited reinforcements arriving from Australia following the defeat of the conscription referendum, the 21st Battalion’s strength fell to the point where it was able to field little more than a company of men fit for active service. As a result it was ordered to disband and provide reinforcements to other battalions. On 25 September 1918, however, the battalion’s personnel mutinied in protest against the order to disband and subsequently the order was rescinded. Thus, the 21st Battalion took part in the final Australian operation of the war, joining the attack at Montbrehain on 5 October. The following day, however, upon a request made by Prime Minister Billy Hughes, the Australian Corps was withdrawn from the line. The 21st Battalion had the distinction of being the last Australian battalion to be withdrawn.

Following this, the battalion was formally disbanded on 13 October 1918 and its personnel dispersed to other units as reinforcements. Throughout its service during the war, it suffered 872 men killed and 2,434 wounded (including those that were gassed). Members of the battalion received the following decorations: one Victoria Cross, five Distinguished Service Orders with one bar, one Order of the British Empire, 22 Military Crosses with seven bars, 29 Distinguished Conduct Medals, 117 Military Medals with seven bars, seven Meritorious Service Medals, 24 Mentioned in Despatches, and eight foreign awards.

The 21st Battalion received the following battle honours for its service during World War I:
Suvla, Gallipoli 1915–1916, Egypt 1915–1917, Somme 1916, Pozieres, Bapaume 1917, Bullecourt, Ypres 1917, Menin Road, Polygon Wood, Broodseinde, Poelcappelle, Passchendaele, Hamel, Amiens, Albert 1918, Mont St Quentin, Hindenburg Line, Beaurevoir, France and Flanders 1916–1918.

The 21st Battalion attacks Mont St Quentin, 1 September 1918

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28 Battalion AIF – Unit History

Posted on January 21, 2012 by muzza

“The 28th: A Record of War Service in the Australian Imperial Force, 1915-19, Vol. I Egypt, Gallipoli, Lemnos Island, Sinai Peninsula” By COLONEL H. B. COLLETT – 1922

The 28th Battalion was raised at Blackboy Camp in Western Australia on 16 April 1915. The battalion left Australia in June, and, after two months spent training in Egypt, landed at Gallipoli on 10 September.

The 28th Battalion was raised at Blackboy Camp in Western Australia on 16 April 1915 from recruits previously earmarked for the 24th Battalion, which was instead being raised in Victoria. The battalion left Australia in June, and, after two months spent training in Egypt, landed at Gallipoli on 10 September.

28 Bn in Egypt

At Gallipoli, the 7th Brigade, which included the 28th Battalion, reinforced the weary New Zealand and Australian Division. The 28th had a relatively quiet time at Gallipoli and the battalion departed the peninsula in December, having suffered only light casualties.

After another stint in Egypt, the 7th Brigade proceeded to France and the Western Front, as part of the 2nd Australian Division. The 28th Battalion took part in its first major battle at Pozières between 28 July and 6 August 1916. After a spell in a quieter sector of the front in Belgium, the 2nd Division returned to the south in October, where the 28th Battalion took part in confused and costly fighting to the east of Flers, in the Somme Valley.

For many of the major battles of 1917 the 28th found itself in supporting roles. At the second battle of Bullecourt, the 28th provided reinforcements who were nonetheless involved in heavy fighting. The 28th went on to attack as part of the third phase at the battle of Menin Road, capturing its objectives in seven minutes, and was in reserve during the capture of Broodseinde Ridge. The battalion was also in reserve for the battle of Poelcappelle on 9 October, but, with the attack floundering in the mud, it soon became embroiled in the fighting.

In April 1918, the 28th fought to turn back the German spring offensive and, from 8 August participated in the joint British and French offensive that marked the beginning of Germany’s defeat. The Battalion was prominent in the fighting to secure crossing points over the Somme River around Peronne, and in the advance beyond Mont St Quentin. The 28th’s last actions of the war were fought as part of the effort to break through the Beaurevoir Line in the first week of October 1918. The first members of the battalion began returning to Australia in January, and the 28th was disbanded in March 1919.

The Unit History Volume 1 is available in PDF eBook format. Volume 1 of the Unit history covers the Unit formation, transport to Egypt, action in Gallipoli and the Sinai from 1915-1916. A second Volume was never produced.

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Blackboy Camp

Gallipoli

28 Bn at Gallipoli

Map at Gallipoli

Australia and New Zealand in the Great War The Australian Imperial Force -11 Battalion (RWAR) AIF

Posted on December 28, 2011 by muzza

Australia and New Zealand in the Great War
The Australian Imperial Force

11 Battalion (RWAR) AIF

(Royal Western Australian Regiment)

A poignant Group portrait of the Australian 11th Battalion, Royal Western Australia Regiment , 3rd Infantry Brigade, Australian Imperial Force posing on the Great Pyramid of Giza on 10 January 1915, only 2 weeks prior to the landing at Gallipoli. The 11th Battalion would be amongst the first to land at Anzac Cove on April 25 1915 and many of these men would be killed or wounded. In the five days following the landing, the battalion suffered 378 casualties, over one third of its strength.

The 11th Battalion was among the first infantry units raised for the AIF during the First World War. It was the first battalion recruited in Western Australia, and with the 9th, 10th and 12th Battalions it formed the 3rd Brigade.

The battalion was raised within weeks of the declaration of war in August 1914 and embarked for overseas after just two weeks of preliminary training. It arrived in Egypt to continue its training in early December. The 3rd Brigade was the covering force for the ANZAC landing on 25 April 1915 and so was the first ashore at around 4:30 am. Ten days after the landing, a company from the 11th Battalion mounted the AIF’s first raid of the war against Turkish positions at Gaba Tepe. Subsequently, the battalion was heavily involved in defending the front line of the ANZAC beachhead. In August, it made preparatory attacks at the southern end of the ANZAC position before the battle of Lone Pine. The 11th Battalion continued to serve at ANZAC until the evacuation in December.

After the withdrawal from Gallipoli, the 11th Battalion returned to Egypt. It was split to help form the 51st Battalion, and then bought up to strength with reinforcements.

In March 1916, the battalion sailed for France and the Western Front. From then until 1918, the battalion took part in bloody trench warfare. Its first major action in France was at Pozières in the Somme valley in July. After Pozières, the battalion manned trenches near Ypres in Flanders before returning to the Somme valley for winter.

In 1917 the battalion took part in the brief advance that followed the German Army’s retreat to the Hindenburg Line. During a German counterattack at Louverval, France, in April 1917 Lieutenant Charles Pope was killed performing the deed for which he would be awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross. The battalion subsequently returned to Belgium to participate in the offensive that became known as the Third Battle of Ypres.

The battalion helped to stop the German spring offensive in March and April 1918, and later that year participated in the great Allied offensive launched east of Amiens on 8 August 1918. This advance by British and empire troops was the greatest success in a single day on the Western Front, one that German General Erich Ludendorff described as “the black day of the German Army in this war”

The 11th Battalion continued operations until late September 1918. At 11 am on 11 November 1918, the guns fell silent. This armistice was followed by a peace treaty, signed at Versailles on 28 June 1919.

In November 1918 members of the AIF began to return to Australia. In February 1919, the 11th and 12th Battalions were amalgamated due to steadily declining numbers in both battalions. They remained so linked until their last members returned home for demobilisation and discharge.

Casualties
1115 killed, 2249 wounded (including gassed)
Bear in mind the Unit strength when fully manned was at best no more than 1000 officers and men, and not all are combatants. This Unit came from a State of the Commonwealth of Australia which in 1914 had a population of only 320,000.

The 3rd Battalion AIF – Randwick to Hargicourt – The History of the 3rd Battalion A.I.F.

Posted on December 28, 2011 by muzza

The 3rd Battalion AIF – Randwick to Hargicourt – The History of the 3rd Battalion A.I.F.

The 3rd Battalion was among the first infantry units raised for the AIF during the First World War. Like the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battalions it was recruited from New South Wales and, together with these battalions, formed the 1st Brigade.

The battalion was raised within a fortnight of the declaration of war in August 1914 and embarked just two months later. After a brief stop in Albany, Western Australia, the battalion proceeded to Egypt, arriving on 2 December. The battalion took part in the ANZAC landing on 25 April 1915 as part of the second and third waves and served there until the evacuation in December. In August, the battalion took part in the attack on Lone Pine. For his valorous action in defending Sasse’s Sap at Lone Pine on 9 August, Private John Hamilton was awarded the Victoria Cross.

After the withdrawal from Gallipoli, the battalion returned to Egypt. In March 1916, it sailed for France and the Western Front. From then until 1918 the battalion took part in operations against the German Army, principally in the Somme Valley in France and around Ypres in Belgium. The battalion’s first major action in France was at Pozières in the Somme valley in July 1916. Later the battalion fought at Ypres, in Flanders, before returning to the Somme for winter.

The battalion participated in a short period of mobile operations following the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line in early 1917, but spent much of that year fighting in increasingly difficult conditions around Ypres. In 1918 the battalion returned to the Somme valley and helped to stop the German spring offensive in March and April. The battalion subsequently participated in the Allies’ great offensive of that year, launched east of Amiens on 8 August 1918.

The Battalion returned to Australia in 1919.

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1 Battalion Australian Imperial Force – World War 1

Posted on December 27, 2011 by muzza

The 1st Battalion AIF – The History of the 1st Battalion A.I.F. 1914-19

1 Bn at Steeles Post Gallipoli May 1915

The 1st Battalion was the first infantry unit recruited for the AIF in New South Wales during the First World War.

The battalion was raised within a fortnight of the declaration of war in August 1914 and embarked just two months later. After a brief stop in Albany, Western Australia, the battalion proceeded to Egypt, arriving on 2 December. The battalion took part in the ANZAC landing on 25 April 1915 as part of the second and third waves, and served there until the evacuation in December. Its most notable engagement at Gallipoli was the battle of Lone Pine in August. Two members of the battalion, Captain A. J. Shout and Lieutenant L.M. Keysor were awarded Victoria Crosses for their valour at Lone Pine, Captain Shout posthumously.

After the withdrawal from Gallipoli in December 1915, the battalion returned to Egypt. In March 1916, it sailed for France and the Western Front. From then until 1918 the battalion took part in operations against the German Army, principally in the Somme Valley in France and around Ypres in Belgium. At Bullecourt in May 1917, Corporal G. J. Howell became the third member of the battalion to be awarded the Victoria Cross. The battalion participated in the battle of Amiens on 8 August 1918. This advance by British and empire troops was the greatest success in a single day on the Western Front, one that German General Erich Ludendorff described as “the black day of the German Army in this war”.

The Battalion continued operations until late September 1918. At 11 am on 11 November, 1918, the guns fell silent. The November armistice was followed by the peace treaty of Versailles signed on 28 June 1919. Between November 1918 and May 1919 the men of the 1st Battalion returned to Australia for demobilisation and discharge.

Menin Road Ypres Belgium

Battle Honours

ANZAC 1915

Landing at ANZAC
Suvla
Sari Bair-Lone Pine

France and Flanders 1916-19
Somme
Pozieres
Bullecourt
Ypres 1917
Menin Road
Polygon Wood
Broodseinde
Poelcappelle
Passchendaele
Lys
Hazebrouck
Amiens
Albert 1918 (Chuignes)
Hindenburg Line
Epehy

Casualties
1165 killed, 2363 wounded

LEST WE FORGET
In memory of Lcpl R Dendtler 1 Bn AIF died of wounds 16 May 1915 Gallipoli

The Unit History of 1 Bn AIF is available on CDROM here

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The Dardanelles – An Epic Told in Pictures

Posted on December 18, 2011 by muzza

The Dardanelles – Foreword

The finest feat ever performed by British Arms ” was the description applied by Sir Ian Hamilton, in his historic despatch, to the performances of our soldiers in Gallipoli.

Of that great feat the heroic troops of Australia and New Zealand can claim the lion’s share. In those stupendous struggles which they fought side by side with their brothers in arms from the Motherland they achieved something far greater than unsurpassed acts of military valour; they forged strong links to bind together yet more closely the peoples of Greater Britain. The Anzac heroes who bled and died in Gallipoli, their English comrades, and the men of the Fleet who went to their death aboard the sinking battleships in the Dardanelles, have left a legacy to the British Empire which will have even more lasting effects than will the victory which is coming to us.

The Dardanelles campaign has showed Great Britain and her Dominions beyond the seas united in one common bond of brotherhood. The heroes of Anzac, of Suvla Bay, and the Beaches have made history by their surpassing bravery, their indomitable courage, their coolness, their cheerfulness in circumstances of appalling hardships and danger. Their story will live for ever.

This book can add no lustre to their imperishable fame, but it can make their history the more real. It shows in photographs the actual conditions in which they fought and died, it forms a pictorial record of the scenes of which so much has been written, and makes real places and incidents that have previously been only names.

Many of the photographs in this book were taken under fire. They constitute a unique souvenir of a phase in a campaign that ranks above the greatest military feats the world has hitherto known and that forms a standard by which all deeds of soldier valour will be measured in the future.

The Dardanelles

DESCRIPTION of the OPERATIONS from SIR IAN HAMILTON’S DESPATCH

The full story of what has been called the “glorious failure” at Suvla Bay has been told in an intensely vivid and graphic despatch by Sir Ian Hamilton, who was in command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. It is not possible, within the scope of this book, to print this despatch in full, but the following extracts will serve to indicate the nature of the operations associated with the places illustrated in the preceding pages.

THE DATE OF THE GREAT ADVENTURE.

Only one other action need be mentioned before coming to the big operations of August. On the extreme right of Anzac the flank of a work called Tasmania Post was threatened by the extension of a Turkish trench. The task of capturing this trench was entrusted to the 3rd Australian Brigade. After an artillery bombardment, mines were to be fired, whereupon four columns of 50 men each were to assault and occupy specified lengths of the trench. The regiment supplying the assaulting columns was the nth Australian Infantry Battalion.

At 10.15 p.m. on July 3ist the bombardment was opened. Ten minutes later and the mines were duly fired. The four assaulting parties dashed forward at once, crossed our own barbed wire on planks, and were into the craters before the whole of the debris had fallen. Total casualties : 11 killed and 74 wounded ; Turkish killed, 100.

By the time this action was fought a large proportion of my reinforcements had arrived, and, on the same principle which induced me to put General Stopford in temporary command at Helles, I relieved the war-worn 29th Division at the same place by the 13th Division under Major-General Shaw. The experiences here gained, in looking after themselves, in forgetting the thousand and one details of peace soldiering and in grasping the two or three elementary rules of conduct in war soldiering, were, it turned out, to be of priceless advantage to the 13th Division throughout the heavy fighting of the following month.

And now it was time to determine a date for the great venture. The moon would rise on the morning of the 7th at about 2 a.m. A day or two previously the last reinforcements, the 53rd and 54th Divisions, were due to arrive. The first day of the attack was fixed for August 6th.

THE ANZACS AT CHUNUK BAIR.

I will now proceed to tell of the assault on Chunuk Bair by the forces under General Birdwood, and of the landing of the 9th Corps in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay. The entire details of the operations allotted to the troops to be employed in the Anzac area were formulated by Lieutenant-General Birdwood, subject only to my final approval. So excellently was this vital business worked out on the lines of the instructions issued that I had no modifications to suggest, and all these local preparations were completed by August 6th in a way which reflects the greatest credit, not only on the Corps Commander and his staff, but also upon the troops themselves, who had to toil like slaves to accumulate food, drink, and munitions of war. Alone the accommodation for the extra troops to be landed necessitated an immense amount of work in preparing new concealed bivouacs, in making interior communications, and in storing water and supplies, for I was determine . to put on shore as many fighting men as our modest holding at Anzac could possibly accommodate or provision. All the work was done by Australian and New Zealand soldiers almost entirely by night, and the uncomplaining efforts of these much-tried troops in preparation are in a sense as much to their credit as their heroism in the battles that followed. Above all, the water problem caused anxiety to the Admiral, to Lieutenant-General Birdwood, and to myself.

The troops to advance from Suvla Bay across the Anafarta valley might reckon on finding some wells – it was certain, at least, that no water was waiting tor us on the crests of the ridges of Sari Bair ! Therefore, first, several days’ supply had to be stocked into tanks along the beach and thence pumped up into other tanks half-way up the mountains ; secondly, a system of mule transport had to be worked out, so that, in so far as was humanly possible, thirst should not be allowed to overcome the troops after they had overcome the difficulties of the country and the resistance of the enemy.

Once the capture of Old No. 3 Post was fairly under way, the remainder of the right covering column carried on with their attack upon Bauchop’s Hill and the Chailak Dere. By 10 p.m. the northernmost point, with its machine-gun, was captured, and by 1 o’clock in the morning the whole of Bauchop’s Hill, a maze of ridge and ravine; every-, where entrenched, was fairly in our hands.

The attack along the Chailak Dere was not so cleanly carried out—made, indeed, just about as ugly a start as any enemy could wish. Pressing eagerly forward through the night, the little column of stormers found themselves held up by a barbed wire erection of unexampled height, depth, and solidity, which completely closed the river bed —that is to say, the only practicable entrance to the ravine. The entanglement was flanked by a strongly-held enemy trench running right across the opening of the Chailak Dere. Here that splendid body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest and their best, but in the end, when things were beginning to seem desperate, a passage was forced through the stubborn obstacle with most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Shera and a party of New Zealand Engineers, supported by the Maoris, who showed themselves worthy descendants of the warriors of the Gate Pah. Thus was the mouth of the Chailak Dere opened in time to admit of the unopposed entry of the right assaulting column.

THE ATTACK ON THE LONE PINE TRENCHES.

The most simple method of developing this complicated series of operations will be first to take the frontal attacks from the existing Anzac position, and afterwards to go on to the assault on the more distant ridges. During the 4th, 5th and 6th of August the works on the enemy’s left and centre were subjected to a slow bombardment, and on the afternoon of August 6th an assault was made upon the formidable Lone Pine entrenchment. Although, in its essence, a diversion to draw the enemy’s attention and reserves from the grand attack impending upon his right, yet, in itself, Lone Pine was a distinct step on the way across to Maidos. It commanded one of the main sources of the Turkish water supply, and was a work, or, rather, a series of works, for the safety of which the enemy had always evinced a certain nervousness. The attack was designed to heighten this impression.

The work consisted of a strong point d’appui on the south-western end of a plateau, where it confronted, ‘at distances varying from 60 to 120 yards, the salient in the line of our trenches named by us the Pimple. The entrenchment was evidently very strong ; it was entangled with wire and provided with overhead cover, and it was connected by numerous communication trenches with another point d’appui known as Johnston’s Jolly on the north, as well as with two other works on the east and south. The frontage for attack amounted at most to some 220 yards, and the approaches lay open to heavy enfilade fire, both from the north and from the south . . .

This rare book can be purchased in PDF ebook format here….The Dardanelles – An Epic Told in Pictures

The uncensored Dardanelles

Posted on November 19, 2011 by muzza

The Uncensored Dardanelles by Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett

One of the most important of all books on the ill-fated campaign, though hated by Cyril Falls, who wrote (in his War Books): “This book is, from the military point of view, chiefly interesting as an explanation of the prejudice and distrust which soldiers cannot avoid when they have to do with war correspondents of a certain type. It also illustrates to what follies vanity and cocksureness may lead a man in the position wherein Mr Ashmead-Bartlett found himself, even when that man is strikingly able, a clear writer, and an experienced war correspondent.”

Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett was the eldest son of Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett (1849-1902). Born in 1881, he was educated at Marlborough College. In 1897, at the age of 17, he accompanied his father to Turkey as the guest of the Sultan and followed the Turkish army in its campaign against the Greeks. At one point the party was arrested by the Greeks as spies. Ashmead-Bartlett had begun studying to become a barrister when he left with his regiment for the South African War in February 1900. At the end of May he was taken ill, sent home and spent 7 months in hospital. By early in 1901 he was in Marseilles and Monte Carlo, supposedly for recuperation (A/3), and in May 1901 he returned to London to stay with his uncle and aunt, the Burdett-Coutts, and continued his legal studies.

It was not until 1904 that he began his career as a war correspondent by covering the siege of the Russian port of Port Arthur by the Japanese, entering the city with the victors. His account, Port Arthur: the siege and capitulation (London 1906) was well received. For the next few years he mixed a full social life in London and the country and in Paris (as described in his diaries) with periods as a war correspondent and writer and a developing political career. As Reuters’ special correspondent he accompanied the French army in Morocco (1907-08), the Spanish in Morocco (1909) and the Italians in Tripoli (1911). At home he fought the safe Labour seat of Normanton in Yorkshire for the Conservatives in January 1910 and the Liberal seat of Poplar in December 1910. He was then employed by the Daily Telegraph to be its correspondent in the Balkans and he covered the two Balkan wars of 1912-1913.

As correspondent for the Fleet Street papers, Ashmead-Bartlett, who worked for the The Daily Telegraph, covered the 25 April 1915 landing at Anzac Cove. He had gone ashore at Anzac Cove at 9.30 pm on the evening of the landing and, wearing an non-regulation green hat, was promptly arrested as a spy but was released when the boatswain who had brought him ashore testified for him.

Ashmead-Bartlett was responsible for the first eyewitness accounts of the battle. His report of the landing was published in Australian newspapers on 8 May, before the reports of the Australian correspondent, C.E.W. Bean. His colourful prose, unrestrained by the pursuit of accuracy which hampered Bean’s dispatches, was thick with praise for the Anzacs and went down well with the Australian audience:

“There has been no finer feat in this war than this sudden landing in the dark and storming the heights, and, above all, holding on while the reinforcements were landing. These raw colonial troops, in these desperate hours, proved worthy to fight side by side with the heroes of Mons, the Aisne, Ypres and Neuve Chapelle.”

On 27 May 1915, Ashmead-Bartlett was aboard HMS Majestic, a British battleship anchored off W Beach at Cape Helles, when it was torpedoed by the German U-boat U-21. Two days earlier he had seen HMS Triumph go down off Anzac, the first victim of the U-21, and he was well aware that the Majestic would likely suffer the same fate. On the night of 26 May he helped drink the last of the ship’s champagne. He had his mattress brought up on deck so that he would not be trapped in his cabin. Ashmead-Bartlett survived the sinking but lost all his kit. He sailed for Malta to acquire a new wardrobe.

As the battle progressed, Ashmead-Bartlett’s reports became highly critical which left him in disfavour with the British commander-in-chief, General Sir Ian Hamilton. Instead of returning to the Dardanelles from Malta, he went on to London, arriving on 6 June, to report in person on the conduct of the campaign. During his time in London, he met with most of the senior political figures including Andrew Bonar Law (the Colonial Secretary), Winston Churchill (by that time displaced as First Lord of the Admiralty), Arthur Balfour (Churchill’s replacement at the Admiralty) and the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith. He was also questioned by the Secretary of State for War, Horatio Kitchener.

When he returned to Gallipoli, Ashmead-Bartlett established himself on the island of Imbros which was also the site of Hamilton’s headquarters. Here he lived in relative safety and comfort, even having brought his own cook from Paris. Returning to the pensinsula, he witnessed the new landing at Suvla during the August Offensive:

“Confusion reigned supreme. No-one seemed to know where the headquarters of the different brigades and divisions were to be found. The troops were hunting for water, the staffs were hunting for their troops, and the Turkish snipers were hunting for their prey.”

Ashmead-Bartlett had obtained a movie camera while in London with which he captured the only film footage of the battle. On 21 August he was watching from Chocolate Hill when the British IX Corps launched the final attack of the campaign, the Battle of Scimitar Hill. While filming, he was buried when an artillery shell landed nearby but was quickly dug free.

When Australian journalist Keith Murdoch arrived at Gallipoli in September, Ashmead-Bartlett found a receptive audience for his commentary and analysis of the campaign. Murdoch travelled to London carrying a letter from Ashmead-Bartlett — it is disputed whether Murdoch knew the contents — which damned the campaign, describing the final offensive as “the most ghastly and costly fiasco in our history since the battle of Bannockburn.” The letter, intended for Asquith, was intercepted in Marseilles and on 28 September, Ashmead-Bartlett was told to leave Gallipoli.

On his return to London, Ashmead-Bartlett gave an “interview” to The Sunday Times (it was on opinion piece presented as an interview to circumvent censorship rules). Published on 17 October, it was the first detailed account of the campaign and was widely circulated, published in The Times and Daily Mail as well as in Australian papers.

Short of money, Ashmead-Bartlett undertook a lecture tour of England and Australia. He reported on the fighting on the Western Front in France. Following the war he fought in Hungary against the Bolsheviks. He spent two years as a Conservative MP. He died in Lisbon in 1931.

The Assembly of the Armada

I came to be associated with the Dardanelles Expedition in the following manner. At the commencement of the war no Special Correspondents were allowed in the field, a state of affairs which speedily led to discontent amongst the public, who felt that they were entitled to hear of the gallant actions of our soldiers and sailors on land and sea. This veto on the Press gave rise to a widespread belief that the truth was being concealed, and that many grave events were taking place which were being purposely hidden by the authorities. The main obstacle to overcome was the hostility of Lord Kitchener, who was-as he had ever been throughout his career-bitterly opposed to War Correspondents. Sir John French took an entirely different view. He desired to utilise the Press, believing that descriptive accounts of their actions, subject to an intelligent censorship to prevent information from reaching the enemy, encouraged the troops in the field and the public at home. For many months Lord Kitchener remained adamant. Time and time again deputations waited on him, but never got further than Sir George Arthur, his private secretary. Protests were written by newspaper proprietors, and Cabinet Ministers intervened, but in vain. All propositions, however reasonable, were invariably turned down by that great man, who entirely failed to realise, at this stage, that if he wished to make the war a national one, and to induce the whole nation to take part in it, it was necessary to interest the people and to employ an extensive propaganda for this purpose. Neither were precedents lacking which should have warned Lord Kitchener and his advisers that they were pursuing a policy which had been tried before, and had singularly failed. Since the days of Russell, Kinglake, and Archibald Forbes, War Correspondents have played an honourable and valuable role in every campaign, and no British Army has ever had cause to regret their presence at the front. A long line of illustrious writers have added prestige to British arms from Afghan’s snows to the South African veldt. During the Russo-Japanese War the question of War Correspondents became an international one. The British, American, and Continental Press had gone to great expense to send their best men to Tokyo to accompany the Japanese armies. For months these poor ” Die Hards,” amongst whom were such well-known names as Richard Harding Davis, John Fox, Martin Egan, William Maxwell, Bennett Burleigh, and Frederick Palmer, to mention but a few, remained in Japan unable to reach the front, receiving scraps of information thrown to them from headquarters in Tokyo, spending a great deal of money and losing much time, but without obtaining any of those tangible results which are the sole justification for their existence from the editor’s, proprietor’s, and public’s points of view. The months passed and many left Japan as their newspapers were unable to stand the financial strain. When only a remnant of the original band remained, the Japanese Government suddenly awoke to the fact that they were deliberately failing to make use of this great weapon of free propaganda to advertise their cause—just when they most required the financial assistance of Europe. Then, ” As if by stroke of the enchanter’s wand,” the Correspondents found themselves no longer outcasts unwanted and ignored, but honoured guests whose presence in the field was regarded as essential to the success of the Japanese cause.

Arrangements were made to divide them into three groups to accompany the different armies, and, pending the inevitable delays, they were entertained lavishly in Tokyo at dinners, luncheons, garden parties, whilst the fairest Geishas were laid at their feet as some slight compensation for the cavalier manner in which they had been treated since their arrival. From that hour the Japanese cause gained prestige ; the deeds of the Japanese armies received their due recognition, and, finally, during the negotiations, which ended in the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Island Nation had secured an excellent Press throughout the world.

The Press foresaw, but the majority of the soldiers did not, that a like situation would arise in the World War. Public interest began to slacken, recruits did not pour in as had been anticipated, and munition workers failed to display that keenness which patriotism and duty demanded, if their comrades at the front were to receive adequate support. Yet the public were not to blame, the authorities were responsible. How could the masses appreciate the war in its true orientation, as long as they were mentally fed on official bulletins of three or four lines, recording the fact that we had either taken or lost a trench in Flanders ; that the Russians had advanced or retired so many kilometres to or from rivers with unpronounceable names, or had captured towns the nomenclature of which is not included in the curriculum of our Board School education?

The Landing at ANZAC

APRIL 24th. Throughout the morning there were scenes of unwonted activity in Mudros Bay. The warships changed their anchorage and took up fresh stations, and the crowded transports slowly made their way to the entrance of the harbour. At 3 p.m. our boats brought the 500 men of the 11th Australian Infantry on board for the last time. Numbered squares had been painted in white on the quarter-deck, and on each of these a company fell in. The men were then dismissed and made their way forward to the mess decks. The hospitable British tars handed over their limited accommodation to the newcomers, who were to bear the brunt of the attack. At 5 p.m., our force, the Second Division of the fleet, consisting of the Queen, Prince of Wales, London, and Majestic, with four transports bearing troops, and the covering ships Triumph, Bacchante, and Prince George, slowly steamed out of the bay. As we passed through the long lines of waiting transports, our bands played the national anthems of all the Allies, and deafening cheers greeted our departure. It was the most majestic and inspiring spectacle I have ever seen, but withal there was an atmosphere of tragedy. Many, now full of life and hope and joy, will never see another sun sink to rest. The weather was beautifully fine, and when we had cleared the entrance of the bay we turned our backs on Gallipoli and steamed due west to pass round the far side of the island of Lemnos, en route for a secret rendezvous only known to the Admiral. It is painfully obvious that we can only effect a local surprise, because the Turks, in Sir Ian Hamilton’s own words, knew of the exact composition of his force before he ever left Egypt, and now they must have learnt from their aviators and spies, scattered amongst the islands, that our preparations are complete. They can also calculate on our striking between the waning of the old moon and the rising of the new. At six o’clock the Australian contingent fell in on one side of the quarter-deck, and the crew of the London on the other. Captain Armstrong read Admiral de Robeck’s proclamation wishing success to all ranks. His place was then taken by the ship’s chaplain, who conducted a short service, and, as he uttered solemn prayers for victory, the men stood with bowed and bared heads. The Australians were then taken to the mess deck, where a hot meal was served out to them by the crew ; then, after a smoke, they turned in to obtain some rest before dawn. It was the last sleep for many a brave warrior from ” Down Under.” At seven o’clock dinner was served in the wardroom, where the Australian officers were entertained as our guests. Everyone feigned an unnatural cheerfulness, the wine passed round, not a word was said of what the morrow might bring forth, yet over the party there seemed to hover the dread angel of death. After this tragic repast we surrendered our cabins to our Dominion friends, and snatched some sleep in the wardroom chairs. At sunset all lights were extinguished, and we steamed slowly through the night to an unknown destination, and to an unknown fate.

April 25th. At 1 a.m. the fleet came to a dead stop and all on board were roused. I visited the mess decks, and watched the Australian troops having a final hot meal before falling in. They were as calm as if about to take part in a route march. At 2 a.m. the men fell in by companies on the numbered squares, of which I have already spoken. Our boats had meanwhile been lowered and attached to the steam pinnaces. Each battleship had towed three extra pinnaces from Mudros in addition to her own.

There was only a faint sheen from the stars to light up the dramatic scene on deck. This splendid contingent from Australia stood there in silence, as the officers, hurrying from group to group, issued their final instructions. Between the companies of infantry were the beach parties, whose duty it was to put them ashore. Lieutenants in khaki, midshipmen—not yet out of their ‘teens—in old white duck suits dyed khaki colour, carrying revolvers, water-bottles, and kits almost as big as themselves, and sturdy bluejackets equipped for the shore. At 2.30 a.m. the pinnaces towed the boats alongside, and the Australians climbed down the wooden ladders. Thanks to the constant rehearsals there was no confusion, no overcrowding, and not a single mishap occurred. The tows then went astern, each battleship trailing four behind her. At 3 a.m., the fleet began to move slowly towards the shore until, a little after 4 a.m., the distant silhouette of the coast became visible for the first time. At 4.30 a.m. the Queen, London, Prince of Wales, and Majestic were in line about three thousand yards from the shore. The signal was then given for the tows to cast off, and make their way to the beach. It was still very dark and each pinnace, towing four boats, locked like a great snake as it slowly forged ahead . . .

: General Sir Ian Hamilton

: Prayers For Victory , H.M.S. London , April 24th, 1915

: View of Lancashire Landing In Early Days

: Bows of The River Clyde Facing V Beach

: The Ruins of Seddel Bahr Castle

: Captured Turkish Prisoners

: Field-Marshal Sir W. R. Birdwood

: 11th Division Embarking At Imbros For Suvla

: Prow of One of The ” Beetles,” Suvla

For more despatches from Gallipoli see here: Ashmead Bartlett’s Despatches from Gallipoli An Epic of Heroism

Sandakan Death Marches

Posted on November 11, 2011 by muzza

The Sandakan Death Marches were a series of forced marches in Borneo from Sandakan to Ranau which resulted in the deaths of more than 3,600 Indonesian civilian slave labourers and 2,400 Allied prisoners of war held captive by the Empire of Japan during the Pacific campaign of World War II at prison camps in North Borneo. By the end of the war, of all the prisoners who had been incarcerated at Sandakan and Ranau, only six Australians survived, all of whom had escaped. It is widely considered to be the single worst atrocity suffered by Australian servicemen during the Second World War.

Sandakan POW camp on October 24, 1945, a few months after the camp was destroyed by the retreating Japanese troops. In No. 1 compound (pictured), graves containing the bodies of 300 Australian and British prisoners were later discovered. It is believed they were the men left at the camp after the second series of marches. Each grave contained several bodies, in some cases as many as 10.

Constructing the airstrip

In 1942 and 1943, Indonesian civilians imported from Java, along with Australian and British POWs who had been captured at the Battle of Singapore in February 1942, were shipped to North Borneo in order to construct a military airstrip and POW camp at Sandakan, North Borneo (Sabah). As on the Burma Railway the prisoners were forced to work at gunpoint, and were often beaten whilst also receiving very little food or medical attention. In August 1943, with the intention of controlling the enlisted men by removing any commanders, most officer prisoners were moved from Sandakan to the Batu Lintang camp at Kuching. Conditions for the remaining prisoners deteriorated sharply following the officers’ removal. Any rations given were further reduced, and sick prisoners were also forced to work on the airstrip. After construction was completed the prisoners initially remained at the camp. In January 1945, with only 1,900 prisoners still alive, the advancing Allies managed to successfully bomb and destroy the airfield. It was at this time with Allied landings anticipated shortly that camp commandant Captain Hoshijima Susumu decided to move the remaining prisoners westward into the mountains to the town of Ranau, a distance of approximately 260 kilometres (160 miles). He claimed that this was an order of Lt Gen Masao Baba, commanding officer of the 37th Japanese Army.
The first marches

The first phase of marches across wide marshland, dense jungle, and then up the eastern slope of Mount Kinabalu occurred between January and March 1945. The Japanese had selected 470 prisoners who were thought to be fit enough to carry baggage and supplies for the accompanying Japanese battalions relocating to the western coast. In several groups the POWs, all of whom were either malnourished or suffering serious illness, started the journey originally under the intention of reaching Jesselton (Kota Kinabalu). Although the route took nine days, they were given enough rations for only four days. As on the Bataan Death March, any POWs who were not fit enough or collapsed from exhaustion were either killed or left to die en route. Upon reaching Ranau, the survivors were halted and ordered to construct a temporary camp. As one historian later commented: “Those who survived… were herded into insanitary and crowded huts and many died from dysentery. By 26 June, only five Australians and one British soldier were still alive.”

The second marches

A second series of marches began on 29 May 1945 with approximately 536 prisoners. The new Sandakan camp commander, Captain Takakuwa Takuo, ordered the prisoners towards Ranau in groups of about fifty with accompanying Japanese guards. The march lasted for twenty-six days, with prisoners even less fit than those in the first marches had been, provided with fewer rations and often forced to forage for food. Compound No. 1 of the Sandakan camp was destroyed in an attempt to erase any evidence of its existence. Only 183 prisoners managed to reach Ranau. Upon their arrival on 24 June 1945, participants of the second marches discovered that only six prisoners from the first series of marches during January were still alive.

The final march

Approximately 250 people were left at Sandakan after the second march departed. Most prisoners were so ill that the Japanese initially intended to let them starve to death. However on 9 June 1945 it was decided to send another group of 75 men on a final march. The remaining men were so weak that none survived beyond 50 kilometres (30 miles). As each man collapsed from exhaustion, that man was shot by a Japanese guard. All remaining prisoners left at Sandakan who could not walk either were killed or died from a combination of starvation and sickness before the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945.

Aftermath

Due to a combination of a lack of food and brutal treatment at the hands of the Japanese, there were only 38 prisoners left alive at Ranau by the end of July. All were too unwell and weak to do any work, and it was ordered that any remaining survivors should be shot. They were killed by the guards during August, possibly up to 12 days after the end of the war on August 14.

In total, only six Australian servicemen managed to escape. During the second marches, Gunner Owen Campbell and Bombardier Richard Braithwaite managed to escape into the jungle, where they were assisted by locals and eventually rescued by Allied units. During July, Private Nelson Short, Warrant Officer William Sticpewich, Private Keith Botterill and Lance Bombardier William Moxham managed to escape from Ranau and were also helped by the local people, who fed them and hid them from the Japanese until the end of the war. Of the six survivors, only three survived the lingering effects of their ordeal in order to give evidence at various war crimes trials in both Tokyo and Rabaul. The world was able to receive eyewitness accounts of the crimes and atrocities committed. Captain Hoshijima was found guilty of war crimes and hanged on April 6 1946. Capt Takakuwa and his second-in-charge, Capt Watanabe Genzo, were found guilty of causing the murders and massacres of prisoners-of-war and were hanged and shot on 6 April 1946 and 16 March 1946 respectively.

Sergeant Hosotani Naoji (left, seated) of the Kenpeitai (Japanese secret police) at Sandakan is interrogated by Squadron Leader F. G. Birchall (second right) of the Missing Servicemen Section and Sergeant Mamo (right) of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service on October 26, 1945. Naoji confessed to shooting two Australian POWs and five Chinese civilians.

A War Memorial and Gardens of remembrance were built at Kundasang, Sabah in 1962 to commemorate those who had died at Sandakan and Ranau.

The Sandakan Death Marches have been dramatised in the 2004 play Sandakan Threnody — a threnody being a hymn of mourning, composed as a memorial to a dead person. The play was written by Australian composer Jonathan Mills, whose father survived a term of imprisonment at Sandakan in 1942-43.

Harry Morant – “The Breaker”

Posted on October 22, 2011 by muzza

Harry ‘Breaker’ Harbord Morant (9 December 1864 – 27 February 1902) was an Australian drover, horseman, bush poet and soldier whose skill with horses earned him the nickname “The Breaker”. The bulk of his published work appeared in The Bulletin magazine.

During service in the Second Boer War, Morant participated in the summary execution of several Boer (Afrikaaner) prisoners and the murder of a German missionary, Daniel Heese, who had been a witness to the shootings. His actions led to his controversial court-martial for murder; his death warrant was personally signed by the British commander in South Africa, Lord Kitchener, although Lord Kitchener subsequently denied the issuance of it. Morant was executed for murder by a contingent of Cameron Highlanders (a regiment of the British Army) in Pretoria gaol (South Africa) on 27 February 1902.

Lord Kitchener

In the century since his death, Morant has become a folk hero to some in Australia. His story has been the subject of several books, a stage play, and a major Australian feature film. The controversy surrounding his conviction and death lead in part to the Australian Government refusing to allow British military courts to pass the death sentence on Australian soldiers in subsequent conflicts….a major break with the British Crown and an early step in Australian independence from Britain.

Breaker Morant

Accounts of Morant’s life before the Boer War vary considerably, and it appears that Morant fabricated a number of these romantic legends. Morant is often described as being ‘well-educated’ and claimed to have been born in 1865 at Bideford, Devon, England and to have been the illegitimate son of Admiral Sir George Digby Morant of the Royal Navy; a claim repeated as fact by later writers, although the admiral denied it. Morant entrusted his cigarette case and other personal belongings to Major Bolton, the prosecuting officer during the later courts martial with the words “see that my family gets them”. Years later, when Bolton’s daughter tried to hand them to the family of Sir George, she was sent away and told Morant was not related to them. It has been suggested that the young Morant came into the care of a wealthy Scottish author, soldier, hunt-master and golfer, George Whyte-Melville. Like other stories there is no evidence for this theory.

The results of enquiries made in 1902 by both The Northern Miner and The Bulletin newspapers identified him as Edwin Henry Murrant who had arrived at Townsville in Queensland on the SS Waroonga in 1883. Murrant was born at Bridgwater in Somerset, England in December 1864, the son of Edwin Murrant and Catherine (née Riely). Edwin and Catherine were Master and Matron of the Union Workhouse at Bridgewater and after Edwin died in August 1864, four months before the birth of his son, Catherine continued her employment as Matron until her retirement in 1882. She died in 1899 when Morant was in Adelaide, South Australia, preparing to leave for South Africa.

Morant settled in outback Queensland, and over the next 15 years, working in Queensland, New South Wales and South Australia, the charismatic roustabout made a name for himself as a hard-drinking, womanising bush poet and gained renown as a fearless and expert horseman. Harry Breaker Morant was one of the few horsemen who managed to ride the notorious buckjumper, Dargin’s Grey, in a battle that became a roughriding legend.

Morant worked in a variety of occupations; he reportedly traded in horses in Charters Towers, then worked for a time on a newspaper at Hughenden in 1884, but there are suggestions that he left both towns as a result of debts. He then drifted around for some time until he found work as a bookkeeper and storeman on the Esmaralda cattle station.

On 13 March 1884, Morant married Daisy May O’Dwyer, who later became famous in Australia as the anthropologist Daisy Bates, but the couple separated soon after and never formally divorced; Daisy reportedly threw him out after he failed to pay for the wedding and then stole some pigs and a saddle. He then worked for several years as an itinerant drover and horse-breaker, as well as writing his popular bush ballads, becoming friendly with famed Australian poets Henry Lawson, Banjo Patterson and William Ogilvie.

At the time Morant volunteered for military service (in 1899), the formal federation of the Commonwealth of Australia was still two years away. Australia consisted of separate self-governing colonies, each of which was still subject to the British Crown. Because the population included many British immigrants, most Australians still had strong ties to “The Mother Country”. Consequently, thousands of Australian men volunteered to fight for Britain in the Second Boer War, which pitted British colonial forces against Dutch Boer settlers in South Africa.

Evidently, seeing this as a chance to return to England and redeem himself in the eyes of the family he had left 16 years before, Morant enlisted with the Second Contingent of the South Australian Mounted Rifles. While in Adelaide, Morant was reportedly invited to visit the summer residence of the South Australian governor, Lord Tennyson. After completing his training, he was appointed lance corporal and his regiment embarked for the Transvaal on 27 February 1900.

In many respects, the terrain and climate of South Africa is remarkably similar to that of outback Australia, so Morant was in his element. His superb horsemanship, expert bush skills, and educated manner soon attracted the attention of his superiors. South Australian Colonel Joseph Gordon recommended him as a dispatch rider to Bennet Burleigh, the war correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph; the job reportedly provided the debonair Morant with ample opportunity to visit the nearby hospital and dally with the nurses.

The statement of service Morant tendered at his trial is quoted, apparently verbatim, in the book written by his friend and colleague, George Witton. According to that account, Morant was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Bushveldt Carbineers (BVC) on 1 April 1901. Prior to that, he had served in the South Australian Second Contingent for nine months. During that duration, he was promoted to the rank of sergeant. Subsequently, he returned to Devon, England for a period of time.

Bushveldt Carbineers in a damaged Boer homestead.

In March 1900, Morant carried dispatches for the Flying Column to Prieska, under Colonel Lowe, 7th D.G., who was in the general advance to Bloemfontein and took part in the engagements of Karee Siding and Kroonstadt, and other engagements with Lord Roberts until the entry into Pretoria. Morant was at Diamond Hill and was then attached to General French’s staff, Cavalry Brigade, as war correspondent with Bennet Burleigh of the London Daily Telegraph. He accompanied that column through Middelburg and Belfast to the occupation of Barberton. At this point, he took leave and returned to Devon, England for six months. Here he became close friends with Captain Hunt, and the two of them became engaged to a pair of sisters. Hunt, who was still ‘signed on’, returned to South Africa to take command of a regiment in the Bushveldt Carbineers, whereas Morant (who had intended that his military service come to an end) followed him shortly after not having found the forgiveness he sought in England. Originally returning to take up a commission in Baden Powell’s Transvaal Constabulary, he was convinced by Hunt to instead accept a commission in the BVC.

A photograph from the Boer War showing Lieutenant Handcock, left, and Lieutenant Morant, second from left.

A previously unpublished photo in Nick Bleszynksi’s book from the UK National Archive, taken circa 1900 in Bideford (presumably while on leave), shows the 35-year-old Morant to have been a debonair and strikingly handsome man. His short dark hair, carefully groomed, surmounts chiselled features and piercing pale eyes. His left foot rests on a stone; leaning slightly to his left, his left arm rests across the raised leg, riding crop held between thumb and forefinger, a cloth cap dangling from his fingers. Immaculately dressed in an expensive tailored riding outfit, his right thumb is hooked nonchalantly in the coat pocket, a cigarette dangling between his first two fingers.

Following their defeats on the battlefield during 1899–1900, the Boer rebels embarked on a guerrilla campaign against the British. In response, Lord Kitchener, the British commander in South Africa assembled and deployed a number of irregular regiments to combat Boer commando units and protect British interests in the region.

On his return from leave, Morant joined one of these irregular units, the Bushveldt Carbineers, a 320-strong regiment that had been formed in February 1901 under the command of an Australian, Colonel R.W. Lenehan. Following his friend’s lead, Captain Hunt joined the BVC soon after.

Major Robert William Lenehan (1865-1922)

The regiment, based in Pietersburg, 180 miles (290 km) north of Pretoria, saw action in the Spelonken region of the Northern Transvaal during 1901–1902. The region was remote, wild and dangerous and was also in a particularly unhealthy malarial area. Because of this, the British had difficulty in finding troops and as a result, many colonial soldiers enlisted.

Mounted soldiers from 2nd South Australian mounted rifles contingent with Harry 'Breaker' Morant third from the left during the Boer War circa 1901

About seventy percent of the men in the BVC were Australians, but the regiment also included about forty surrendered Boers (“joiners”) who had been recruited from the internment camps, and according to Witton, their presence was greatly resented by the Australians. The garrison was soon divided into two columns; one, under the command of Lieutenant Morant, operated in the Strydpoort district, about 30 miles (48 km) south-east of Pietersburg.

Most Boer commandos had no uniforms, and fought in their ordinary civilian attire. On long service, as the state of their clothing became progressively worse, many resorted to taking the clothes of enemy dead or captured troops. Some Boer commandos exploited the resulting potential for confusion, using the uniforms to gain a tactical advantage in battle by masquerading as British soldiers; they also blew up trains. Kitchener responded with equal ruthlessness, ordering the destruction of Boer farms and the mass internment of refugees and prisoners of war in order to deprive the commandos of their civilian support base. (As a result of this 27,000 women and children died of malnutrition and disease in the British concentration camps.) Kitchener foiled the train-wrecking by ordering the placing of Boer civilians – mostly women and children – on the front of trains.

Concentration camp in the Free State.

Although unknown to the general public, and denied by the British Army during Morant’s trial, it is evident that Kitchener did in fact issue an order to the effect that British and colonial troops were to shoot any Boer commandos they encountered who were dressed in khaki. This secret order, allegedly confirmed in a cipher telegram sent by Kitchener to Lord Roberts, the British Secretary of War, on 3 November 1901, was to be Morant’s undoing.

Morant’s unit was very successful in eliminating roving bands of enemy commandos from their area, forcing the Boers to transfer their activities to the Bandolier Kop area, on the northern fringe of the Spelonken. In response, the BVC moved north under the command of British Captain James Huntley Robertson and established a command post in a farmhouse about 90 miles (140 km) north of Pietersburg, which they renamed Fort Edward.

Burning a Boer homestead

The other ranking officer at the fort was Captain Alfred Taylor , a special officer with the Army’s Intelligence Department. He had been selected and sent to Spelonken by Kitchener himself because of his knowledge of “the natives”. In his book, Witton wrote that as far as the Africans were concerned:“ “…(Taylor) had a free hand and the power of life and death; he was known and feared by them from the Zambesi to the Spelonken, and was called by them ‘Bulala’, which means to kill, to slay.”

Captain Alfred Taylor (1862-1941)

Taylor had the power to order out patrols and, according to Witton, it was generally understood that Taylor was the commander at Spelonken, and that Taylor admitted as much in evidence at the court-martial. Taylor was, as Bleszynski notes, implicated in some of the killings in the case, yet was acquitted of all charges. His role is one of the most problematic aspects of the case.

By all accounts, Captain Robertson had great difficulty in maintaining discipline, and some of his troops ran wild — they looted a rum convoy, kept seized Boer livestock for themselves, and appropriated liquor and stills from the Boer farms they raided. According to George Witton’s account, the situation was bordering on mutiny by mid-year.

On 2 July 1901, Captain Taylor received word of a disturbing incident; a few days earlier, a group of six Boers had approached the fort, apparently intending to surrender, but they were intercepted by a British patrol led by Sergeant Major Morrison, and on his orders they were all disarmed, taken prisoner, and subsequently shot dead.

When this news reached Pietersburg, the Fort Edward detachment was recalled; after an enquiry, Robertson and Morrison were allowed to resign unconditionally. His squadron was replaced by a new one under the command of Captain Hunt and it included Lieutenants Morant, Handcock and Witton.

The exact sequence and nature of the events leading up to Morant’s arrest and trial are still disputed, and accounts vary considerably. While it seems clear that some members of the BVC were responsible for shooting Boer prisoners-of-war and others, the precise circumstances of these killings and the identities of those responsible will probably never be known for certain. The following account is drawn mainly from the only surviving eyewitness source, and the 1907 book Scapegoats of the Empire by Lieutenant George Witton, one of the three Australians sentenced to death for the alleged murders and the only one to escape execution.

With Hunt now commanding the detachment at Fort Edwards, discipline was immediately re-imposed by Lieutenant Morant and Lieutenant Handcock, but this was resisted by some. In one incident, several members of a supply convoy led by Lieutenant Picton looted the rum it was carrying, resulting in their arrest for insubordination and for threatening to shoot Picton. They escaped to Pietersburg, but Captain Hunt sent a report to Colonel Lenehan, who had them detained. When the matter was brought before Colonel Hall, the commandant of Pietersburg, he ordered the offenders to be discharged from the regiment and released. In his book, Witton explicitly accused these disaffected troopers of being responsible for “the monstrous and extravagant reports about the BVC which appeared later in the English and colonial press.”

Back at Fort Edward, the seized livestock was collected and handed over to the proper authorities and the stills were broken up, but according to Witton, these actions were resented by the perpetrators, and as a result Morant and Handcock were “detested” by certain members of the detachment.

Witton arrived at Fort Edwards on 3 August with Sergeant Major Hammett and 30 men, and it was at this point that he met Morant and Handcock for the first time.

The pivotal event of the Morant affair took place two days later, on the night of 5 August 1901. Captain Hunt led a 17-man patrol to a Boer farmhouse called Duivelskloof (Devil’s Gorge), about 80 miles (130 km) south of the fort, hoping to capture its owner, the Boer commando leader Veldtcornet Barend Viljoen. Hunt also had some 200 armed native African irregulars with him, and Witton claimed that although “those in authority” denied the use of African auxiliaries, they were in fact widely used and were responsible for “the most hideous atrocities”.

Hunt had been told that Viljoen had only 20 men with him. The Boers surprised the British as they approached. During the ensuing skirmish, both Barend Viljoen and his brother Jacob Viljoen were killed. Witnesses later testified that Captain Hunt was wounded in the chest while firing through the windows and Sergeant Frank Eland was killed while trying to recover his body. Witnesses later testified that Hunt was still alive when the British retreated. According to a witness and corroborated by others, Hunt, who was only wounded, was killed and mutilated, his neck broken, his face stamped upon with hob-nailed boots and his legs slashed with a knife. His body had also been stripped completely of clothes.

Captain Percy Frederick Hunt (1873-1901)

When news of Hunt’s death reached the fort, it had a profound effect on Morant; Witton said he became “like a man demented”. Morant immediately ordered every available man out on patrol, broke down while addressing the men, and ordered them to avenge the death of their captain and “give no quarter”.

Significantly, Morant did not see Hunt’s body himself; according to Witton, Morant arrived about an hour after the burial. He questioned the men about Hunt’s death and, convinced that his friend had been murdered in cold blood, he again vowed to give no quarter and take no prisoners. Witton recounted that Morant then declared that he had, on occasion, ignored Hunt’s order to this effect in the past, but that he would carry it out in the future.

The following day, after leaving a few men to guard the mission (which the Boers threatened to burn in reprisal for harbouring the British), Morant led his unit back to the Viljoen farm. It had been abandoned, so they tracked the retreating Boers all day, sighting them just on dusk. As the Australians closed in, the hot-headed Morant opened fire too early and they lost the element of surprise, so most of the Boers escaped. They did, however, capture one commando called Visser, wounded in the ankles so that he could not walk.

The next morning, as Morant and his men continued their pursuit, a native runner brought a message that the lightly manned Fort Edward was in danger of being attacked by the Boers, so Morant decided to abandon the chase.

At this point, he searched and questioned Visser and found items of British uniform, including a pair of trousers which he believed was that of Hunt’s, but was later proved to be of much older origin; he then told Witton and others that he would have Visser shot at the first opportunity. When they stopped to eat around 11 a.m. Morant again told Witton that he intended to have Visser shot, quoting orders “direct from headquarters” and citing Kitchener’s recent alleged ‘no prisoners’ proclamation. He called for a firing party, and although some of the men initially objected, Visser was made to sit down on an embankment (he could not stand), and was shot. After being shot, Visser was still alive, and Morant ordered Picton to administer a coup-de-grace with pistol shots to the head.

On the return journey to the fort, Morant’s unit stopped for the night at the store of a British trader, a Mr Hays, who was well known for his hospitality. After they left, Hays was raided by a party of Boers who looted everything he owned. When Morant and his men arrived back at Fort Edward, they learned that a convoy under Lieutenant Neel had arrived from Pietersburg the previous day, just in time to reinforce Captain Taylor against a strong Boer force that attacked the fort. During the encounter, one Carbineer was wounded and several horses were shot and it was at this time that Taylor had a native shot for refusing to give him information about the Boers’ movements. Neel and Picton then returned to Pietersburg.

Other killings followed; on 23 August, Morant led a small patrol to intercept a group of eight prisoners from Viljoen’s commando who were being brought in under guard; Morant ordered them to be taken to the side of the road and summarily shot. The South African born German missionary, Reverend Predikant C.H.D. Heese, spoke to the prisoners prior to the shooting.

About a week later, reports began to circulate that Reverend Heese had been found shot along the Pietersburg road about 15 miles (24 km) from the fort on his way to Pietersburg to report the activities of Morant and his group to the British authorities. At his later court-martial, it was proved that Morant himself had shot Heese in an effort to prevent him from disclosing the murder of the Boer prisoners-of-war, which would be alarming considering he was acquitted of this crime at that court-martial. Shortly afterwards, acting on a report that three armed Boer commandos were heading for the fort, Morant took Handcock and several other men to intercept them and after the Boers surrendered with a white flag, they were taken prisoner, disarmed and shot.

Later the same day, Major Lenehan arrived at Fort Edwards for a rare visit. Morant persuaded Lenehan to let him lead a strong patrol out to search for a small Boer unit led by Field-cornet Kelly, an Irish-Boer commando whose farm was in the district. Kelly had fought against the British in the main actions of the war, and after returning to his home he had become a commando rather than surrender.

Morant’s patrol left Fort Edward on 16 September 1901 with orders from Lenehan that Kelly and his men were to be captured and brought back alive if possible. Covering 130 miles (210 km) in a week of hard riding, they left their horses 2 miles (3.2 km) from Kelly’s laager and went the rest of the way on foot. In the early hours of the next morning, Morant’s patrol charged the laager, this time taking the Boers completely by surprise; Morant himself arrested Kelly at gunpoint at the door of his tent. A week later, they returned to Fort Edward with the Kelly party and then escorted them safely to Pietersburg. The British commandant, Colonel Hall, personally sent Morant a message congratulating him on the success of his mission, after which Morant took two weeks leave.

Then, in mid-October, the Spelonken detachment was suddenly recalled to Pietersburg and Fort Edward was abandoned until March 1902. On 24 October 1901, Colonel Hall ordered the arrest of six members of the Carbineers. Four were Australians: Major Lenehan and Lieutenants Handcock, Witton and Hannam; the other two, Captain Taylor and Lieutenant Picton, were English. When Morant returned from leave in Pietersburg, he too was arrested, although no charges were laid at the time. A Court of Enquiry into the affairs of the Bushveldt Carbineers followed. The War Office subsequently stated that on 8 October 1901, some members of the BVC who had been discharged at Pietersburg on the expiration of their service had reported the irregular actions of the officers at Fort Edward over the preceding months.

From left, Breaker Morant and Peter Handcock were killed by firing squad; George Witton was given a life sentence

The men were held in solitary confinement within the garrison, in spite of vigorous protests by Lenehan; he even wrote directly to Kitchener to ask that he be allowed to inform the Australian government of his position, but Kitchener ignored the request. Meanwhile, the Court of Enquiry held daily hearings, taking evidence from witnesses about the conduct of the BVC. Two weeks later, the prisoners were finally informed of the charges against them; in December, they were again brought before the panel and told that they were to be tried by court-martial. Curiously, in the cases of Hannam and Sergeant Major Hammett, the panel found that there were no charges to answer.

On hearing of the arrests, Kitchener’s Chief of Police, Provost Marshall Robert Poore remarked in his diary, “… if they had wanted to shoot Boers they should not have taken them prisoner first” — a view later ruefully echoed in his book by George Witton. While it is certain that Morant and others did kill some prisoners, their real “mistake” in terms of their court-martial was that they killed the Boers after having captured and disarmed them after they surrendered with a white flag. As Poore noted in his diary, had they shot them before they surrendered, the repercussions might well have been considerably less serious, since they could have claimed (truthfully or otherwise) that they had been killed in battle, rather than murdered after being taken prisoner.

Ominously, just before the court-martial, Colonel Hall was suddenly removed from his post at Pietersburg and transferred to India. The BVC were disbanded and replaced by a new regiment called the Pietersburg Light Horse. On 15 January 1902, the accused were finally given copies of the charges against them and informed that they would be defended by Major James Francis Thomas (1861–1942), who in civilian life had been a solicitor in Tenterfield, New South Wales. The court-martial began the following day.

The court-martial of Morant and his co-accused began on 16 January 1902 and was conducted in several stages. Two main hearings were conducted at Pietersburg in relatively relaxed conditions; one concerned the shooting of Visser, the other the ‘Eight Boers’ case. A large number of depositions by members of the BVC were made, giving damning evidence against the accused. For example, a Trooper Thompson stated that, on the morning of the 23rd (1901), he saw a party of soldiers with eight Boers: “Morant gave orders, and the prisoners were taken off the road and shot, Handcock killing two with his revolver. Morant later told me that we had to play into his hands, or else they would know what to expect.” A Corporal Sharp said that he “would walk 100 miles barefoot to serve in a firing squad to shoot Morant and Handcock.”

Soon after the second hearing, the prisoners were suddenly thrown in irons, taken to Pretoria under heavy guard and tried on the third main count, the killing of Reverend Heese. Although acquitted of killing Reverend Heese, Morant and his co-accused were quickly sentenced to death on the other two charges. Morant and Handcock were shot within days of sentencing, while Witton’s sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by Lord Kitchener. Kitchener personally signed Morant and Handcock’s death warrants. The Field Marshal was absent on tour when the executions took place.

Lieutenant George Ramsdale Witton

During the day of 26 February, Morant and Handcock were visited by a distraught Major Thomas; Witton says that news of the impending execution had “almost driven him crazy”. Thomas then rushed off to find Kitchener and plead with him, but was informed by Colonel Kelly that the Commander-in-Chief was away and was not expected back for several days. Thomas pleaded with Kelly to have the executions stayed for a few days until he could appeal to the King, but was told that the sentences had already been referred to England — and confirmed — and that there was “not the slightest hope” of a reprieve; Morant and Handcock “must pay for what he did”.

Major James Francis Thomas (1861-1942)

When asked if he wanted to see a clergyman, Morant replied indignantly, “No! I’m a Pagan!” On hearing this, the unfortunate Handcock asked, “What’s a Pagan?” and after hearing the explanation, declared “I’m a Pagan too!” As the afternoon wore on, all the prisoners could clearly hear the sound of coffins being built in the nearby workshop. At 16:00 hours, Witton was told he would be leaving for England at five the following morning.

That night, Morant, Picton, Handcock and Witton had a “last supper” together; at Morant’s request, he and Handcock were allowed to spend their last night in the same cell. Morant spent most of the night writing and then penned a final sardonic verse, which Witton quotes in its entirety.

26 February 1902 The ‘Confession’

The ‘Confession’ written on the back of photograph A05828 addressed to the Reverend Canon Fisher was written by Lieutenant (Lt) Harry Harbord Morant and signed by Morant and Lt Peter Joseph Handcock, it reads:

To the Rev. Canon Fisher, Pretoria The night before we’re shot We shot the Boers who killed and mutilated our friend (the best mate I had on Earth) Harry Harbord Morant Peter Joseph Handcock

At 05:00 hours on 27 February, Witton was taken away and was allowed to say a brief farewell to Morant and Handcock, but was only allowed to see them through the small gate in the cell door and clasped hands.

Shortly before 06:00 hours, Morant and Handcock were led out of the fort at Pretoria to be executed by a firing squad from the Cameron Highlanders. Both men refused to be blindfolded; Morant gave his cigarette case to the squad leader, and his famous last words were: “Shoot straight, you bastards! Don’t make a mess of it!”. A contemporary report (from The Argus 3 April 1902) however has his last words as “Take this thing (the blindfold) off”, and on its removal, “Be sure and make a good job of it!”. Witton wrote that he was by then at Pretoria railway station and heard the volley of shots that killed his comrades. However Poore, who attended the execution, wrote in his diary that he put Witton and Lieutenant Picton on the train that left at 17:30 hours. Thus Witton would have been several miles on the way to Cape Town when the execution occurred.

The grave of Breaker Morant (1902)

The British Army continued the cover-up of the case even after the deaths of the two men. There was no indication given beforehand that either the men or their regiment was in any kind of trouble, and due to British military censorship, reports of the trial and execution did not begin to appear in Australia until the end of March 1902. The Australian government and Lieutenant Handcock’s wife, who lived in Bathurst with their three children, only learned of Handcock and Morant’s death from the Australian newspapers weeks after their executions. After learning of his sentence, Lieutenant Witton arranged to send two telegrams, one to the Australian government representative in Pretoria and the other to a relative in Victoria, but despite assurances from the British, neither telegram was ever received.

News of the executions of Morant and Handcock caused an uproar when it reached Australia, no doubt amplified by the fact that Morant was already a well-known figure. The Morant case added fuel to the growing public resentment of the British military and British rule in general—a feeling which, a decade later, grew into a major anti-British backlash as a result of the catastrophic Gallipoli campaign, in which thousands of Australian and New Zealand troops were killed, and in the planning of which Kitchener along with Winston Churchill played an integral part. Largely as a result of the Morant case, the Australian army never again accepted British Army justice, in cases involving its soldiers.

The Australian government demanded an explanation from Kitchener who, on 5 April 1902, sent a telegram to the Australian Governor-General, and which was published completely in the Australian press. It reads as follows:
“In reply to your telegram, Morant, Handcock and Witton were charged with twenty separate murders, including one of a German missionary who had witnessed other murders. Twelve of these murders were proved. From the evidence it appears that Morant was the originator of these crimes which Handcock carried out in cold-blooded manner. The murders were committed in the wildest parts of the Transvaal, known as Spelonken, about eighty miles north of Pretoria, on four separate dates namely 02 July, 11 August, and 07 September. In one case, where eight Boer prisoners were murdered, it was alleged to have been done in a spirit of revenge for the ill treatment of one of their officers – Captain Hunt – who was killed in action. No such ill-treatment was proved. The prisoners were convicted after a most exhaustive trial, and were defended by counsel. There were, in my opinion, no extenuating circumstances. Lieutenant Witton was also convicted but I commuted the sentence to penal servitude for life, in consideration of his having been under the influence of Morant and Handcock. The proceedings have been sent home.”

News of the executions excited considerable public interest in the UK and a summary of the trial was published in The Times on 18 April 1902, but the British government announced in the House of Commons that, in keeping with normal practice, the court-martial proceedings would not be made public. The official transcripts of the court-martial reportedly disappeared soon afterwards.

The Treaty of Vereeniging ending the war was signed on 31 May 1902.

George Witton was transported to naval detention quarters England and then to Lewes prison in Sussex. Some time later he was transferred to the prison at Portland, Dorset and was released after serving twenty-eight months. His release was notified to the British House of Commons on 10 August 1904. On his release he returned to Australia and for a while lived in Lancefield, Victoria, where he wrote his controversial book about the Morant case. He published it in 1907 under the provocative title Scapegoats of the Empire. The book was reprinted in 1982 following the success of the 1980 film Breaker Morant. Witton died in Australia in 1942. The Marquis de Moral described the book as “It is mostly a garbled and untrue version of the facts. It was not worth the trouble to attempt to analyse it.”

Some years ago a short Enfield carbine surfaced in Adelaide with the words; G. R. Witton carved into the stock. The rifle matched the description of the arm mentioned by Witton in his book adding to the argument that Witton’s account of events was not a fabrication. There was a certain irony that Witton carved his name into his rifle stock, for a photo of that carving appears in an Australian book, Carvings From the Veldt, p. 94. Ironically Witton acknowledged in his 1907 account that he had shot a Boer who had tried to seize Witton’s carbine.

Alfred Taylor became a Native Commissioner in Rhodesia and a Member of Parliament and died in 1941.

The story of Morant’s life, exploits, trial and execution have been examined in several books and numerous press and internet articles, but as noted above, each account varies very considerably from the other in both the facts presented and their interpretation. There are facts intermingled with fiction.

The most important primary source, the official records of the court-martial, vanished following the trial and their location remains a mystery. A report on the case from Kitchener to the Australian Governor-General (published in the Australian press on 7 April 1902) quotes Kitchener as saying that “the proceedings have been sent home” [i.e. to England].” Whatever their actual fate, the transcripts have not been seen since the trial and evidently not even the Australian government was granted access to them.

In the ‘Afterword’ to the 1982 reprint of Witton’s book, G.A. Embleton states that:

” .. the British authorities have been approached by many researchers eager to examine the transcripts thought to be held by the War Office. Invariably these requests have been met with denials that the documents exist or pronouncements to the effect that they cannot be released until the year 2002 … It now appears that the papers never reached England … (it was) recently announced that the court-martial papers had been discovered in South Africa…”

A comprehensive record of the trial of Morant and Handcock, complete with a large number of depositions by members of the BVC and other witnesses of the deeds of Morant and Handcock, appears in Arthur Davey’s “Breaker Morant and the Bushveldt Carbineers” (Van riebeeck Society, Cape Town 1987).

In the absence of the original trial records, three primary sources remain. The first is the report of the trial printed in The Times in April 1902; the second is George Witton’s crucial first-hand account of the events of 1901–02, contained in his book Scapegoats of the Empire. The third and most recent is a revealing letter about the case, written by Witton to Major Thomas in 1929, which was kept secret at Witton’s request until 1970. In it, Witton suggests that although Handcock broke down and confessed to the crimes, he did so under duress.

Witton’s book, published five years after the trials, recounts the entire Morant affair at length, covering some 240 pages, but the chapters dealing with the court-martial are especially remarkable for their detail. Indeed, they contain so much information that is so precise — much of it apparently quoted verbatim — that there are only four possible explanations:
Witton fabricated much of the text
he possessed a photographic memory
he took notes at the trial (or compiled notes from memory very soon afterwards), or
he had access to either the trial transcript or notes taken by someone else (presumably the defence counsel, Major Thomas).

This last option is the most plausible, and the notes of Scapegoats on the Alfred Deakin Memorial Library website asserts that Witton in fact did have access to Major Thomas’ records when he wrote his book.

In spite of the fact that the book went through at least two editions and was widely reviewed at the time, this crucial source became virtually unavailable for more than 70 years, and most originals disappeared. Here too, accounts vary as to the reason for its rarity. Persistent claims suggest that the book was suppressed by the Australian government and that almost all copies were seized and destroyed. Another version claims that they were accidentally burned in a fire at the publisher’s warehouse.

Whatever the reason, the outcome was the same — until its reprint in 1982, only seven copies of the book survived, the seven advance copies originally given to Witton by his publisher (D.W Patterson of Melbourne). These were held variously by Australian public libraries and in the possession of Witton’s family. The book’s rarity clearly had a significant effect on historical writings about Morant and the Carbineers.

Witton’s first hand and primary evidence account is crucial to what is known about the Morant case, and there are legitimate questions to be asked about its veracity. One vital concern is that it was published some five years after the event, although all or parts of it may have been written earlier; while in prison. If he did not fabricate large sections of his account of the trial, the nature of the text makes it almost certain that he must have drawn on detailed written information — but he does not name the source, or whether they were his own or someone else’s notes. If they were made by another, the obvious candidate is his defence counsel, Major Thomas, and the two were known to have been in touch over many years after the case.

Witton obviously wanted to clear his name, but the question here is whether he was seeking to cover his guilt or proclaim his innocence. He was admittedly working from a position of some strength — in Australia he and his co-accused were widely believed to have been innocent — but a telling point in his favour is that he had already been pardoned and released, thanks to a campaign that was fully supported by no less a figure than the second Australian Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin.

Another factor in Witton’s favour is that there were good reasons for not reopening the debate. He wrote only five years after the events, and Kitchener was still alive, still in command of the British armed forces and still one of the most powerful men in the Empire. Witton published a highly contentious book with a highly provocative title, which explicitly accused the British Army and its Commander-In-Chief of a cover-up, of staging a show trial, and then executing two Australian soldiers on the flimsiest of evidence as a matter of political expediency. And he wrote all this at a time when publishing material that was deemed seditious or defamatory could easily land an author and/or his publisher in jail.

Witton’s book is an important primary source, albeit questioned as being inaccurate and biased, and ought be viewed as partisan. It may or may not conform to the missing official records of the trial; only their retrieval can shed light on the subject.

Wilcox claims the next important book in creating the Morant myth was Cutlack’s Breaker Morant (1962), a short book as much a cartoon version of reality as The Bulletin once presented. (Wilcox, p. 363.) Cutlack’s story, said Wilcox, was based on Witton’s Scapegoats and Frank Fox’s Breaker Morant.

The 1976 book The Australians At The Boer War by Australian writer R.L. Wallace gives a concise, and reasonably detailed account of Morant’s military career, trial and execution although it contains almost no information about Morant’s earlier life and omits a number of significant details contained in Witton’s account of the events leading up to Morant’s trial. However, Wallace was writing an overall account of the Australians role in South Africa, not the life of Morant, Handcock or Witton.

Although it is generally accepted that Morant and/or others in his regiment were responsible for the deaths of a number of Boer commandos, historical opinion is still divided over the central questions of the case — how many Boers were killed, by whom were they killed, and on whose orders? In his book, Born to Fight, Speed has photos of a number of Canadian Scouts wearing black feathers, a symbol that they would shoot any Boer captured under arms. In South Africa, Morant is regarded as having been a murderer, marauder, womaniser, and a man generally without morals or remorse. The BVC are generally regarded as war criminals, rogue soldiers and cold-blooded murderers. British historical accounts of the Boer War tend to reflect this view and typically give little space to the Morant case. They also, predictably, tend to be highly favorable towards Kitchener.

Church Square, Pretoria after the war had ended. Kitchener can be seen front right

The Thomas Pakenham (Lord Longford) book The Boer War (1979) is a major work, running to some 659 pages, yet the events of the Morant case occupy only a single paragraph — although it must be admitted that Witton’s book was not republished for another three years after that. Nonetheless, Pakenham addresses only one major question. He labels as “a misconception” the notion that there was any foreign political influence on the case — obliquely referring to the claims of German government pressure over the killing of Reverend Heese. He effectively shifts all blame for the killing of Boer prisoners onto the Australians, exonerating Kitchener of any responsibility for the outcomes of the ‘no prisoners’ policy, and ascribing to him a simpler and “cruder” motive for ordering the executions. According to Pakenham, evidence of his own army’s indiscipline drove Kitchener “wild with frustration” — clearly implying that Morant and his co-accused were simply out of control.

The 1998 biography of Kitchener by British author John Pollock likewise exemplifies the ‘Establishment’ British view. Despite the great amount of research that has been done since Pakenham’s book was published, Pollock still manages to dispatch the case in a mere two paragraphs and the names of Morant, Handcock, and Witton do not even appear in the index.

Pollock prefaces his remarks about Morant by referring to many cases in which the supposedly kind and sensitive Kitchener had commuted death sentences passed against British soldiers — clearly implying that Morant and Handcock must indeed have deserved their fate. His account of Kitchener’s visit to Australia during his world tour in 1910 conspicuously omits any mention of the highly controversial claim that Kitchener allegedly refused to officiate at the dedication of a war memorial in Peter Handcock’s home town of Bathurst, NSW unless Handcock’s name was removed from the list of names of the fallen. However this claim is spurious and the town council decided not to place Handcock’s name on the memorial. It was eventually placed on the memorial in 1964.

Pollock admits that there were ‘atrocities on both sides’ during the Boer War, but largely glosses over the very serious question of alleged British war crimes against Boer insurgents, particularly in regard to the scandal of the internment camps set up to hold Boer “refugees” — the original ‘concentration camps’ — in which over 28,000 Boers (mainly women and children) died. Although he does admit that under Kitchener’s command ‘… Boer rebels found wearing British uniforms might be shot without trial …’, he avoids stating directly that these were Kitchener’s orders — the claim central to Morant and Handcock’s defence at their court-martial.

Noting that the executions caused ‘an outcry in Australia’, Pollock briefly mentions the claims by ‘friends of Morant’ that the court-martial was ‘a farce’, and the claims that the Boers and the Rev. Heese had not been murdered, but that they had in fact been killed ‘in a raid that went wrong’. But, while he admits the case ‘remains contentious’, he ends on a decidedly pejorative note, describing the Morant story as “a fertile field for fiction and film”.

Morant’s supporters, on the other hand, argue that he and Handcock were unfairly singled out for punishment even though many other British soldiers were known to have carried out summary executions of Boer prisoners. In their view, the two Australians were made scapegoats by the British, who were intent on concealing the existence of the “take no prisoners” policy against Boer insurgents — a policy which, they claim, had been promulgated by Kitchener himself.

However, Hamish Paterson, a South African military historian and a member of the Military History Society, has pointed out that the Bushveldt Carbineers were a British Imperial unit, not an Australian one: technically, the two “Aussies” were British officers.

Australian author Nick Bleszynski is a leading proponent of the ‘scapegoat’ argument. He asserts that while Morant and the others probably committed some crimes and may well have deserved disciplinary action, there is now persuasive evidence from several sources to show that the Kitchener ‘no prisoners’ order did indeed exist, that it was widely known among both the British and Australian troops and was carried out by many disparate units. He also argues that the court-martial was fundamentally flawed in its procedures.

Bleszynski, like Witton, Denton, and Beresford, believes that Morant and Handcock were given a show trial, branded as murderous renegades and then executed as a matter of political expediency. He argues that this was done mainly to appease the Boer government and help secure a peace treaty, but also to prevent the British public from learning that, however unpalatable their actions, Morant and his men had in fact been carrying out a standing ‘no prisoners’ order that had been issued by the British commander-in-chief himself.

The graves of Morant and Handcock were left unattended for many years, but after the release of Beresford’s film it became a popular place of pilgrimage for Australian tourists. In June 1998 the Australian Government spent $1,500 refurbishing the grave site with a new concrete slab. The marble cross which stood over the grave had been vandalised, as had many other gravestones nearby.

In 2002, a group of Australians travelled to South Africa and held a service at the Pretoria graveside to commemorate the execution on the morning of the 100th anniversary. The service was also attended by the Australian High Commissioner to South Africa. The group left a new marker on the grave.

A petition to pardon Morant and Handcock was sent to Queen Elizabeth II in February 2010. The petition has been severely criticised in South Africa, specifically by descendants of the Viljoen brothers who were killed in the skirmish with Hunt and Eland, and the descendants of the family of Rev Heese.

Hamish Paterson states: “I don’t think they [the Australian supporters of a Morant pardon] have actually considered what Morant was convicted of. Let’s start off with the laws of war. If for example, we have a surrender. You want to surrender and I don’t accept your surrender, so I choose not to accept it, that I’m entitled to do. However, the situation changes dramatically once I accept your surrender, then I must remove you from the battlefield to a POW camp and keep you safe. If, for example, Kitchener said, “take no prisoners,” that was very different from “shoot prisoners!” So Morant and Handcock made two very basic errors: Once you’ve accepted the surrender, you take them to the railway line and get them shipped off to Bermuda, or wherever. At that point, the sensible thing to do was to ship them off to a POW camp. The next error was to shoot these guys in front of a neutral witness, and then you kill the witness. These are a series of terrible errors of judgement. Because they killed a German missionary, the Kaiser (became) involved. Technically, the two “Aussies” were British officers. The problem was you were dealing with an unstable set-up in the BVC . It had just been formed. I don’t see a regular Australian unit behaving that way. I rather suspect why no British guys were shot was that they were either regular army or militia, or yeomanry, all of which are very unlikely to actually shoot prisoners. I think no British were shot because they hadn’t made the mistake of shooting prisoners who’d already surrendered.”

Jim Unkles, an Australian lawyer, submitted two petitions, one to Queen Elizabeth II, and the other to the House of Representatives Petitions Committee in October 2009 to review the convictions and sentences of Morant, Handcock and Witton. The petitions were referred to the British Crown by the Australian Attorney General. A public hearing conducted by the Petitions Committee on 15 March 2010, described in part as the case for pardons as “strong and compelling”.

In November 2010 a statement from the Ministry of Defence in the UK said that the appeal had been rejected.

“After detailed historical and legal consideration, the Secretary of State has concluded that no new primary evidence has come to light which supports the petition to overturn the original courts-martial verdicts and sentences,” the statement said.

The decision was supported by Australian military historian Craig Wilcox and by South African local historian Charles Leach, while Jim Unkles continues to campaign for a judicial inquiry.

Morant's grave today

On 21 October 2011 the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported that the Australian Commonwealth Governmenr Attorney-General will officially ask the British government to revisit the trial and execution of Harry “Breaker” Morant.

Robert McClelland says he’s seen new evidence that raises serious questions about the procedural fairness of the trial of Breaker Morant and his fellow lieutenant, Peter Handcock.

Mr McClelland says that doesn’t necessarily mean he believes the Boer War soldiers weren’t responsible for the massacre of 12 prisoners in 1901.

Mr McClelland said:

My preliminary conclusion and it will be confirmed I think, by the research is that there was a denial of procedural fairness and on that basis I’ll be writing. There was a range of material, for instance in the court of enquiry which was held before the court martial, the accused weren’t provided with any legal representation. That enquiry also heard evidence that wasn’t provided to the accused.

The defence lawyer was engaged with essentially one day’s notice. The prosecution had three months and the defence lawyer was put in a conflict of interest representing all three accused rather the accused having separate representation.

The previous submissions have gone to the issue of the merits and that is the merits of shooting the prisoners and whether there was a shoot to kill order and whether they were acting on that or acting on their own behalf. This submission that I’ll be making will substantially bypass that issue and focus on the procedural defects and if a proceeding is initiated by a procedural defect then it is null and void.

Certainly there is documentation to suggest that at least they received verbal orders from a superior but I won’t be going into the merits of their conduct.

I think by today’s standards in particular, there is no way that the shooting of civilians could be justified in any circumstances but I won’t be going into that issue.

Australian Bren Gun Carrier North Africa

Posted on September 9, 2011 by muzza

Beer – the number one priority in war

Posted on June 11, 2011 by muzza

The Australian soldiers in North Africa in WW2 shown here have made their priority clear – VB is an Australian beer brand – Victoria Bitter.

Massacre at Ambon – the sacrifice of the 2/21 Bn Australian Imperial Force

Posted on May 14, 2011 by muzza

The Battle of Ambon occurred on the island of Ambon in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), on 30 January – 3 February 1942, during World War II. A Japanese invasion was resisted by Dutch and Australian forces. The chaotic and sometimes bloody fighting was followed by a series of major Japanese war crimes.

As part of the military agreement made by the governments of Australia and the NEI in 1941, AIF troops were sent to help garrison the island of Ambon, which lies just south of the larger island of Ceram. Ambon was an important air and sea link between Australia, New Guinea, and the northern NEI. The airfield at Laha, and the harbours of Ambon and Binnen Bays, were considered to be of vital significance to the Allies.

Accordingly, an Australian battalion (the 2/21st), with supporting units and a detachment of Lockheed Hudson bombers from No. 13 Squadron, RAAF, was landed at Ambon in mid-December 1941. This combined unit, known as “Gull Force”, reinforced the existing local garrison of 2,600 men, and was placed under the overall command of Dutch Lieutenant Colonel J.R.L. Kapitz.

Following intensive air attacks in late January 1942, the Hudsons were withdrawn, leaving the troops without support. The Japanese invasion on 29–30 January, supported by heavy air and sea bombardments, quickly overwhelmed the defenders, who surrendered on 3 February. The small force of about 300 men defending the airfield at Laha were summarily executed by their captors, and buried in mass graves. The fate of these men was not discovered until after the war, while the remainder of Gull Force endured a captivity so harsh that nearly 75 percent of them died before liberation.

Background

During 1941, as the Allies perceived the possibility of war with Japan, Ambon was seen to be a strategic location, because of its potential as a major air base. The Australian government and military commanders saw that it could be used in raids on northern Australia and decided to reinforce the Dutch forces on the island.

Geography

Ambon is located in the Maluku (Moluccas) islands, just south of the much larger island of Seram (Ceram). Ambon has what might be described as a “figure eight” or “hourglass” shape, and consists of two peninsulas separated by a narrow isthmus, with long narrow bays on either side of the isthmus. The key airport at Laha is in the west of the Hitu Peninsula — northern part of the island — facing the Bay of Ambon. The town of Ambon is at the opposite side of the bay, on the southern part of the island, Laitimor Peninsula.

Forces

Allies

At the outbreak of war on 8 December, Ambon was garrisoned by the 2,800-strong Molukken Brigade of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) garrison, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Kapitz and consisting of Indonesian colonial troops, under European officers. The garrison was poorly equipped and trained, partly as a result of the Netherlands having been defeated and occupied by Nazi Germany. The KNIL units were not equipped with radios and relied on landlines and written communications. They included 300 partly trained reservists.

The Australian Army’s 1,100-strong Gull Force, commanded by Lt. Col. Leonard Roach, arrived on 17 December. The force consisted of the Australian 8th Division’s 2/21st Infantry Battalion, as well as some divisional artillery and support units. Kapitz was appointed Allied commander on Ambon. Roach had visited the island before Gull Force’s deployment and requested that more artillery and machine gun units be sent from Australia.

Officers of the 2/21st Battalion take a break in Darwin before embarking for Ambon in December 1941. Many of these men later died in captivity.

On 6 January, after Dutch and British territories to the north fell to Japan, Ambon came under attack from Japanese aircraft. Roach complained about the lack of response to his suggestions, and as a result he was replaced by Lt. Col. John Scott on 14 January.

Kapitz’s headquarters was at Halong, between Paso and the town of Ambon. It included four armoured cars, an anti-aircraft machine gun detachment and four 40 mm AA guns. In the belief that the terrain on the south coast of Laitimor was too inhospitable for landings and that any attack was likely to be in the east, around the Bay of Baguala, the KNIL forces were concentrated at Paso, near the isthmus, under Major H. H. L. Tieland. There were small KNIL detachments at likely landing places in the north of Hitu.

Two companies of the 2/21st Battalion and 300 Dutch troops were at Laha airfield, under the command of Major Mark Newbury. They were accompanied by Dutch artillery: four 75 mm field artillery pieces, four 37 mm anti-tank guns, four 75 mm AA guns, four 40 mm AA guns, a AA machine gun platoon and a AA machine gun battery.

However, Lt Col. Scott, Gull Force HQ and the remainder of the Australian troops were concentrated in the western part of Laitimor Peninsula, in case of an attack from the Bay of Ambon. “A” Company of the 2/21st and one KNIL company were stationed at Eri, on the south west side of the bay. The 2/21st Battalion’s pioneer platoon was on the plateau around Mt Nona (the highest point on Laitimor), with a Dutch anti-aircraft machine gun detachment. Smaller Australian detachments were at: Latuhalat, near the south western tip of Laitimor and; at Cape Batuanjut, just north of Eri. Gull Force HQ and a strategic reserve, “D” Company, were located on a line from the Nona plateau to Amahusu beach, between Eri and the town of Ambon.

The Allies had few aircraft to spare. The KNIL Air Service sent No. 2 Flight, Group IV (2-Vl. G.IV) from Java to Laha. Of an original four Brewster Buffalos, two crashed on route to Ambon. The Royal Australian Air Force sent two flights, comprising 12 Lockheed Hudson Mk 2 light bombers, from No. 13 and No. 2 Squadrons, were deployed to the area, under Wing Commander Ernest Scott (who was not related to Lt Col. John Scott). One flight was based at Laha, and another was sent to Namlea on the neighbouring island of Buru.

The U. S. Navy’s Patrol Wing TEN, with PBY Catalinas, based at the Halong seaplane station from 23 December. Wing Headquarters moved to Java 9 January, but American PBYs mounted patrols from Halong through the 15 January air raid, and then abandoned the base as too exposed. Altogether five USN PBYs were destroyed there by air attack. The Wing’s seaplane tenders supported patrols, but left after 8 January. Tender-based patrols from WILLIAM B. PRESTON (AVD 7) and HERON (AVP 2) at anchorages further south continued until 5 February.

The Royal Netherlands Naval Air Service / Marineluchtvaartdienst flew patrols from Ambon/Halong; GVT 17 with Catalina flying boats continued from the start of war through 14 January, when they were ordered to Java.

U. S. Navy and RAAF aircraft made several very dangerous evacuation flights into Ambon/Laha in the last days of January.

Gouden Leeuw, a Royal Netherlands Navy minelayer, left Ambon in early January, after mining approaches to the island. By mid-January, Heron was the only Allied combat ship at Ambon.

Japan

A Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) task force for the invasion of Ambon, commanded by Rear Admiral Takahashi, included the aircraft carriers Hiryu and Soryu, two seaplane tenders, the heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro, the light cruiser Jintsu, 15 destroyers, five minesweepers, four submarine chasers and two patrol boats.

The Japanese ground forces were made up of about 5,300 personnel: the Ito Detachment of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), under Major General Takeo Ito, comprising the 38th Division HQ and the 228th Infantry Regiment, along with marines from the 1st Kure Special Naval Landing Force (part of the China Area Fleet), under Rear Admiral Koichiro Hatakeyama.

Laha airfield, Ambon (as seen on December 15, 1945). Site of the Laha massacre, February 1942. The airfield was the site of a stand by the Australian 2/21st Battalion and other Gull Force units, which surrendered to Japanese forces on February 3, 1942. The Bay of Ambon is in the background. In 1945, the airfield became the headquarters of the Australian 33rd Brigade.(Photographer: Staff Sergeant R. L. Stewart.)

Battle

January 30

From 6 January onwards, Ambon was attacked by Japanese aircraft.

Allied aircraft made some sorties against the approaching Japanese fleet, with little success. On 13 January, the two Buffalos, piloted by Lt Broers and Sgt Blans, attacked a flight of 10 Zero fighters. Broers’ plane was hit and caught fire, but he continued to attack until it became uncontrollable, at which point he abandoned the Buffalo, using his parachute and landed in the sea. Blans was also shot down but also managed to use his parachute, landing in trees on Ambon. Both men were rescued. Broers suffered severe burns and Blans had 17 different wounds.

The naval aviation base at Halong was soon rendered unusable by Japanese air raids, and was abandoned by the Dutch and US navies in mid-January. On 30 January, about 1,000 Japanese marines and IJA personnel landed at Hitu-lama on the north coast. Other elements of the 228th Regiment landed on the southern coast of the Laitimor Peninsula. Although the Japanese ground forces were numerically not much bigger than the Allies, the Japanese had overwhelming superiority in air support, naval and field artillery, and tanks. The remaining Allied aircraft were withdrawn that day, although RAAF ground staff remained. Within a day of the Japanese landings, the Dutch detachments in their vicinity were overrun and/or had withdrawn towards Paso. The destruction of bridges on Hitu was not carried out as ordered, hastening the Japanese advance.

There was a second wave of landings, at Hutumori in south eastern Laitimor, and at Batugong, near Paso. An Australian infantry platoon was detached to reinforce its the pioneers on Nona plateau. The defences at Paso had been designed to repel attacks from the north and west, and now faced assault from the south. A KNIL platoon was detached from Paso to resist the attack on Batugong, causing a gap in the Dutch lines. The Japanese took advantage of this, and were assisted by the failure of a KNIL telephone line.

January 31

Batugong fell in the early hours of 31 January, enabling the Japanese to encircle the eastern flank of the Passo positions. Meanwhile, Kapitz ordered the Ambonese KNIL company at Eri to take up a position at Kudamati, which appeared prone to attack.

A Map of Ambon in 1942, showing the sites of major actions and the main Japanese landings.

At noon on 31 January, Kapitz moved his headquarters from Halong to Lateri, closer to Passo. Telephone communications between Kapitz and his subordinates, including Lt Col. Scott, ceased when the Japanese cut the lines. The Japanese force which had landed at Hitu-Lama then attacked the Passo defences from the north-east. Then, in the words of the Australian official historian:
at 6 p.m. a motor-cycle with sidecar was seen on the road to the west of the Passo position showing white flags and travelling towards the Japanese. Firing on the Passo perimeter was suspended on the orders of the Dutch company commanders, and the troops were allowed to rest and eat.

It is not clear who authorised the surrender. There was no immediate response from the Japanese, and — in a meeting with company commanders — Kapitz and Tieland ordered the Dutch troops to recommence fighting. However, when Tieland and the company commanders returned to their positions, they found that their troops had been taken prisoner, and they were forced to surrender.

The first land attack on Laha occurred on the afternoon of 31 January. An Australian platoon north-east of the airfield was attacked by a stronger Japanese force, which it repelled.

Japanese forces were also approaching the town of Ambon from the south west. At about 4 p.m. on 31 January, the Japanese captured the town, including an Australian casualty clearing unit.

February 1

Several Japanese attacks were launched simultaneously on 1 February:
Kapitz and his headquarters staff were taken prisoner in the early hours. Kapitz surrendered the remaining forces in the Paso area and sent a note to Lt. Col. Scott urging him to do the same. (The message did not reach Scott for two days.), an Australian transport unit and KNIL positions at Kudamati were attacked by infantry, mountain guns in high ground were shelling a Dutch artillery battery on the coast at Benteng, which was forced to withdraw, putting further pressure on Kudamati, infantry attacked the eastern flank of Australian positions at Amahusu on Nona plateau, a foothold was established in spite of fierce Australian opposition and Japanese aircraft and naval artillery attacks on the positions at Eri.

The Australian positions were also receiving large numbers of Dutch personnel fleeing from Paso. At 10:30 p.m., Scott ordered a withdrawal of the Allied forces at Amahusu and the south west, to Eri. The position at Kudamati was effectively encircled.

February 2–3

On 2 February (some sources say 1 February), the Japanese minesweeper W-9 struck a mine laid by the Dutch minelayer Gouden Leeuw in the Bay of Ambon and sank. Two other Japanese minesweepers were also damaged by mines.

After dawn on 2 February, the main Australian force on Nona plateau, commanded by Lieutenant Bill Jinkins, was in danger of encirclement. Jinkins ordered a withdrawal to Amahusu, where he became aware that the Dutch had surrendered. Unable to ascertain the disposition of Lt Col. Scott’s force, Jinkins decided to meet senior Japanese officers under truce at the town of Ambon. They allowed him to speak to Kapitz, who wrote another note advising the Australian commander to surrender. Jinkins set off to find Lt Col. Scott.

Meanwhile, the Japanese forces attacking Laha were reinforced and a concentrated assault on the Allies began, including naval artillery, dive bombers, fighter planes and probing attacks by infantry. A Japanese night attack in high grass near the beach, between two Allied positions, was beaten back by an Australian platoon. However, a massive Japanese offensive commenced at dawn on 2 February. By 10 a.m., only about 150 Australians and several KNIL personnel were still able to fight at Laha, and Newbury ordered them to surrender.

By the morning of 3 February, the Australians around Eri were struggling to cope with increasing air and naval attacks, wounded Australians, the influx of Dutch personnel, diminishing supplies and widespread fatigue. A Japanese flag had been seen flying on the other side of the bay, at Laha. By the time Jinkins reached Lt Col. Scott, the latter had himself met the Japanese and decided to surrender. The Allied position at Kudamati was surrendered separately at midday.

Laha massacre

Allied casualties in the battle were relatively light. However, at intervals for a fortnight after the surrender, IJN personnel chose more than 300 Australian and Dutch prisoners of war at random and summarily executed them, at or near Laha airfield. This is reported to have been revenge for the sinking of the Japanese minesweeper. Those killed included W/Cdr Scott and Maj. Newbury. According to an Australian War Memorial principal historian, Dr Peter Stanley, over the following three and a half years, the surviving POWs:
…suffered an ordeal and a death rate second only to the horrors of Sandakan, first on Ambon and then after many were sent to the island of Hainan [China] late in 1942. Three-quarters of the Australians captured on Ambon died before the war’s end. Of the 582 who remained on Ambon 405 died. They died of overwork, malnutrition, disease and one of the most brutal regimes among camps in which bashings were routine.

Tan Toey Prisoner of War camp

Tan Toey

In May 1942, Brigadier A R Allen, 3rd Infantry Brigade, was appointed President of a Court of Inquiry held in Melbourne in order to ‘report and inquire on the facts and conditions associated with the landing, of Japanese forces and events subsequent … in New Britain, Timor and Ambon.

Through interviews with men who had escaped and returned to Australia, the Court discovered that the men in Gull Force had separated into two groups on the north and the south sides of the bay. The two forces were only able to communicate by boat and after the Japanese landing they operated quite independently. They had no air support after 7 January. The only survivors were from the Amboina side of the island and none of the witnesses were able to give any evidence about the men in the two companies on the north side in the vicinity of Laha airfield.

The Court concluded that although nothing definite was known about the troops in the Laha area,

“there was no evidence of any acts of terrorism or brutality practised by the Japanese against Australian troops, nor of any breaches of international law or rules of warfare committed by Japanese forces”.

[Clause (g) in the Report of the Court of Inquiry Report. AWM 54 Item 229/1/7 Part 1]

Three years later when Australian troops reoccupied Ambon in September 1945, they discovered mass graves containing Australian bodies. Indonesian and Japanese witnesses supplied some details of their massacre. About 300 of those men who surrendered at Laha airfield on Ambon were killed in four separate massacres around the airfield. They were bayoneted, clubbed to death or beheaded. Not one of them survived.

In 1946, incidents which followed the fall of Ambon became the subject of one of the largest ever war crimes trials: 93 Japanese personnel were tried by an Australian military tribunal at Ambon. R. Adm Hatakeyama was found to have ordered the Laha massacres, however he died before he could be tried. Commander Kunito Hatakeyama, who was in direct command of the massacres, was sentenced to execution by hanging. Lieutenant Kenichi Nakagawa was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Three other Japanese officers were executed for mistreatment of POWs and/or civilians on other occasions, during 1942–45. (The trials were the basis for the feature film Blood Oath, released in 1990.)

General Ito was sentenced to death that same year for war crimes committed in other parts of the Pacific.

Most of the men captured at Laha had their hands bound before execution. This signal wire was recovered from one of the bodies exhumed after the war.

One of the four mass graves in which victims of the Laha massacre were buried. After the war, the bodies were moved to the Ambon War Cemetery.

A working party of Japanese POWs excavates Australian and Dutch remains from a mass grave at Tawiri, Ambon, under the direction of the Australian War Graves Maintenance Unit, December 1945

Other subsequent events

Approximately 30 Australian soldiers, including Jinkins, escaped from Ambon, in the space of several weeks after the surrender, often by rowing prahus (canoes) to Seram.

Another result of the capture of Ambon was the realisation of Australian fears of air attacks, when Japanese planes based at Ambon took part in major air raids on Darwin, Australia on 19 February.

Gull Force Statistical Summary

Killed in Action (estimated) …………………… 54

Massacred at Laha …………………………….. 229

Executed in POW camps ……………………… 17

Killed in bombings …………………………….. 13

Killed in Chinese ambush on Hainan ………. 9

Died as prisoners on Ambon …………………. 378

Died as prisoners on Hainan ………………… 66

Missing on Hainan …………………………….. 10

Died after liberation …………………………… 3

TOTAL DEATHS …… 779

Repatriated to Australia from Hainan ……… 181

Repatriated to Australia from Ambon ………. 119

Total escapes from Ambon ………………….. 52

ORIGINAL STRENGTH OF GULL FORCE … 1131

Returning prisoners from Ambon - Morotai August 1945

Site of the Cowra Breakout, New South Wales, Australia

Posted on April 23, 2011 by muzza

Cowra

During World War II, a prisoner of war (POW) camp near the town of Cowra in New South Wales, Australia was the site of one of the largest prison escapes of the war, on 5 August 1944. At least 545 Japanese POWs were involved in the breakout.

Cowra camp

Cowra, a farming district about 200 km due west of Sydney, was the town nearest to No. 12 Prisoner of War Compound, a major POW camp, where 4,000 Axis military personnel and civilians were detained. The prisoners at Cowra also included 2,000 Italians, Koreans who had served in the Japanese military, and Indonesian civilians detained at the request of the Dutch East Indies government.

By August 1944, there were 2,223 Japanese POWs in Australia, including 544 merchant seamen. There were also 14,720 Italian prisoners, who had been captured mostly in the North African Campaign, and 1,585 Germans, mostly naval or merchant seamen.

Although the POWs were treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, relations between the Japanese POWs and the guards were poor, due largely to significant cultural differences: Japanese culture at the time regarded capture and detention as shameful and expected soldiers to die rather than accept capture.

A riot by Japanese POWs at Featherston prisoner of war camp in New Zealand, in February 1943, led to security being tightened at Cowra. Eventually several Vickers and Lewis machine guns were installed to augment the rifles carried by the members of the Australian Militia’s 22nd Garrison Battalion, which was composed mostly of old or disabled veterans or young men considered physically unfit for frontline service.

In the first week of August 1944, a tip-off from an informer at Cowra led authorities to plan a move of all Japanese POWs at Cowra, except officers and NCOs, to another camp at Hay, New South Wales, some 400 km to the west. The Japanese were notified of the move on 4 August.

In the words of historian Gavin Long, the following night:
At about 2 a.m. a Japanese ran to the camp gates and shouted what seemed to be a warning to the sentries. Then a Japanese bugle sounded. A sentry fired a warning shot. More sentries fired as three mobs of prisoners, shouting “Banzai”, began breaking through the wire, one mob on the northern side, one on the western and one on the southern. They flung themselves across the wire with the help of blankets. They were armed with knives, baseball bats, clubs studded with nails and hooks, wire stilettos and garotting cords.

The bugler, Hajime Toyoshima, had been Australia’s first Japanese prisoner of the war. Soon afterwards, most of the buildings in the Japanese compound were set on fire.

Within minutes of the start of the breakout attempt Privates Benjamin Gower Hardy and Ralph Jones (GC) manned the No. 2 Vickers machine-gun and were firing into the first wave of escapees, but they were soon overwhelmed by the sheer weight of numbers and killed. However, Private Jones managed to remove and conceal the gun’s bolt prior to his death. This rendered the gun useless, thereby preventing the prisoners from turning it against the guards.

The actions of the Japanese POWs in storming machine gun posts, armed only with improvised weapons, showed what Australian Prime Minister John Curtin later described as a “suicidal disregard of life”. Nevertheless, 359 POWs escaped. Some prisoners, rather than escaping, attempted or committed suicide, or were killed by their countrymen. Some of those who did escape committed suicide, or were killed, to avoid recapture. All those still alive were recaptured within 10 days of the breakout.

During the breakout and subsequent rounding up of POWs, four Australian soldiers and 231 Japanese soldiers died and 108 prisoners were wounded. The leaders of the breakout commanded their escapees not to attack Australian civilians, and none were killed or injured.

The findings of an official inquiry into the events were read to the Australian House of Representatives by Curtin on 8 September 1944. Among its findings were:
Conditions at the camp were in accordance with the Geneva Conventions;
No complaints regarding treatment had been made by or on behalf of the Japanese prior to the incident, which appeared to have been the result of a premeditated and concerted plan;
The actions of the Australian garrison in resisting the attack averted a greater loss of life, and firing ceased as soon as they regained control;
Many of the dead had committed suicide or been killed by other prisoners, and many of the Japanese wounded had suffered self-inflicted wounds.

Hardy and Jones were posthumously awarded the George Cross as a result of their actions.

No. 12 Camp continued to operate until the last Japanese and Italian prisoners were repatriated in 1947.

Cowra maintains a significant Japanese war cemetery, and a Japanese garden was later built, on Bellevue Hill, to commemorate these events. The garden was designed by Ken Nakajima in the style of the Edo period.

The Krait, Darling Harbour, Sydney, Australia

Posted on January 21, 2011 by muzza

The MV Krait is a wooden hulled vessel famous for its use during World War II by the Z Special Unit (Z Force) of Australia during the raid against Japanese ships anchored in Singapore Harbour. The raid was known as Operation Jaywick.

Krait was originally a Japanese fishing vessel based in Singapore called Kofuku Maru. Following the outbreak of war the ship was taken over by Allied forces and used to evacuate over 1,100 people from ships sunk along the East Coast of Sumatra. The ship eventually reached Australia via Ceylon and India in 1942 and was handed over to the Australian Military. In Australian service she was renamed Krait after the small but deadly snake.

In September 1943 Krait transported members of Z Special Unit to Singapore where they successfully raided the city’s harbour, sinking seven ships. She returned to Australia in October. Krait was used by the Australian military throughout the war and was present at the surrender of the Japanese forces on Ambon in September 1945.

Battle of Milne Bay, New Guinea 1942

Posted on December 11, 2010 by muzza

The Battle of Milne Bay (Operation RE) was a battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II. Japanese marines attacked the Australian base at Milne Bay on the eastern tip of New Guinea on 25 August 1942, and fighting continued until the Japanese retreated on 5 September 1942. However armed resistance ended on 7 September 1942. The battle was the first in the Pacific campaign in which Allied troops decisively defeated Japanese land forces, forcing them to withdraw and completely abandon their strategic objective.

: Sqn Ldr Keith “Bluey” Truscott, Commanding Officer of 76 Squadron, taxiing along Marston Matting (PSP) at Milne Bay in September 1942

: Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks bogged near Rabi, Milne Bay

The Japanese hoped to secure an air and naval base to provide air and naval support to the Japanese Kokoda Track campaign to take Port Moresby, New Guinea by capturing the newly constructed airfields at Milne Bay.

The British Field Marshal Sir William Slim, who had no part in the battle, said:
“Australian troops had, at Milne Bay in New Guinea, inflicted on the Japanese their first undoubted defeat on land. If the Australians, in conditions very like ours, had done it, so could we. Some of us may forget that of all the Allies it was the Australian soldiers who first broke the spell of the invincibility of the Japanese Army; those of us who were in Burma have cause to remember.”

Japanese forces had experienced local setbacks before: their first attack on Wake Island was thrown back, and American Marines defeated the Japanese on Guadalcanal in the Battle of the Tenaru, four days before the Battle of Milne Bay began. But unlike Milne Bay, these actions did not result in complete Japanese withdrawal and the abandonment of the military campaign.

In fact, it was elite Japanese marines, known as Kaigun Rikusentai (Special Naval Landing Forces), rather than the Imperial Japanese Army who attacked the Allied forces at Milne Bay. The Japanese high command committed approximately 850 marines from the 5th Kure Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) led by Commander Shojiro Hayashi, a company of the 5th Sasebo SNLF, led by Lieutenant Fujikawa, 10th Naval Landing Force and 2nd Air Advance Party with 350 (non-combat) personnel from the 16th Naval Construction Unit. The Japanese force was led initially by Commander Shojiro Hayashi.

The Allies, commanded by the Australian Major General Cyril Clowes, were defending three strategically-important airstrips. The soldiers were made up of the 18th Infantry Brigade of the Australian 7th Division, the 7th Brigade, a Militia formation, Companies A, C and a section of E Company of the 55th Battalion of the 14th Brigade, 9th Battery of 2/3rd Light Anti Aircraft Regiment, US 709th Anti Aircraft Battery and the 9th Battery of 2/5th Field Regiment. In addition, a portion of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 46th (General Service) Engineers Regiment, was deployed for the purpose of airfield construction.

Although the Allied forces numbered 8,824, only about 4,500 were infantry. The Japanese enjoyed a significant advantage in the form of light tanks, which the Allies had not deployed. The Japanese also had complete control of the sea during the night, allowing reinforcement and evacuation. However, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) No. 75 and 76 Squadrons, flying P-40 Kittyhawk aircraft together with No. 6′s Hudsons from No. 1 Strip at Milne Bay, which played a critical role in the fierce fighting, were largely uncontested during the day.

From 4 August 1942, Japanese aircraft began to bomb Milne Bay in preparation for the landing.

The main Japanese invasion force left Rabaul on 24 August, under the command of Rear Admiral Mitsaharu Matsuyama. The fleet comprised Light cruisers, Tenry? and Tatsuta, destroyers, Urakaze, Tanikaze and Hamakaze, transports, Nankai Maru and Kinai Maru and two submarine chasers CH-22 and CH-24.

On the 25 August, Milne Bay GHQ was alerted by an RAAF Hudson bomber near Kitava Island, of the Trobriand Islands and coastwatchers that a Japanese convoy of six escorts and three transports was approaching the Milne Bay area. HMAS Arunta and transport SS Tasman, left the Milne Bay area sailed for Port Moresby after learning of the invasion force. RAAF aircraft scrambled from No. 1 Strip and 12 RAAF P-40′s and a Hudson strafed the convoy and attempted to bomb the transports, with 250lb bombs near Rabi Island. Only limited damage was caused to the convoy and no ships were sunk. With night approaching the RAAF returned to base.

The second convoy of invasion troops, from Buna, consisting of 350 marines of 5th Sasebo SNLF, led by Commander Tsukioka, were stranded on Goodenough Island, after they rested on the island and their barges were destroyed by No. 75 Squadron RAAF P-40′s. It was intended that the second convoy land at Taupota and cross the Stirling Range and attack the rear flank of the Milne Bay defenders.

Due to the attack on the main convoy, the Japanese were forced to land further from their main objective at Rabi, near the Milne Bay airbases. At 11.30pm on 25 August, the Japanese landed 1,150 troops and two Type 95 Ha-Go tanks, at Ahioma on the northern shore of Milne Bay, eleven kilometres east of their intended landing area.

D Company, of the 61st Battalion was caught near the landing site at Ahioma, attempting to fall back to KB Mission and a small skirmish occurred. The D Company-requisitioned luggers Bronzewing and Elevala were disabled; however, the motor launch Dadosee escaped.

By dawn of 26 August, the Japanese had reached the main position of B Company of the 61st Battalion’s around KB Mission. The Japanese suffered a serious setback when their base area was heavily attacked at daylight by RAAF Kittyhawks and a Hudson aircraft, as well as US 5th Air Forces B-25s, B-26s and B-17s, killing a number of enemy troops, destroying supplies and a number of landing barges beached near the KB Mission. The destruction of the landing barges prevented their use to outflank the Australian battalions. The RAAF Kittyhawks were very close to the action, with aircraft strafing Japanese positions very shortly after taking off.

A counterattack by the 61st Battalion drove the Japanese from KB Mission; however, after six hours of intense fighting, the 61st Division withdrew to the Gama River. The 61st Battalion suffered 15 killed, 14 wounded and some missing, and the 25th Battalion, 3 killed and 2 missing.

The Australian 2/10th Infantry Battalion, was ordered to the Gama River, by Major General Cyril Clowes, and went into the offensive. However, they came upon the Japanese Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks and valiantly tried to disable them with sticky bombs, which failed to stick due to the humid conditions of the tropics. The Japanese troops and the supporting tanks inflicted severe casualties on the 2/10th Infantry Battalion, who suffered 43 killed and 26 wounded. The 2/10th Infantry Battalion was forced to retreat to north of No. 3 Strip south of Kilarbo, on 27 August 1942. No. 3 Strip was under construction by the 46th (General Service) Engineers Regiment at the time. The 25th Battalion held the Japanese back and a two day lull followed.

On 29 August, Japanese reinforcements were landed consisting of 768 men from the 3rd Kure SNLF and 5th Yokosuka SNLF, with Commander Minoru Yano, who took over from Hayashi. The warships of the convoy shelled the allied positions at Gili Gili while offloading the reinforcements. The Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks were found by an Australian forward patrol on 30 August, near Rabi bogged in the mud abandoned.

On 31 August at 3:00am, three banzai charges were repelled at No. 3 Strip with withering machine gun and mortar fire from 25th Battalion and 61st Battalion as well as the 46th (General Service) Engineers Regiment and artillery fire from the Australian 2/5th Field Regiment.

The 2/12th Battalion launched a counteroffensive at 9.00 am on 31 August and pushed the Japanese back along the north coast of Milne Bay. They were joined by the 2/9th Battalion on 3 September and faced significant strong resistance on 4 September. The advance of a section from the Australian 2/9th Battalion was held up by fire from three Japanese machine gun positions. Corporal John French ordered the other members of the section to take cover before he attacked and destroyed two of the machine guns with grenades. French then attacked the third position with his submachine gun. The Japanese firing ceased and the Australian section advanced to find that the machine gunners had been killed and that French had died in front of the third position. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions at Milne Bay.

On 5 September, the Japanese high command ordered a withdrawal. On 6 September the offensive reached the main camp of the Japanese landing force. The 2/9th Battalion had lost 30 killed and 90 wounded, the 2/12th Battalion 35 killed and 44 wounded.

Three Beaufighters of No. 30 Squadron RAAF and six Beauforts of No. 100 Squadron RAAF arrived at Milne Bay on 6 September 1942 to provide additional support against any further landings and provide anti-shipping missions. At night of the 6 September, Japanese light cruiser Tatsuta, part of the force assigned to evacuate the surviving troops after their defeat, bombarded the Gili Gili wharves and sank the MV Anshun.

On the night of the 7th further Japanese warships bombarded onshore positions. Patrols by Australian troops tracked down and killed Japanese troops trying to trek overland to Buna.

According to official figures 311 Japanese personnel were killed with 301 missing in action. The Japanese navy evacuated 1318 personnel. Of the 534 Australian casualties 161 were killed or missing in action. The U.S. forces lost 14 personnel killed and several wounded.

The Japanese committed war crimes at Milne Bay, namely the killing of surrendered prisoners of war and civilians. None of the 39 Australian troops captured by the Japanese survived. All were killed and some were mutilated as well. In addition at least 59 civilians were murdered. These events were documented by the Webb Royal Commission in Australia after the war.

The effect on the morale of all Allied servicemen in Asia and the Pacific was profound, but especially for other Australians fighting a rearguard action on the Kokoda Track, U.S. Marines simultaneously fighting the Guadalcanal Campaign and Slim’s troops in the 14th Army who had been retreating in Burma.

The battle honour Milne Bay was subsequently awarded to the Australian 9th, 25th, 61st, 2/9th, 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions.

Battle of Christmas Island

Posted on October 9, 2010 by muzza

Japanese shinto shrine and memorial Gaze Rd Christmas Island - pic nla.gov.au

Japanese wartime shinto shrine and memorial Gaze Rd Christmas Island - pic nla.gov.au

Japanese forces occupied Christmas Island, on 31 March 1942, during World War II. Because of a mutiny by Indian soldiers against their British officers, Japanese troops were able to occupy Christmas Island without any resistance. However, the United States Navy submarine Seawolf caused severe damage to the Japanese cruiser Naka.

From the outbreak of war in South East Asia in December 1941, Christmas Island was a
target for Japanese occupation because of its rich phosphate deposits. Christmas Island at the time was a British possession under administrative control of the Straits Settlement, situated 300 kilometers south of Java. It was important for two reasons: it was a perfect control post for the east Indian Ocean area; and it was an important source of phosphates, which were needed by Japanese industry.

After the occupation of Java Japanese Imperial General Headquarters issued orders for “Operation X” (The Invasion and Occupation of Christmas Island).

Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura was assigned to command the Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet’s Occupation Force, with the light cruiser Naka as his flagship. The fleet also consisted of the light cruisers Nagara and Natori, and destroyers Minegumo, Natsugumo, Amatsukaze, Hatsukaze, Satsuki, Minazuki, Fumizuki and Nagatsuki, oiler Akebono Maru and transports Kimishima Maru and Kumagawa Maru, with 850 men of the 21st, 24th Special Base Forces and the 102nd Construction Unit.

Opposing this invasion force was an old 6-inch gun brought down from Singapore after World War I, and possibly up to three anti-aircraft guns. The British garrison, a detachment of the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery, numbered 32 men, mostly Indian troops led by a British officer and four NCOs.

Naval Gun at Governor's Residence

The first attack was by a Japanese submarine that torpedoed a Norwegian vessel, the Eidsvold, loading phosphate in Flying Fish Cove. This was on 21 January 1942. The vessel drifted and eventually sank off West White Beach. 50 European and Asian staff and their families were evacuated to Perth. In late February and early March 1942, two aerial bombing raids and shelling from the sea led the District Officer to hoist the white flag. After the Japanese naval group sailed away the British officer raised the Union Jack once more. During the night of 10 – 11 March, a mutiny of the Indian troops, abetted by the Sikh policemen, led to the murder of the five British soldiers and the imprisonment of the remaining 21 Europeans.

Captain Leonard Williams was murdered by the mutineers

Indian troops, apparently believing Japanese propaganda concerning the liberation of India from British rule, mutinied and killed their sleeping British superiors on 10 March 1942, then locked up the District Officer and the few other European inhabitants of the island pending an execution that apparently was thwarted by the Japanese occupation.

Memorial to Captain Williams and the British gunners

At dawn on 31 March 1942, a dozen Japanese bombers launched the attack, destroying the radio station, which stood roughly where the post office is today. Fragments of bombs dropped were still being found into the 1980s in the Post Office Padang. Because of the mutiny, the Japanese expeditionary corps was able to disembark at Flying Fish Cove without opposition.

At 0949 the same morning, the USN submarine Seawolf fired four torpedoes at the Naka; all missed. Seawolf attacked again at 0650 the following morning, firing three torpedoes at Natori, missing again. That evening, with her final two torpedoes, from 1,100 yards (1,000 m), Seawolf managed to hit Naka on her starboard side, near her No.1 boiler. The damage was severe enough Naka had to be towed back Singapore by Natori, and eventually was forced to return to Japan for a year of repairs.

Sendai-class light cruiser Naka

On 31 March a Japanese fleet of 9 vessels arrived and the Island was surrendered. A naval brigade, phosphate engineers and 700 marines came ashore and rounded up the workforce, most of whom had fled to the jungle. Sabotaged equipment was repaired and preparations were made to resume the mining and export of phosphate.

Isolated acts of sabotage and the torpedoing of the Nissei Maru at the wharf on 17 November 1942 meant that only small amounts of phosphate were exported to Japan during the occupation. In November 1943, over 60% of the Island’s population was evacuated to Surabayan prison camps, leaving of total population of just under 500 Chinese and Malays and 15 Japanese to survive as best they could. In October 1945 HMS Rother reoccupied Christmas Island.

From Christmas Island, and other bases in the East Timor and New Guinea area, Imperial Japanese Army Mitsubishi Ki-46 “Dinah” aircraft performed reconnaissance missions over northern Australia.

Natori returned to Christmas Island and withdrew all elements of the occupation force with the exception of a twenty-man garrison detachment to Banten Bay on 3 April 1942. All that the Japanese had gained was the phosphate rock which was loaded on the transport ships.

IJn Natori

After the end of the occupation, liberating troops destroyed a Shinto shrine at which the Japanese had reportedly forced many local Muslims to worship. The Indian mutineers were prosecuted by a Military Court in Singapore and five were sentenced to death in 1947. The sentences were commuted to life imprisonment after the governments of India and Pakistan protested.

Revhead

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Category Archives: Australian Military History

The 39th Battalion Australian Imperial Force (AIF)

ANZAC – Australia’s youngest casualty

His Majesty’s Troopship Southland – an incident of the Gallipoli campaign

First Australian Imperial Force – Mutiny on the Western Front.

The 21st Battalion Australian Imperial Force

28 Battalion AIF – Unit History

Australia and New Zealand in the Great War The Australian Imperial Force -11 Battalion (RWAR) AIF

The 3rd Battalion AIF – Randwick to Hargicourt – The History of the 3rd Battalion A.I.F.

1 Battalion Australian Imperial Force – World War 1

The Dardanelles – An Epic Told in Pictures

The uncensored Dardanelles

Sandakan Death Marches

Harry Morant – “The Breaker”

Australian Bren Gun Carrier North Africa

Beer – the number one priority in war

Massacre at Ambon – the sacrifice of the 2/21 Bn Australian Imperial Force

Site of the Cowra Breakout, New South Wales, Australia

The Krait, Darling Harbour, Sydney, Australia

Battle of Milne Bay, New Guinea 1942

Battle of Christmas Island